The election bill passed by the parliament last week, with its demand for a 2% electoral threshold, predictably created dissatisfaction and disappointment among small political parties.

Even the promising Islamic-based Justice Party (PK), which won seven seats in the 1999 general election, branded the bill as unfair.

Article 142 states that only political parties which won at least 2% of the vote or 10 seats in the House in the 1999 election qualify for the 2004 polls.

Article 143 goes on to state that political parties failing to pass the 2% electoral threshold rule are not allowed to contest the next election unless they merge with other parties.

The new ruling aims at a process of natural selection from among the 200 minor parties that emerged from the liberalization of political parties begun under the presidency of B.J. Habibie.

More importantly, the six parties that qualify for the 2004 polls undeniably represent not only the mainstream of Indonesian politics, but also reflect the social basis of party supporters.

On 1 February 1999 Habibie proclaimed Law Number 2/1999 on political parties, which aimed to change the authoritarian system established under the Suharto regime through Law number 5/1985 which allowed government interference over the political parties.

Article 4 verse 1 of the 1999 law required parties to be founded before a notary and to be registered at the Ministry of Justice. Government approval was not required.

In consequence, 181 new political parties were registered, although only 48 qualified to compete in the 1999 elections. In that poll, six parties took the 462 seats available in the House of Representatives, with the remaining 38 seats allocated to the military and police.

The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) under Megawati Sukarnoputri, representing secular nationalism, won 153 seats. Suharto's former political base, Golkar, still demanded respect in the number two position, winning 120 seats.

The good result for Golkar established that despite the taint of its close connection with Suharto and his cronies, the party possessed a real and solid base. Golkar gained its votes from the conservative nationalists, including from among civil servants and retired military officers. It also won support from Islamic elements from the alumni of Muslim Student Association (KAHMI).

The nationalist conservatives of Golkar stated by the vote that the party continued to have relevance and that it was not merely the machine of Suharto.

Thus, in the 1999 polls Golkar became the social basis of nationalists who did not support Megawati or did not follow the ideology of her father, founding President Sukarno.

Golkar-NU links

Political analyst Enceng Sobirin from social and economic research institute LP3ES told Laksamana.Net that one factor that brought Golkar such strong support was backing from Muslim organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).

Sobirin, who is also from a NU family, NU supporters were easily mobilized by Golkar functionaries linked to NU such as Slamet Effendy Yusuf. The alliance between Golkar and NU factions had been carefully crafted throughout the Suharto era, especially under then State Secretary and Vice President Sudharmono.

Abdurrahman Wahid's National Awakening Party (PKB) won 51 seats in 1999, mainly dominating the vote in East Java province, while the United Development Party (PPP) was more successful in covering a much broader base and took 58 seats in parliament.

PKB and PPP are both largely controlled by NU figures and were rightly identified by party analyst Coen Husain Pontoh as traditionalist Muslim-leaning parties.

Though PPP chairman and now Vice President Hamzah Haz does not belong to Wahid's political inner circle within NU, former PPP secretary general Tosary Wijaya was a relative of Wahid, thus effectively playing the role of Wahid's channel to PPP. It was Tosary who was instrumental in consolidating the NU caucus in the parliament to support Wahid as president in the 1999 People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) session.

Amien Rais' National Mandate Party (PAN) presents a different story. Claiming to be pluralistic in nature, PAN is nevertheless still perceived as representing modernist Muslims, with a base among urban society and university students. This gave PAN 34 seats in the 1999 elections.

The Crescent Star Party (PBB) is more committed than PAN in declaring itself as the descendant of the former Masyumi party, and represents a modernist Muslim party committed to establishing an Islamic state. PBB won little support from mainstream modernist Muslim organizations such as Muhammadiyah, most of whose votes went to PAN.

Muhammadiyah and PAN share with PBB a commitment to the Islamic state, but tend to avoid political confrontation over the role of Islam in the organization of the state.

Little change in 40 years

Research conducted by Husain Pontoh showed that in the 1999 polls secular nationalist leaning parties gained 59.8% of votes, significantly up from there 27.4 percent in the 1955 general election (the last free election before 1999) (See Coen Husain Pontoh, Partai Politik and Konsolidasi Demokrasi, Pengalaman Tiga Pemerintahan Pasca Reformasi).

Islamic-leaning parties gained 38% percent, 5.7% more than in the 1955 polls. Socialist- and communist-leaning parties drastically decreased their share of the vote.

This research suggests that it can be argued that over the last 40 years, the loyalty of the supporters to political streams, be they secular nationalist or Islamic, essentially remain unchanged. Secondly, in the 1999 polls class politics was an unmarketable commodity in the national political mapping.

It remains unclear whether this represents disillusionment with leftist ideology following the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union or the legacy of the oppressive character of the Suharto regime against anything that smacked of communism or socialism.

The success of the big six showed that cultural solidarity is more attractive in the eyes of the ordinary people than class antagonism.

As a result, a strange coalition was inevitable among the six parties. In the process of electing the House Speaker, for instance, PDI-P and PKB joined to support PDI-P veteran politician Sutarjo Suryoguritno. Golkar, PAN, PPP, PBB and the military joined to nominate Akbar Tanjung.

This kind of tactical coalition, adds Husain Pontoh, has blurred the polarization between pro-New Order and anti-New Order groups. The tactical coalition reached its zenith in the presidential election that catapulted Abdurrahman Wahid into the national leadership.

Golkar and Islamic parties united under the Central Axis (Poros Tengah), together with Wahid's PKB, supported Wahid as president. Megawati was backed only by the members of her own party and a handful of other nationalist-leaning groups such as the Justice and Unity Party (PKP), a party splintered from Golkar.

This kind of coalition showed little consistency. PDI-P and PKB represent long-standing cultural solidarity between secular nationalists and traditionalist Muslims.

Abdurrahman Wahid thus gave the impression that he was willing to cooperate with Islamic parties that he earlier branded sectarian and exclusive.

A realignment took place In the coalition against Wahid which led to his downfall in July 2001. Except for PKB, almost all of the parties that helped to put Wahid into the presidency joined to depose him over his alleged involvement in misuse of funds from the National Logistics Agency (Bulog).

As a result of this tactical coalition which had nothing to do with cultural solidarity or class-based affiliations, Megawati replaced Wahid to become Indonesia's fifth president.

Prospects remain unclear

The prospects for the six leading under the new election bill remain unclear. The proportional and open-list system is expected by some political observers to neutralize the tendency of party politicians to get involved in the horse trading and backdoor deals.

Optimists believe that through this system legislators will be accountable to the electors, as well as to the central executive boards of their parties.

Article 84 of the bill stipulates that voters must perforate party symbols as well as candidates' names or photos on ballot papers, meaning that voters will have a far more direct relationship with legislators and vice versa.

In this setting, there would be no place for politicians without real roots in electorates, let alone corrupt politicians with no sense of accountability to the people.

In this respect, the warning signals to PDI-P given by State Minister of National Development Planning Kwik Kian Gie on Monday (17/2/03) bear comment.

Stating that PDI-P is the most corrupt party (a statement he denied a day later after a meeting with party chairwoman Megawati), Kwik warned that the party was on the brink of disarray, and would likely crumble in the next election.

Kwik reportedly told Megawati that his statement was a response to a question posed from the audience at a seminar. Denied or not, the statement caused an angry reaction from State Minister of State-Owned Enterprise Laksamana Sukardi and Manpower Minister Yakob Nuwawea.

Despite the angry reaction, Kwik is seen by analysts as having stated the truth in warning of the potential collapse of PDI-P at the next election, where its candidates will have to fight with an image of the party as a reformist element severely eroded.

Megawati, who will take part in a direct presidential election with the benefit of her personal image and her connection with founding President Sukarno, is unlikely to suffer as deeply as her party, since her reputation as a nationalist remains relatively strong.

This presents the possibility that Megawati will be re-elected as president, but with her party support in parliament decimated.

Status quo

The only problem still remaining as a result of the new election bill is that of the small parties. Their only choice now is to merge or build a new party. The Justice Party, according to chairman Hidayat Nur Wahid, apparently is preparing to build an alternative party.

Other new small parties established in 2002 such as the Bung Karno Nationalist party (PNBK), led by disenchanted former Megawati political advisor Eros Djarot; the New Indonesian Party (PIB) led by economist DR Sjahrir; and the National Democratic Party (PDK) led by former Wahid minister Ryass Rasyid, still need to be tested before the public.

The way out for these parties is to form a strategic alliance, although in practice this will not be as easy as many imagine. Social activist Agus Muldya told Laksamana.Net that an underlying deadlock facing the new and small parties is a reflection of the social movement in Indonesia as a whole.

"Be they NGOs, mass movements or political parties, their reasoning is mostly driven by issues rather than by the peoples' needs. As a result, their existence has nothing to do with objective conditions." If this interpretation is correct, the small parties are likely to stay that way, since their existence has little to do with the aspirations of voters, and therefore is likely to leave political power in the hands of the existing players.