Rafiqa Qurrata A'yun, Ary Hermawan and Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir – A wave of protests across Indonesia triggered by the genuine grievances of many Indonesians deprived of their right to a decent livelihood has recently devolved into violent riots that have cost the lives of at least seven innocent civilians.
The widespread unrest was sparked by the tragic death of online ride-hailing motorcycle taxi driver Affan Kurniawan, who was delivering food to a customer near a protest site in Jakarta when he was ran over and killed by a police tactical vehicle on 28 August.
In a sign of mounting public anger, protesters gathered outside the national legislature (the DPR), demanding its dissolution in response to an exorbitant new housing allowance granted to lawmakers, and provocative comments made by some celebrity lawmakers responding to criticism of their high salaries.
The killing of Affan fuelled public outrage, particularly among the motorcycle taxi driver community, who called for full accountability from the police. Dissatisfied with the authorities' response, demonstrations continued in the following days, with a growing number of protesters targeting the Jakarta Police Headquarters building.
The rally outside the DPR, the epicentre of the protest movement, was largely peaceful. However, in other locations, it escalated into violence, with protesters setting fire to local police stations, local legislative buildings and government offices.
The widespread riots soon triggered social unrest, with many individuals engaging in the looting of properties owned by celebrity parliament members, and even Finance Minister Sri Mulyani Indrawati, who they targeted because of her proposals to raise taxes.
Orchestrated violence?
While the protests were, in the most part, authentic and spontaneous public events, the violence that ensued appears to be orchestrated – or at least manipulated – by powerful factions of the oligarchic elite.
This is indicated by the fact that the riots and looting took place with little interference from Indonesian Military (TNI) members at the scene. This is reminiscent of orchestrated riots in 1998 that led to the downfall of former president Soeharto and the collapse of his New Order.
In the Kwitang area near the police's Mobile Brigade headquarters in Jakarta, some men wearing military uniforms were even filmed handing banknotes to the crowd, a rare act aimed at garnering public sympathy. The police, meanwhile, appeared lethargic in responding to the looting and were absent from any recorded footage of the events.
The weak security response to the riots in Jakarta, with the military appearing far more sympathetic to the public than the police, raises questions about the underlying circumstances at play.
Arson attacks on TransJakarta bus service and mass rapid transport stations only add to the mystery. These were carried out by unidentified perpetrators who locals say were unlikely to be protestors, suggesting this vandalism was an orchestrated rather than spontaneous event.
Given all this, the centralised nature of military and police operations, the dynamics within the leadership of these two institutions, and how they are connected to elite contests needs examination.
Mass riots and elite contests
The 1998 riots reflected a simmering conflict among the elite at the time, particularly within the military faction backing Soeharto's oligarchy, which then included Prabowo himself. Likewise, the latest incidents of mass violence across the country that have grabbed global headlines may also reflect ongoing power struggles among the major oligarchic alliances under Prabowo's presidency.
This struggle involves competing elite factions led by Prabowo, former president Joko "Jokowi" Widodo, and Megawati Soekarnoputri, matriarch of Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), the biggest political party in the DPR. Their rivalry has been, to a great extent, focused on the control of security institutions, particularly the police, who became a target of public anger following the killing of Affan.
Jokowi, who maintains strong influence within the police and, to some extent, the Attorney General's Office (AGO), remains a threat to Prabowo's presidency. Despite showing a semblance of political harmony with his predecessor, Jokowi, whose endorsement was instrumental to his landslide victory in the last presidential election, Prabowo has gradually eroded the former's influence within the state. He has even made overtures to Megawati, an ally-turned-bitter enemy of Jokowi, to further consolidate his political power.
In his most blatant attempt at undermining Jokowi's influence within the state, Prabowo pardoned two of Jokowi's main political rivals shortly after their corruption convictions – former PDI-P secretary general Hasto Kristiyanto and former trade minister Thomas 'Tom' Lembong, a close ally of former presidential candidate and enemy of Jokowi, Anies Baswedan.
The balance of power is visibly shifting, especially after Megawati publicly supported the Prabowo administration despite having no PDI-P member in the Prabowo's Red and White cabinet (though former spy chief Budi Gunawan, Megawati's closest ally, serves as Prabowo's chief security minister). With the latest riots framed mainly as a rebuke to the police, currently led by Jokowi's appointee and ally, Gen. Listyo Sigit Prabowo, speculation is rife that the riots were orchestrated – or exploited – to create a pretext to remove Listyo and so further weaken Jokowi.
This does not imply that protests are merely tools for the elite to further their political agendas. But the reality is that opportunities for instrumentalising social unrest for political purposes arise when conflicts among elites intensify.
Public anger has clearly emerged as a response to the accumulation of issues that arose under Jokowi's presidency (2014-2024) and have continued under Prabowo's rule. The controversial housing allowance policy for the lawmakers came amid the weakening of people's purchasing power, particularly among the middle class, whose number has shrunk in recent years. The gutting of post-reform institutions such as the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) by the elite, particularly under Jokowi, has also eroded public trust in the government.
Incidents of police brutality against protesters have further fuelled these grievances, leading to a wave of increasingly widespread protests and instances of unrest. That said, people's protests as an organic response to the many injustices they face are vulnerable to exploitation for political manoeuvring by elites in their contests.
What's the endgame?
Following the killing of Affan by police, calls are mounting for police chief General Listyo Sigit Prabowo to be held accountable and removed. Prabowo, however, has so far refrained from doing so, which raises important questions about whether he is willing to completely alienate his predecessor, Jokowi.
Since the beginning of his presidency, Prabowo's power has relied on alliances with other key elite figures. His success in the 2024 election can be attributed mainly to the endorsement he received from Jokowi, as he ran with Gibran Rakabuming Raka, Jokowi's son, on his ticket as vice president. Moreover, in the House of Representatives (DPR), his party, Gerindra, is only the third largest party, so Prabowo relies on a coalition to pass laws.
In his speech responding to the unrest on 31 August 2025, Prabowo was accompanied by seven party leaders, including Megawati Sukarnoputri, Bahlil Lahadalia, Surya Paloh, Muhaimin Iskandar, and Zulkifli Hasan. Also present were People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) chair, Ahmad Muzani, the DPR chair, Puan Maharani, and the Regional Representatives Council (DPD) chair, Sultan Najamuddin. The absence of Vice President Gibran was striking.
The speech was mainly made up of normative statements, lacking an apology directed at the protestors' grievances. He did quote the DPR leaders who said they will revoke certain policies, including the lawmakers' allowances, and impose a moratorium on overseas working visits, although more deliberations will be needed to finalise these decisions.
Prabowo also instructed the police to be responsible in enforcing the law, particularly when the unrest had led to what he called attempts at treason and terrorism by protesters. But there was no sign Listyo's head will roll. Instead, the next day, Prabowo visited police officers injured in the riots and asked Listyo to promote them.
With Listyo still leading the police force, Jokowi will be able to maintain his bargaining power, at least for now. This is not to say that Jokowi's influence hinges solely on Listyo's control of the police alone. But the police force, which also consists of competing factions representing different political and business interests, expanded its authorities and capabilities under Jokowi's leadership and has since forged a strong alliance with the former president. Critics have even called the police the 'Brown Party' of Jokowi, referring to the colour of their uniforms.
The stakes are therefore high for the police force. If it is seen as under the control of Jokowi, it will be a major target for Prabowo. But completely aligning with Prabowo would weaken its bargaining power. Either way, there must be some risk of the police being relegated to a subordinate position to the military, reminiscent of the way the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) was structured under Soeharto's New Order.
If the Prabowo-TNI alliance prevails, the president, a former army Special Forces (Kopassus) commander, could finally further entrench his interests within the state and use the riots as a pretext to increasingly repress dissenters by imposing martial law. Such a scenario has already been used by certain parties as a propaganda narrative to demobilise protests and ease pressure on the police, while also sowing public fear of Prabowo and the army. This narrative clearly reflects the intensifying power struggle among political elites, particularly between the Jokowi-police alliance and the Prabowo-TNI alliance.
But regardless of the outcome of the conflicts among the elite, the organic protest movement of the people must be aware of the risks of co-option by the competing elite factions. Without considering the broader context, social protests may only lead to the ousting of one faction of contending elites while allowing others to maintain control over state power – or even increase it.