Natalie Sambhi – The leaders of Australia and Indonesia this week marked a new phase in the bilateral security relationship, announcing the substantive conclusion to the Australia- Indonesia Treaty on Common Security. It's a surprise that this treaty should come so soon after the signing last year the upgraded Defence Cooperation Agreement. At the same time, it is a natural corollary of the increasing closeness of Australia – Indonesia defence and security ties over the past decade.
While the official text has not yet been released, the new treaty is said to build upon the 2006 Australia – Indonesia Security Cooperation Agreement, known as the Lombok Treaty, and has been modelled closely on the 1995 Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS) – torn up by the Habibie administration after Australia's participation in the 1999 peace stabilisation mission in East Timor.
This new agreement commits the two neighbours to developing a shared operating picture of the security environment through regular consultations at the leader and ministerial levels – both in general and when one or both countries is under threat. The 1995 version only obliged such regular consultations at the ministerial level.
These treaties are drafted carefully to account for a range of contingencies and give each side an "out" if needed.
During a joint press conference with Indonesia's Prabowo Subianto in Sydney on Wednesday, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said the current agreement also obliged parties "to consult and consider what measures may be taken either individually or jointly" if one or both were threatened. That language is shared in other Australian agreements with the United States (known as the ANZUS Treaty), with Papua New Guinea (the Pukpuk Treaty), and in the Five Power Defence Arrangements signed with the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Singapore, and Malaysia. In contrast, this is Indonesia's first such security agreement since the AMS deal with Australia. These consultations do not oblige one party to automatically come to the military assistance of the other.
How the treaty will be operationalised in future will depend on the leaders at the time and the prevailing security environment. For instance, the ANZUS Treaty only commits Australia and the United States to consultations; however, it was invoked by then prime minister John Howard after the 9/11 attacks, which was a key reason for Australia's participation in US-led, UN-mandated military operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Future leaders might take a maximalist or minimalist interpretation, depending on the circumstances and perceived alliance obligations. These treaties are drafted carefully to account for a range of contingencies and give each side an "out" if needed, making them more acceptable to the leaders in question and to domestic audiences. One could easily imagine a situation in which Jakarta would be reluctant to join military operations with Canberra against Beijing.
Importantly, the agreement deepens trust and predictability between two neighbours that don't always see eye to eye – a necessary step if both are to manage crises and competition in an increasingly uncertain region. In addition to these consultations, there also appears to be an intent to expand cooperation between security bodies, including the military, police, and border forces, as part of "mutually beneficial security activities".
Developing this shared picture helps signal Australia's posture as firmly embedded within the region, rather than being seen as an extension of a "great and powerful friend". As Foreign Minister Penny Wong affirmed during an ABC News interview on the same day as the announcement, "we have to anchor our security in our region through a network or web of relationships" with neighbouring states. This will enable Jakarta and Canberra to have frank conversations about sensitive issues such as potential military operations concerning archipelagic waters and regional airspace.
Southeast Asian states – especially Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore – would likely view positively a key security partner further investing in a fellow ASEAN member and in the region.
Besides talking about what the treaty is, it's equally important to talk about what the treaty is not. This doesn't mean Indonesia will abandon its long-standing non-alignment, which is part of its strategic DNA. Nor is it merely an "Indonesian agreement with an AUKUS partner". While Australia is party to the AUKUS pact, the depth and complexity of the Indonesia – Australia security relationship should be appreciated on its own terms, not refracted through the narrow lens of bloc politics.
Indeed, the security agreement will sit alongside Indonesia's other partnerships and stands as an example of its "free and active" foreign policy. Photos of Prabowo wearing an HMAS Canberra cap alongside his Australian counterpart provide a visual complement to images of him alongside Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong-un during a military parade in Beijing.
Under Prabowo, Indonesia has been actively cultivating its economic and security relationships with a plurality of willing partners, including the Gulf states, Brazil, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and Canada. For instance, Jakarta and Ottawa recently signed a defence agreement that includes regular defence dialogues and cooperation on military industry.
This new security agreement with Australia shows that Indonesia remains true to its word on being "friends to all" – even if Australia is not friends with everyone in that circle.
Prabowo said his country was determined to "maintain the best of relationships in order to enhance and guarantee security for both of our countries." Australia and Indonesia have seen their share of ups and downs since Canberra's early diplomatic support for Indonesia's independence. While the future remains uncertain, both sides have now committed to facing the hard times – and navigating them – together.