Max Lane – The successful registration of the Workers Party (Partai Buruh, PB) for Indonesia's 2024 parliamentary (DPR) elections attracted considerable attention among commentators and especially among Indonesia's civil society community.
Until 2024, almost all the parties in parliament could trace their origins back to the New Order period. There was additional interest in the PB phenomena because it projected itself as not only representing workers but also the full spectrum of the poor and activist civil society. Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, the non-representation of organised civil society, including unionised workers and other sectors, has been a feature of mainstream electoral politics.
The PB's vote in the 2024 elections was much lower than what was hinted as possible by a party spokesperson who claimed a constituency of 10 million. With just 972,910 votes, or 0.64 per cent of the national vote, the PB did not reach the 4 per cent threshold to win any DPR seats. It did, however, win 11 seats in some local parliaments. PB activists told the author that most of these were in West Papua, where PB's popularity was based on the profile of its leader from an earlier period, the late Mochtar Pakpahan, a Christian social democrat who had supported self-determination for West Papua. Other local seats were won in Lampung, Ambon and two in Bekasi.
The most basic explanation for this simply relates to the paltry resources available to the PB compared to all the existing parties. These parties, each with support concentrated in different geographical areas, had long been embedded in local business and elite family networks, often intertwined with religious and social organisations, for decades.
Also important was that PB's election campaign featured two controversies that revealed fundamental contradictions and a resultant deep political ambiguity, which blunted any potential for presenting PB as an alternative to the elite parties in any inspiring manner.
First, the PB was unable to take a clear stand towards the three presidential candidates. The PB stated it could support none of the candidates because they all supported the government's Job Creation Law, which was opposed by all unions because of its weakening of union rights. However, PB leaders reserved the right to change their policy if there was a run-off (which did not take place as Prabowo Subianto swept the first round). This stance gave the impression that the PB was leaving the door open to negotiations with an elite figure. PB's head, who also leads the Indonesian Trade Union Confederation (KSPI), Said Iqbal, had supported Prabowo in the two previous elections.
More crucial was PB's deafening silence on the most controversial issues of interest to exactly the civil society constituency it claimed to represent. PB campaigned against the Job Creation Law and for a "welfare state" with better social welfare provisions and wages, amongst other things. However, the most significant issues among the civil society constituency were President Joko Widodo's use of his incumbency to facilitate his ambitions for a family political dynasty, the use of cash payments and basic goods for the poor (bansos) as leverage to intimidate people, and Prabowo's impunity from prosecution regarding his alleged past human rights violations. The PB, while it may have mentioned these issues in passing in an occasional press conference, did not campaign seriously on them. Thus, PB's potential for differentiation from the existing parties was low. The campaign on a "welfare state" was also insufficient as a basis for differentiation, as all presidential candidates advocated social improvements. Prabowo, for example, promised free school lunches for children and the building of three million new cheap houses – significant incentives for Indonesia's huge working precariat.
This ambiguity was connected to the desire of PB's central figures not to alienate heavyweights such as Prabowo. Since the elections, PB's central leadership, represented by Said Iqbal, has increasingly come out in support of president-elect Prabowo. In some statements, Said Iqbal has called Prabowo a "genius" who will be able to solve the country's problems.
In May, the Political Committee (Kompol), a bloc of activists from unions and other groups in the PB, issued a statement protesting these positions. The KomPol is most closely associated with the civil society constituency, although it likewise did not prioritise campaigning on the issues of Widodo's dynasty or Prabowo's impunity – perhaps constrained by party discipline. It is also closely associated with the Indonesian United Workers Union (KPBI), whose chairperson is Ilham Syah, an activist in the People's Democratic Party (PRD) in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The statement declared that the PB should prioritise becoming an opposition to the elite and only negotiate with the elite when they accommodate workers' demands.
The second contradiction has emerged with the announcement of a new government policy – the Public Housing Savings Programme (Tapera). This has created a different contradiction and ambiguity. The policy imposes compulsory deductions of 3 per cent from all workers' income, which would go towards a fund to finance public housing. Introduced with no prior discussion with unions or civil society, it has been roundly condemned by all unions. There have been ongoing street demonstrations protesting the policy, saying the unions will also take the issue to the courts.
This creates a contradiction in that Prabowo, now supported by PB's leadership, is in the government that announced this policy. Said Iqbal has stated that, while he has not talked with Prabowo about the issue, the new government would find some other solution connected to the latter's promise to build three million new homes. Prabowo has responded to the polemic rather vaguely: "We will study, and we are looking for the best solution".
These two contradictions expose a fundamental divide within the trade union-civil society constituency concerned with how to relate to the political establishment: whether to seek alliances with elite elements or to build an opposition.
In watching how these tensions evolve, it should be noted that apart from the forces attempting to organise through PB, such as the Kompol grouping, there are also coalitions, such as the several civil society coalitions and the Labour Movement with the People (Gebrak), with members outside of PB, who will continue to play the role of a social opposition outside the electoral system. All this tension clearly exposes the ongoing absence of representation of critical civil society within Indonesia's electoral system.
[Max Lane is a Visiting Senior Fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He has been an academic at the University of Sydney, Victoria University (Melbourne), Murdoch University and the National University of Singapore and has lectured at universities in Southeast Asia, Europe and the United States.]
Source: https://fulcrum.sg/indonesias-labour-party-after-the-elections-ambiguities-continue