Made Supriatma – After nearly a month of mounting controversy, a group calling itself the Forum of Retired TNI Soldiers (FPP) has submitted a letter to Indonesia's Parliament and People's Consultative Assembly, urging the initiation of impeachment proceedings against Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka.
President Prabowo Subianto has signalled his readiness to listen to the concerns of the retired generals, but there are deeper undercurrents. In recent months, Prabowo has consolidated his power by sidelining former President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and inching closer to his predecessor's political rivals.
The call for Gibran's impeachment stems from concerns over his eligibility to serve as the nation's second-highest elected leader and alleged procedural flaws in the Constitutional Court ruling that allowed him to run. The forum comprises 332 retired military personnel and initially issued a petition expressing concern over the current state of the nation.
Although President Prabowo and the political elite in Jakarta do not appear to be taking the FPP movement seriously, they have not ruled out the possibility of impeaching the vice president. Prabowo has pledged to listen to the concerns of the retired generals and expressed his willingness to engage in dialogue. Jokowi, Gibran's father, has dismissed the idea of impeachment, arguing that it would be impossible since the Indonesian people elected Gibran and Prabowo on a joint ticket.
The FPP's push to impeach Gibran appears to be part of a broader effort to reduce Jokowi's lingering influence. Early in his presidency, Prabowo seemed to allow Jokowi significant influence over government affairs. Without much fanfare that would attract controversy, however, Prabowo has gradually begun to roll back many of Jokowi's signature initiatives – most notably, large-scale infrastructure projects like the new capital city, Nusantara. In their place, Prabowo is introducing his own flagship programmes, such as the sovereign wealth fund Danantara, free nutritious meals for students, food estates in Papua and other regions, the Red and White Village Cooperatives, and "People's Schools".
Eight months into his term, Prabowo is showing an approach that is distinct from Jokowi's. The latter sought to introduce laws that strengthened the government's control of the bureaucracy of local governments. Prabowo has gone a step further by showing a stronger preference for a command economy and state capitalism – an outlook he articulated in his two books, Kepemimpinan Militer (Military Leadership) and Paradoks Indonesia (Indonesian Paradox). Like Jokowi, Prabowo brought most of Indonesia's major political parties into his coalition. But in Prabowo's case, he did so arguably not to empower them but to neutralise opposition and consolidate control. Unlike Jokowi, Prabowo has been quietly building up a powerful institution, the military.
Through a steady consolidation of power, Prabowo has made significant strides in what appears to be a deliberate process of de-Jokowi-sation. This effort has also triggered a broader realignment among the political elite, with many of Jokowi's key allies gradually sidelined and replaced by figures loyal to Prabowo.
Prabowo has effectively consolidated his power, in part by weakening key state institutions. Parliament has been reduced to little more than a rubber stamp for his agenda.
At the same time, Prabowo has begun to draw closer to Megawati Soekarnoputri, chair of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) and Jokowi's chief political rival. While this rapprochement has not yet materialised into a formal alliance, Prabowo's overtures to Megawati clearly signal his intent to step out of Jokowi's shadow.
Jokowi has also found himself mired in a trivial yet persistent controversy: there have been questions raised about the authenticity of his degree from the Gadjah Mada University. Realising the damage to his image and political dynasty, Jokowi eventually took legal action.
The de-Jokowi-sation process has also involved the systematic weakening of figures once central to Jokowi's inner circle. One example is Budi Arie Setiadi, the Minister of Cooperatives and leader of the Pro-Jokowi volunteer network. He is now embroiled in a scandal after being accused of facilitating online gambling during his previous role as Minister of Communication and Information. Similarly, Erick Thohir, the Minister of State-Owned Enterprises and once a powerful figure under Jokowi, has been increasingly sidelined since the establishment of Danantara. Once seen as a potential future presidential contender, Thohir now appears to be excluded from making major policy decisions, signalling a sharp decline in his political influence.
A similar fate has fallen on Bahlil Lahadalia, the Minister of Investment and Head of the Investment Coordinating Board. Prabowo appears intent on curbing Bahlil's influence, particularly following his failure in the distribution of 3kg LPG gas canisters. Bahlil is also entangled in a nickel-mining scandal on Gag Island, near the Raja Ampat conservation area in Papua. However, sidelining Bahlil has proven more complicated than with other figures. Unlike Thohir, who lacks a formal political base, Bahlil chairs the Golkar Party – the second-largest party in Parliament after PDI-P. Jokowi played a huge part in his ascent to the party leadership, via the ousting of former chairman Airlangga Hartarto through a corruption case.
Prabowo has effectively consolidated his power, in part by weakening key state institutions. Parliament has been reduced to little more than a rubber stamp for his agenda. Given that Jokowi has retained some influence over the police and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), Prabowo has approached both with caution. The president is aware of the police's significant power and its historical rivalry with the military. The KPK, widely viewed as operating within the police's orbit, has also been left largely untouched. Instead, Prabowo has moved to strengthen the Attorney General's Office and the judiciary. He ordered the TNI Commander to provide security for prosecutors and their offices, despite these agencies already having their own internal security forces. He has pledged to raise judges' salaries, signalling his intent to shift the institutional balance of power.
The de-Jokowi-sation process has unfolded quietly, without triggering political upheaval or disturbing overall stability. Prabowo has allowed Jokowi's critics to erode his predecessor's influence, a strategy that ultimately benefits his own administration. Jokowi's influence within the government has been effectively neutralised. Gibran, while unlikely to be impeached, is likely to remain a political lame duck. Increasingly, Jokowi realises the crucial importance of having a political vehicle for his survival. This likely explains his recent move to float the idea of taking over the leadership of the Indonesian Solidarity Party by replacing his youngest son, Kaesang Pangarep. But it may be too late.
[Made Supriatma is a Visiting Fellow in the Indonesia Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Made's research focus is on Indonesian politics, civil-military relations, and ethnic/identity politics and he is also a freelance journalist.]
Source: https://fulcrum.sg/the-onset-of-de-jokowi-sation-in-indonesian-politics