Burhanuddin Muhtadi – Recent nationwide demonstrations by Indonesia's university students under the "Dark Indonesia" (#IndonesiaGelap) movement were initially provoked by the government's budget cuts, which threatened to increase tuition fees and eliminate scholarships.

These protests have since included demands for the removal of military officials from civilian positions in the bureaucracy. Last month, protesters opposed revisions to the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) bill under the #TolakRevisiUUTNI ("Reject the TNI Law Revisions") movement, alarmed by the possible resurgence of authoritarianism. Aligned with #IndonesiaGelap, a separate protest movement emerged in cyberspace under the hashtag #KaburAjaDulu ("Just Flee First"), prompted by Indonesian youth's anxiety and distrust about their own and their country's future trajectory. The movement exhorts them to migrate for work and study.

This student uprising and continued protests (albeit suspended briefly during the Eid holiday) seem to contradict credible presidential approval polls done ahead of the 100-day mark for Prabowo Subianto's administration at the end of January 2025, where they showed high approval of his performance. For instance, a Kompas national poll stated that public approval of Prabowo reached 80.9 per cent, Indikator Politik had 79.3 per cent, while the Indonesian Survey Institute had a high of 81.4 per cent.

However, even when the president had enjoyed high approval ratings, public satisfaction was not equally distributed across society. While the satisfaction of the "lower class" (defined as having low levels of education, especially those with elementary school education or no schooling) towards Prabowo reached 85.8 per cent, those with higher levels of education (that is, those who are in university or have bachelor's or postgraduate degrees) who were satisfied with the president reached 70 per cent. In other words, the surveys found a pattern of dissatisfaction among educated citizens.

For now, #IndonesiaGelap or #KaburAjaDulu may seem like minor expressions of Indonesia's middle-class rage but their political and economic impact can be potentially significant. Indonesian economist and former finance minister Chatib Basri has cited Chile as an example of middle-class anger with a major political impact. Chile excels economically, boasting the highest per capita income in Latin America and a poverty rate that dropped from 53 per cent (in 1987) to six per cent (by 2017). Its Human Development Index is the highest in Latin America. Despite this, Chilean social dissatisfaction nearly led to a revolution in October 2019. The working middle class' extreme unhappiness over a September 2019 public transit fare hike drove riots that culminated in over a million protesters. Eighteen people died.

A different example of middle-class anger was the fall of Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, whose tough policies boosted Bangladesh's economy, with its GDP increasing by about six per cent annually and per capita income climbing from US$698 in 2009 to over US$2,500 in 2023, one of the highest-growing in the region. Hasina was ousted in August 2024 by student protests, mainly over her decision to grant a 30 per cent civil service jobs quota to families of freedom fighters.

While it would be too hasty to conclude that a similar phenomenon would occur in Indonesia, the Prabowo government has attempted to respond to the public's concerns. In light of the protests, the government hastily assured the public that university fees would not increase and that scholarships would not be affected by the budget cuts.

However, the root causes of Indonesian middle-class anxiety have not been addressed. While education levels have increased along with life expectancy, when coupled with de-industrialisation, the shifting trend in available jobs has tended to be towards informal or "gig" jobs of poor quality. This has created discontent among the middle class and aspiring middle-class Indonesians, who expected to secure stable jobs upon graduating from university. However, they have been unable to find full-time employment; many are forced to take on precarious informal employment to survive. While Indonesia's last three presidents (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Joko Widodo and now Prabowo) have provided more assistance to the poor with various social protection instruments, they have arguably neglected the middle class.

At the same time, the middle class has aspirations about the importance of good public services, good governance that is free from corruption and nepotism, and other political issues. If these expectations are not met, online (social media) and in-person (street) protests become channels for middle-class dissatisfaction.

A January 2025 Indikator survey involving 1,220 respondents selected randomly from all provinces across Indonesia found a seeming anomaly: while most respondents said their necessities were pricier, the inflation rate for that month was only 0.76 per cent (and negative 0.09 per cent in February). This suggests that it is people's purchasing power that is declining, not that prices are rising. Notably, 53 per cent of respondents said their household income had not changed in the last year, while 27 per cent said it had declined. Nineteen per cent had increased income, while one per cent did not know or respond.

These results match the growing trend of decreasing savings countrywide. According to Bank Indonesia, public consumption has increased while savings have decreased. As Indonesians' spending on household necessities rises, their purchasing behaviours are defensive. For instance, the Mandiri Investment Index shows that food spending climbed from 13.9 per cent to 27.4 per cent of overall spending. Chatib Basri has said that this indicates economic weakness because lower-income earners spend more on food (as a share of income).

Middle-class anxiety could lead to uncontrolled political instability in Indonesia if the government responds to any economic downturn with insufficient finesse or insensitive gestures and continued denials. Provocative statements and inconsistent policies will create more controversy and further reduce trust. To prevent the instability seen in Chile and Bangladesh, the government of Indonesia needs to expand social protections for its middle class.

[Burhanuddin Muhtadi is a Visiting Senior Fellow in the Indonesia Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, and Senior Lecturer at Islamic State University (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah.]

Source: https://fulcrum.sg/dark-indonesia-and-the-anxiety-of-indonesian-middle-class