Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, Jakarta – Even before the new National Mandate Party (PAN) leader, Soetrisno Bachir, was elected in Semarang, Central Java, over the weekend, a close confidante of its charismatic outgoing leader Amien Rais, spoke ominously of the party's future.
"It's like a vase of flowers standing in the corner. It's nice if it's there but it really doesn't matter if it isn't".
Irrespective of its new leadership, PAN looks set to be depicted as a case study of unfilled potential in political science textbooks.
For a political organization that promised so much, it failed so miserably in fulfilling its potential. Its trajectory contrary to its proxy, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) – one started with a bang then sunk to a whimper, while the latter began humbly but is now reaching stratospheric political heights.
Unlike the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), PAN – particularly Amien Rais – recognized the need for a new leader to take the helm ahead of the 2009 election. Unfortunately, while PDI-P risks becoming tiresome by reelecting Megawati Soekarnoputri, PAN without its charismatic leader and a distinct agenda is already passe.
At its inception in 1998, PAN was the most liberal and progressive among the many parties that sprung up in post-Soeharto Indonesia. It openly advocated federalism and broad pluralism.
But it was the very things that made PAN so unique that resulted in its downfall – it was neither this nor that.
In an election where patronage played a big role to guide a confused electoral mass, PAN in the 1999 election became too secular and estranged conservative Muslim voters from Muhammadiyah, which to this day remains the backbone of party support.
Meanwhile its claim to being secular was not based on a solidly built network. It relied heavily on (somewhat pretentious) "intellectual" figures, who at the end of the day, were nothing more than media nameplates with very little real grassroots support.
In 2004, PAN shifted to a more conservative platform aimed at recapturing Muhammadiyah and Muslim voters. However this move shattered whatever mainstream credibility it had left. Even though they got more seats than in 1999, in absolute votes PAN's returns were fewer – from 7.5 million votes or 7.1 percent of total votes in 1999, to 7.3 million or 6.4 percent in 2004.
The advent of a new leadership does nothing to resolve PAN's two main challenges. The first is a clear constituency. The party, because of its ideological flip-flops, has not endeared itself to a solid block of political voters.
None of the final three leading candidates in PAN's leadership race – Soetrisno Bachir, Fuad Bawazier or Hatta Radjasa – have the mass appeal of Amien, nor can any claim to bring the backing of a solid constituency base. Neither does the new leader, or any of the final contenders for that matter, have a distinct ideological platform to build upon.
Despite the new leadership they will likely continue to rely on the charm of Amien and the loyal Muhammadiyah following.
Some have suggested that the party adopt the National Awakening Party (PKB) strategy of being declared as the de facto formal party of Nahdlatul Ulama. If PAN could do the same with Muhammadiyah it would have a solid constituency base from which to spring, albeit at the cost of alienating some secular voters.
The success of such a strategy could depend on whether Amien himself is able to recapture the Muhammadiyah organization's leadership at its congress next month. Amien is likely to face a strong challenge from Din Syamsuddin who is believed to be harboring his own political aspirations for 2009.
The second challenge is for PAN to find a new cause celebre. Amien was once the "face" of reform and PAN carried with it the banner of post-New Order Indonesia. But nowadays everyone touts reform and reformasi is a tattered symbol. It is in fact the PKS who now represent hopes for change and clean governance.
The PKS has imbued the spirit that PAN pioneered but could never manifest. Consequently, many of the young, urban middle-class Muslim voters, which PAN was one confident of as followers, have clearly switched allegiance to the more dynamic PKS.
They say the first step toward curing any problem is to admit that the problem exists. In this respect PAN has done well to reduce its dependence on an aging figure, which many young voters in 2009 may no longer identify with.
The task now is to clearly define who and what PAN is. If it can do so it has a strong identity and constitutional footing heading into 2009. At the very least then, by the next election, it will have a base of dedicated supporters instead of being a vase (in a shop full of china) that most people are oblivious to.