Ahmad Rizky M Umar – Prabowo made his debut at the UN General Assembly with a controversial speech that implied a departure from Indonesia's long-held foreign policy on the Middle East.
Speaking confidently from the podium, Prabowo expressed Indonesia's commitment to peace in Gaza and promised to send 20,000 peacekeepers to the war-torn region. But he also unexpectedly asked world leaders to safeguard Israel's security and closed his speech with the Jewish greetings 'shalom', symbolically breaking with Indonesia's tradition of pro-Palestine solidarity.
His speech drew praise from not only United States (US) President Donald Trump, a close ally of Israel, but also Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Trump lauded Prabowo's fresh language in front of Arab and Islamic leaders, who were holding a meeting at the side of the UN General Assembly.
Later, Prabowo enthusiastically attended the peace summit at Sharm-El-Sheikh, Egypt, where he witnessed the US-brokered Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement and even talked with Trump on stage. He was also rumoured to have arranged a visit to Israel, which was quickly denied by the Foreign Ministry.
What explains this major shift, and what does it tell us about Indonesia's new foreign policy under Prabowo?
Post-ASEAN foreign policy
To begin with, Indonesia has historically maintained a low-profile approach, internationally at least, on Palestine issues.
Since Soeharto, Indonesia has consistently prioritised regional issues by positioning ASEAN as the core of Indonesia's foreign policy. This does not mean Jakarta does not engage with its Middle Eastern counterparts. It does, but has typically used regional and international organizations to do so, particularly the Organization of Islamic Conference, of which Indonesia is a leading member.
Indonesia also does not have diplomatic relations with Israel, although both countries have maintained low-key trade and security relations. In addition, Indonesia's support for Palestinian self-determination has been vehemently opposed by Israel, especially under Netanyahu.
Prabowo's Israel-friendly remark, therefore, is a radical departure not only from his predecessors' pro-Palestine stance, but also from their ASEAN-focused worldview. While Indonesia's criticisms of Israel remain unchanged, his statement marks not only a shift on Indonesia's approach to Palestine, but also a growing aspiration for a larger role in international politics.
To understand this shift, it is important to look at what Prabowo and his Gerindra party promised in their campaign manifesto. During his famous speech at CSIS Jakarta, Prabowo outlined his foreign policy approach as 'good neighbour policy'. He used the catchphrase, 'A thousand friends too few, one enemy too many'.
Gerindra Party's campaign manifesto outlines a more ambitious "post-ASEAN" foreign policy approach. It considers ASEAN an outdated and limited foreign policy framework and aspires for stronger foreign policy to safeguard national security and sovereignty beyond Indonesia's immediate region.
Indeed, Prabowo has attempted to project an image of Indonesia as a global power since winning the election. Even before inauguration he conducted more than 80 meetings with officials from 38 countries, primarily in his capacity as Defence Minister. After inauguration, he visited more countries and attended key diplomatic events abroad, in contrast to Joko Widodo's low-profile style in international politics.
Prabowo also is less enthusiastic about ASEAN. In December 2024, he sidelined a key ASEAN meeting on Myanmar. Instead he chose to attend a D-8 Summit in Cairo, along with cabinet members including Foreign Minister Sugiono, where he met leaders from the Middle East and Islamic countries.
Moreover, soon after inauguration, he sent Foreign Minister Sugiono to attend the BRICS Summit in Kazan and propose Indonesian membership, signalling an ambition to establish closer engagement with Russia and China. In fact, Indonesia became a BRICS member in 2025, the first ASEAN nation to do so.
Prabowo and Israel
Prabowo's approach to the Israel-Palestine conflict needs to be understood against this 'post-ASEAN foreign policy'.
However, there are two other factors driving his foreign policy shift on Gaza: his close engagement with Israel, even before his presidential inauguration; and his ambition to maintain close relations with US President Donald Trump.
Prabowo's close relations with Israel are an open secret. In 2022, Israel's right-wing newspaper The Jerusalem Post wrote that Prabowo had attempted to use agricultural cooperation as a vehicle for normalisation. He reportedly met with Israel's National Security Adviser Eyal Hulata and charge d'affaires in Bahrain, Itay Tagner, in his capacity as defence minister.
The election of Donald Trump gave further incentives for Prabowo's ambition to play a bigger role in international politics. Prabowo called on Trump when he visited the United States in 2024 before Trump's inauguration, with Trump praising his English language proficiency. While Prabowo did not abandon Indonesia's engagement with China, he sees opportunities to engage with Trump's new far-right alliance, which also includes Netanyahu.
However, it is still unclear if Prabowo's new foreign policy ambition will pay off. While Indonesia has gradually entered Gaza negotiating circles, its role is rather limited, with Egypt and Qatar still playing key roles, alongside the US. Prabowo's promise to send 20,000 peacekeepers is also uncertain, as Israel and Hamas were still exchanging fire in late October.
Prabowo has taken a gamble by leaving ASEAN behind to project a global role for Indonesia. But, realistically, Indonesia does not have the credibility or capability for such a role – especially as Prabowo is also seeking to spend trillions of rupiah to fund expensive populist policies such as the nutritious free meal program.
In an increasingly uncertain international order, it is possible that Prabowo's gamble may eventually pay off, with Trump recognising Indonesia as a new partner. But if he fails to deliver, it may take a serious toll on Indonesia's stature within ASEAN.