Max Lane – On March 31, Prof. Dr. Saiful Mujani of State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta and Director of Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC) created a controversy when he asked at a large gathering of political commentators: "The only way is this: can we consolidate ourselves to bring down Prabowo, that's all."
The title of the gathering was "Before We Are Brought to Order." This was a response to a threat by President Prabowo that commentators would be "brought into order." This was followed by other comments from government officials that Indonesia had a surplus of commentators, provoking a wave of social media satire, with netizens saying there was a surplus of officials. This satire referred back to the size of the president's cabinet. The current Indonesian government under the Red and White Cabinet (Kabinet Merah Putih) features 48 ministers, 56 deputy ministers, and 10 ministerial-level officials, totalling 114 posts. This is the largest cabinet since a cabinet in 1966 that lasted only one month.
At the gathering of commentators in March, Mujani argued that Prabowo would not listen to any independent advice, so it would be better for the country to get rid of him. It was a matter of "saving Indonesia," he said. He also argued that a legal process such as impeachment through parliament was impossible. Prabowo's still-solid governing coalition has a clear majority in parliament.
Saiful Mujani's primary criticism is that President Prabowo's flagship policies are merely "pork barrel politics" – specifically designed to mobilize voters for the 2029 election rather than for genuine public welfare. In a direct post on X, Mujani explicitly labeled the following programs as "pork barrel" initiatives: Makan Bergizi Gratis (MBG), Koperasi Desa Merah Putih, Sekolah Rakyat, Danantara, and the expansion of TNI territorial areas.
Beyond his critique of specific policies, Mujani questioned President Prabowo's leadership legitimacy. He further asserted that President Prabowo is "generally incompetent and lacks authority" and is "not presidential," arguing that a true presidential leader should be inclusive, accept diverse aspirations, and act beyond partisan politics. Here he returns to the earlier statement that the president won't listen to independent advice.
Recently also, in response to the falling value of the rupiah, Mujani accused President Prabowo of creating a false social dichotomy – wealthier urban dwellers versus rural – with his statement that villagers don't use dollars.
Almost immediately after his speech, he was reported by one individual to the police as having violated Article 246 of the Indonesian Criminal Code, which forbids statements agitating for violent action against the government. This was followed by other complaints. Mujani is still being investigated by the police. Many civil rights lawyers and activists have defended him, pointing out that there was no call for violence. It should be noted that President Suharto's resignation in May 1998 occurred after peaceful demonstrations, thus setting a precedent for mobilization forcing a president out of office. During 1997 and before May 1998, the Suharto government did use violence against the movement for change, with at least 14 activists still missing, presumed murdered.
No doubt Mujani felt able to make his call given that the same kind of criticisms are clearly shared by a significant spectrum of civil society. Public intellectuals, human rights organizations, student leaders, and economic think tanks have been constantly making the same criticisms. The presence of such criticisms has probably never been so great since the 1990s. Prabowo himself has regularly publicly responded to these criticisms, stating, as noted above, "that commentators need to be brought into order." He has challenged them to put up alternative candidates in 2029.
While these criticisms are so widespread as to elicit this response from Prabowo and his ministers, it also seems to be the case that most polls show the president to have had 70-80% support, at least until this August. There appears to have been a severe divide between what in Indonesia is called "civil society" and the mass of the population. In the 1950s, before the Sukarno era of mass mobilization and then the Suharto era of authoritarianism, one of the pioneers of Indonesian studies, Professor Herbert Feith of Murdoch University in Australia, concluded that the country was divided between what he called the "political public" and the rest of the population. The political public were those who closely followed politics, studying the daily newspapers and weeklies and engaging in political discussion informed by that reading and observation. This group narrowed greatly during the 1960s and up until 1998. It can now be said to partly overlap with what is called today in Indonesia "civil society." Overwhelmingly but not entirely urban-based, civil society comprises NGOs, trade union leaderships, public intellectuals, think tanks, student leaders, and sections of the media. It is today's "political public" that follows what the civil society groups do and say, either on social media or on the many TV talk shows.
At the kampung, small-town, and village level, there appears to be less intense following of civil society's output. Most of the political organizations whose voices are continuously present at the lower level are the political parties and large religious organizations. All of the political parties are either in the current government or were in previous governments, and none have shown serious interest in taking up civil society's critiques. The large religious organizations have usually worked in tandem with all governments. Meanwhile, with the partial exception of a few unions, two separate worlds of political discourse exist, only weakly attached to each other.
However, a more recent poll shows this "satisfied enough" support has fallen to 51%, a severe drop. So while civil society's critiques do not make up the daily political diet of the kampung and small-town world, this does not mean that sector does not have its own discontents. Angry demonstrations in small towns around Indonesia in August 2025 protesting local taxes and police abuse of protesters revealed that discontent very clearly. While civil society criticism, such as Mujani's, is not systematically and widely explained at the grassroots, political satire including through every kind of meme and also music, is increasingly present on social media, and on the platforms more widely used by the kampung and small-town population.
An imbalance is developing in popular discourse and consciousness. Without BOTH critiques of national policy and without national political opposition movements, that discontent explodes spontaneously and often without any strategic outlook. In a political situation like this, when many are asked, "Are you satisfied with the government?" they may ask, "Compared to who else?" and then answer, "Yeah, OK, satisfied enough." However, a drop from 70% to 51% in "satisfied enough" responses signals that despite the lack of an alternative leadership advocating a strategy for change, the current stability may be coming under threat. If levels of dissatisfaction drop further and discontent deepens, social tensions may overflow even without a clear strategic goal.
If, however, civil society groups were to organize to take their message to the grassroots to connect with the existing discontent there, Indonesia may see a radical change in its political life as more developed opposition is sure to emerge rather than simply overflowing social tensions with no clear goal but which only threaten volatility and ungovernability but no real change.
Postscript:
On 13 August, in the wake of the wide circulation of a critique of policies in the book RESET INDONESIA and the formation by elements of civil society of a Shadow Cabinet as a policy critique mechanism, a meeting of more than 40 intellectuals and academics have published an alternative policy platform and manifesto. More on this in my next SUBSTACK, either directly or via other platforms, such as fulcrum.sg.
Source: https://maxlaneonline.substack.com/p/indonesias-changing-political-divid