Made Supriatma – Indonesia's Constitutional Court has dismissed a slew of lawsuits related to the country's elections in February. The ensuing calm only masks the intense horse-trading that is occurring behind the scenes.

There was much public interest in the legal disputes between the losing and winning candidates of Indonesia's presidential elections in February. This was evidenced by the substantial number of amicus curiae briefs submitted to the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, or MK). In an anticlimactic turn, the Court dismissed all the lawsuits filed by the losing candidates. This underscores deeper political undercurrents.

The two pairs of presidential/vice-presidential candidates, Anies Baswedan-Muhaimin Iskandar and Ganjar Pranowo-Mahfud MD, filed a total of 15 legal demands in court. The plaintiffs' line of attacks went along three fronts. They alleged nepotism in the candidacy of Gibran Rakabuming Raka, the running mate of Prabowo Subianto. They alleged that President Jokowi and government agencies had deployed substantial state apparatus to aid the Prabowo team. Another issue pertained to the misuse of social assistance to influence the outcome of the presidential election. Both camps demanded a rerun of the election. They sought to disqualify Gibran and exclude the Prabowo-Gibran team from the race.

In a 5-to-3 decision, the Constitutional Court dismissed all the lawsuits. Former Chief Justice Anwar Usman had recused himself due to a conflict of interest. Usman, who is Gibran's uncle and President Jokowi's brother-in-law, had previously adjudicated the case that permitted Gibran to run for vice president despite his failure to meet the minimum age requirement.

The Court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to substantiate their claims with regard to nepotism and the deployment of state apparatus during the polls. The Court also determined that the distribution of social assistance did not significantly impact the election's outcome. Consequently, the Court dismissed the call for a repeat election. This effectively upheld the results of the elections and confirmed the Prabowo-Gibran team as the victors.

The MK's decision belies more sinister machinations. In fact, there appears to be a significant shift in Indonesia's political landscape. Intriguingly, both plaintiffs accepted the Court ruling. There was a notable absence of mass turmoil during the reading of the Constitutional Court's decision. This situation starkly contrasts the events of 2019 when Prabowo's camp contested the election results in the same court, leading to violent riots in downtown Jakarta reminiscent of the May 1998 political unrest.

The unsettling calm belies the beginning of a new and intense phase of negotiations and horse-trading for power in the new government. Prabowo has expressed his intention to form a "big tent" ruling coalition. The proposal has garnered support from several political parties that were previously his opponents. However, the method of power-sharing remains unclear. Typically, power-sharing is determined by the distribution of seats among parties in the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR).

Balance of power in the DPR

Distribution of seats in the DPR-RI 2024-2029

The Forward Indonesia Coalition, composed of Gerindra, Golkar, the National Mandate Party (PAN), and the Democrat Party, currently commands 280 seats in the DPR, representing 48 per cent of the total. The coalition backs the Prabowo-Gibran's candidacy. Because of Indonesia's presidential system, they will have no obstacles to governing. However, for the sake of stability and the effective execution of the new government's agenda, a broader coalition is desired. Prabowo intends to add PDI-P to this coalition. Together, the five parties will control 67.2 per cent of DPR seats.

In addition, Nasdem and the National Awakening Party (PKB) – parties formerly aligned with Anies Baswedan's Change for Unity Coalition (KPP) – have decided to join the new government (PKB represents Nahdlatul Ulama). The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) has also expressed interest in joining the government after two terms in opposition. Notably, in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections, the Islamist party was part of Prabowo's coalition.

Prabowo's big tent strategy, however, hinges on the position of PDI-P. The party's matriarch, Megawati Soekarnoputri, has yet to declare whether her party will join the government or sit it out in the opposition. It is an open secret that the 2024 elections intensified conflicts between President Joko Widodo and PDI-P. Jokowi's political career thrived due to his association with the PDI-P. However, the president chose to align with his arch-rival, Prabowo, who in return selected his son as his running mate.

Prabowo is now torn between Megawati and Jokowi, two influential figures in Indonesian politics.

Prabowo seeks the support of Megawati and PDI-P to counterbalance Jokowi's efforts to build his dynasty. With his personal appeal, Jokowi played a significant role in Prabowo's victory, yet he lacks the organisational power of a political party. Jokowi helped to install Gibran as the vice president. He has positioned his youngest son, Kaesang Pengarep, as the leader of the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI). Bobby Nasution, the president's son-in-law, is poised to win the governor's seat in North Sumatra. Jokowi is also striving to exert control over Golkar, the country's second-largest party. He intends to get his loyalist, Bahlil Lahadalia, appointed as the chairman of Golkar at the upcoming party congress in December. Jokowi is eyeing the powerful chairmanship of Golkar's advisory council. If he succeeds on these two counts, Jokowi will solidify his status as a dominant force in Indonesian politics.

Thus far, Megawati and PDI-P have refrained from directly challenging Jokowi. The party's grassroots supporters have been instructed not to engage in street protests. PDI-P has also discreetly shelved plans for an inquiry into election fraud, a measure that could potentially lead to the impeachment of the president if evidence of government malpractice during the elections is uncovered. However, Megawati is cognisant of Prabowo's need for PDI-P's support in government to counterbalance Jokowi's influence.

In the end, the dynamics of Indonesian politics in the near future will be significantly shaped by the interactions between three power centres: Prabowo, Jokowi, and Megawati. For now, PDI-P elites are still debating whether the party should join the government. Ultimately, the decision rests with Megawati. This in turn hinges on her relationship with Jokowi.

This period of negotiations and battle for influence will significantly impact Indonesia's political stability. The silver lining is that there is a consensus among the political elite that Indonesia requires stability to pursue economic development. The hope now rests on Prabowo to uphold that consensus by forging an equitable power-sharing arrangement among the elite. At this, he needs to glean lessons from none other than Jokowi, who has demonstrated adeptness in negotiating and consolidating power.[Made Supriatma is a Visiting Fellow in the Indonesia Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Made's research focus is on Indonesian politics, civil-military relations, and ethnic/identity politics and he is also a freelance journalist.]

Source: https://fulcrum.sg/resolution-of-electoral-dispute-marks-start-of-horse-trading