Ahmad Syarif Syechbubakr – The protests across Indonesia that began on August 25 and peaked on August 31 resulted in ten deaths, at least three people reported missing, hundreds of cars destroyed, and several government buildings burned. Current discussions largely focus on the aftermath of the violence and the demands of the protesters. However, in this article, I focus on the types of the protesters and how they contributed to the violence.
To understand the anatomy of the protesters, I distinguish four groups: university students, the urban poor living in Jakarta's slums and precarious middle class, vocational high school students (STM), and infiltrators or provocateurs (penyusup). I examine how these groups participated in the protests, their motives and how they used violence as a tool.
This article also differentiates three types of violence: street violence, symbolic violence, and negotiated violence. Street violence refers to violence that occurs organically within groups, such as brawls between districts or schools, commonly known in Indonesia as tawuran. Group identity in these cases is often based on location (district) and school affiliation, rather than ethnic or social divisions.
Symbolic violence is directed at specific ethnic or social groups, with the intention of instilling fear or conveying a political message.
Negotiated violence, meanwhile, is strategically employed to compel other groups – or the government – to come to the negotiating table, ultimately leading to bargaining over interests.
These types of violence, although embedded within specific groups, are transferable. However, such transfer depends on the characteristics of each group, specifically, whether a group is predisposed to adopting a new form of violence or not.
University students and the BEM associations
University students in Indonesia have historically been among the most organised protest groups. One group with significant coordinating power is BEM SI (All-Indonesian Student Executive Board). During the August protests, BEM SI was one of the main initiators, including of the protests on August 29 after the tragic death of Affan Kurniawan, a motorcycle taxi driver.
BEM SI is not the only student actor. Other influential groups include HMI (Islamic Students Association), GMNI (Indonesian National Student Movement), and KAMMI (Indonesian Muslim Students Action Union), among others. Nonetheless, BEM SI remains a significant force due to its ability to coordinate across multiple student associations, particularly in smaller universities, and mobilise large-scale protests.
The police and government also tend to prefer coordinating with BEM SI, as it is easier to issue protest permits and manage field coordination through a centralised body.
At BEM SI's most recent congress in Padang, West Sumatra, representatives of the police, the Ministry of Youth and Sports, and the local government head were in attendance. This active involvement of political and security actors in the congress prompted student associations from the University of Indonesia, Diponegoro University, and eight other campuses to resign from BEM SI as a protest.
It is evident that BEM SI maintains direct connections with the police and government, although this does not necessarily mean they always comply with government requests. For university students, organisations like BEM SI are viewed as steppingstones into formal politics. The ability to mobilise protests in response to public frustration over government policies and actions is a form of political capital for young students. In fact, the more active and large-scale the protests they can organise, the greater their future market value to political parties.
Student organisations tend to resort to violence when excluded from the negotiation table. Common forms include burning tires and throwing rocks or bottles at the police. However, their ultimate goal is to gain an invitation to negotiate. Their primary tool is organising large-scale student protests; if this strategy fails to secure a seat at the negotiation table, they turn to violence as a secondary instrument.
Urban poor and the precarious middle class
In the months leading up to the protest, reports indicated that Indonesia's middle class was shrinking. Several indicators showed that the economic slowdown had begun to affect the performance and stability of this social group. Reports of mass layoffs also fueled Indonesia's media for the last couple of months.
At the same time, the government announced budget tightening, which directly affected national economic performance – Indonesia's economy remains heavily driven by government spending.
The urban poor in Greater Jakarta (Jabodetabek) are often involved in informal jobs, such as hawkers, manual labor, and gig jobs, especially motorcycle taxi driving, with around 1 million drivers in Jakarta and surrounding areas.
Another characteristic of the urban poor is the presence of youth, many of whom are elementary, junior high, or high school students, or simply unemployed. These youths are often involved in street brawls (tawuran antarwarga) in their neighborhoods.
The urban poor and precarious middle class are concentrated in urban slum areas, including neighborhoods near the legislature building in West Jakarta, in elite-adjacent areas of Central Jakarta, and, most prominently, in North Jakarta. For example, Affan Kurniawan's house in the Menteng area of Central Jakarta is located very close to the city's downtown office district. Some also reside in Bekasi, Depok and South Tangerang, while working in Jakarta.
Jakarta's urban structure is similar to that of other developing cities such as Rio de Janeiro or Manila, where elite neighborhoods are located side by side with slum areas. As a result, the urban poor are exposed daily to wealthier communities, and vice versa.
At first glance, this situation appears to be a source of social tension. However, evidence from the May 2019 protests, the 2024 demonstrations, and the most recent unrest shows that the urban poor have not targeted wealthy neighborhoods, at least not naturally. Instead, their anger is typically directed at the police and government buildings and vehicles.
Thus, while street brawls and violence are frequent in Jakarta, symbolic violence against other social groups or ethnic communities has not been an inherent defining feature. However, these groups are largely unorganised, often acting out of tension and anger, and they can be easily manipulated into participating in symbolic violence against ethnic or social groups.
Vocational students (STM) groups
Sekolah Teknik Menengah (STM), or vocational high school, is a government program designed to produce graduates who are ready to enter the workforce in manufacturing or other sectors. Although not designed exclusively for male students, in practice the vast majority of STM students in Greater Jakarta are male. These schools are not primarily intended to prepare students for university, although some graduates do continue their studies.
In Indonesia, STMs often carry a negative social perception: they are commonly viewed as the choice for delinquent or underperforming students, while academically strong students are expected to attend prestigious public schools or expensive private high schools.
Much like the urban poor – indeed, most STM students come from lower-income urban families – these students are often associated with street violence. School brawls frequently involve the use of knives and machetes. A widely circulated video in 2023, for example, showed brutal STM street violence in Ciracas, East Jakarta.
This group is tactically organised: they know how to launch attacks, advance toward targets, and regroup in the midst of chaos. However, their primary motive is limited to street violence. Although a video circulated on social media showed an STM student claiming they joined protests out of concern for their teachers' low salaries, there is no consistent evidence to suggest that STM students possess broader political strategies or motives.
They are also relatively easy to neutralise – sometimes with simple gestures such as offering food, drinks, or small talk from the police. Yet, much like the urban poor, they can be easily manipulated into participating in symbolic violence.
'Penyusup': infiltrators and provocateurs
Infiltrators and provocateurs have become key talking points for the government. President Prabowo has framed their actions during the protests as acts of treason and terrorism.
It is important, however, to distinguish provocateurs from vandals. Both may engage in violence, but I define 'provocateur' to mean those who deliberately select targets and initiate attacks in order to derail a protest agenda by channeling anger toward specific groups, thereby directing other actors toward targeted violent objectives.
Their operations occur primarily in the field rather than on social media. While online activity may fuel anger and resentment, it is the actors on the ground who channel these emotions into tactical action.
Identifying provocateurs is difficult, but their methods and patterns of violence can be observed. Investigations by Narasi TV into the burning of a bus station in Central Jakarta on 8 October 2020, and by Tempo magazine into the protests of 25-31 August 2025, provide important insights into how these groups operate.
Typically, provocateurs conceal their identities with hoodies and face masks, and sometimes use subtle markers – such as the color of hats or other symbols – to differentiate themselves from other protesters. Most importantly, they provide direction to otherwise confused and relatively uncoordinated crowds, steering them toward specific public infrastructure, houses, or other targets.
In the August 2025 protests, provocateurs targeted four houses in particular. On 30 August, at 1:30 a.m., Finance Minister Sri Mulyani's house in Bintaro, near South Jakarta and far from the main protest concentrations in West and Central Jakarta, was looted after crowds reportedly moved toward her residence following the sound of fireworks.
The house of Eko Patrio, a PAN Party legislator in the upscale Kuningan-Setiabudi area of South Jakarta, was also looted, although no other houses in the neighborhood were attacked. Likewise, Uya Kuya, another PAN legislator, had his house looted in Duren Sawit, East Jakarta, also a relatively wealthy area.
Perhaps most striking was the attack on Ahmad Sahroni's house in North Jakarta. Located in a predominantly low-income neighborhood, his residence stood out as one of the few elite homes in the area. The looting began in broad daylight at around 3:05 p.m., reportedly initiated by 2 or 3 individuals wearing hats who forced open the gate. Once inside, urban poor and nearby residents joined in.
What's next?
Two factors are central: organizational capacity and group motives. University students and BEM, with stronger organization and clearer political agendas, are less vulnerable to infiltration by provocateurs and often settle for bargaining opportunities such as parliamentary negotiations. By contrast, the urban poor and STM students – lacking organization and clear motives – are easily manipulated by provocateurs, as seen in the looting of the Finance Minister's residence and the homes of parliamentary members, while rarely securing meaningful political concessions.
Understanding these differences is critical for identifying group interests and the conditions under which violence escalates. For policymakers and police, this means tailoring responses: street and negotiated violence present distinct challenges compared to symbolic violence.
A key concern from the recent Indonesian riots is the targeting of private residences of legislators and technocrats – an emerging development. Historically, rioters focused on commercial areas, malls, and vehicles. Yet, influenced by Nepal's example circulating on Indonesian social media, protesters have shifted toward attacking the homes of politicians and officials. While provocateurs may be orchestrating this trend, the normalization of such targets risks making attacks on private residences a spontaneous feature of future unrest.