Airlangga Pribadi Kusman – In 1804, German composer Ludwig van Beethoven tore up the first page of his completed Eroica symphony, which he had initially dedicated to Napoleon Bonaparte – the military general who rode the ideals of the French revolution in his ascent to power and whom Beethoven portrayed in his symphony as a Prometheus figure who defied the gods (the aristocrats). He was disillusioned by the fact that Napoleon had just crowned himself emperor, betraying those revolutionary ideals.

Beethoven's disillusionment is perhaps no stranger to Indonesian pro-democracy activists who are disillusioned by former president Joko Widodo. The grief and fury of activists, artists, poets, and intellectuals erupted when their hopes of restoring the spirit of Reformasi (Reformation) were pinned on the former furniture businessman who they saw as a lean Prometheus figure, humble in appearance, taking on the gods of the oligarchy – only to betray his supporters by creating his own political dynasty.

This sentiment was echoed by the youth – especially students – who have been sounding the alarm over what they call "Dark Indonesia" (Indonesia Gelap). The Indonesia Gelap movement, led by students across the country, is a response to a myriad of problems facing the country, ranging from opposition to the government's budget-cutting programs and problematic bills to undemocratic education reform and a bloated cabinet full of vested interests.

It is safe to say that Indonesia Gelap is the legacy of Jokowi's ten years in power, which can be characterised as a period of predatory populism.

Jokowi's predatory populism

Kurt Weyland defines 'populism' as a political strategy led by a charismatic leader who cultivates a direct, unmediated relationship with a base of fervent supporters – strengthened after winning power. This kind of populism tends to view democratic regulations and systems as obstacles to consolidation of power. As a result, independent institutions are held hostage or weakened, the rule of law is undermined, and citizens' political freedoms eroded.

The strength of Jokowi's authoritarian-leaning and predatory populism lies in the relationship between the leader and an unorganised, informal base of support. In such a populist configuration, the fragility of this base is compensated by consolidating power within state institutions. Over time, this strategy erodes the separation of powers, checks and balances, and the rule of law, eventually turning the leader into a despot who overrides democratic institutions.

Crucially, Jokowi's style of populist rule must be understood in the context of Indonesia's post-New Order political economy. His populism is intricately connected to a predatory political-economic order driven by private interests. It involves orchestrating and mobilising state power via populist strategies, while engaging in socio-political battles over its control.

Instead of dismantling the entrenched power of oligarchic elites, Jokowi's populism has deepened predatory tendencies by attacking institutional reforms established after the fall of Suharto. His political strategy has aligned the accumulation of capital with business interests, populist rhetoric, and bureaucratic life – while also weakening legal structures to allow exploitation of state resources and redistribution of wealth to political allies.

The demands voiced in Indonesia Gelap are the bitter fruits of ten years of predatory populist governance. It began with undermining checks and balances and weakening institutions that oversee the executive branch. Gradually, Jokowi's alliance expanded into a supermajority across parties and parliamentary factions, reducing political oversight of the presidency.

The political consequence of this power consolidation was the ease with which controversial laws passed, often without proper democratic deliberation, such as the Omnibus Law, the Mining Law, the new IKN (Nusantara capital city) project, the accumulation of foreign debt with little public input, and the 2019 revisions to the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) Law. These consolidations of power contrasted starkly with Jokowi's grassroots slogan "Jokowi Is Us" during the 2014 presidential election, which suggested solidarity with ordinary people rather than entrenched oligarchic forces.

Competitive authoritarianism?

As Jokowi consolidated his power, his manoeuvres increasingly clashed with constitutional norms rooted in separation of powers and legal supremacy. This phase began with moves to amend the 1945 Constitution to allow a presidential term extension, supported by political elites close to Jokowi and legitimized by intellectual allies.

However, this manoeuvre was thwarted by Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) leader Megawati Soekarnoputri, who rejected the proposal. He then paired his former political rival, Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto, with his eldest son, then Solo mayor Gibran Rakabuming Raka, as presidential and vice-presidential candidates for the 2024 election. This move was facilitated by the Constitutional Court, led by Jokowi's brother-in-law, Justice Anwar Usman, who manipulated a decision by the court that delivered a rule change lowering the age limit for vice-presidential candidates – paving the way for GiThis move w [Gibran].

During the 2024 presidential election, Jokowi's populist volunteers were heavily involved in ensuring public support for the Prabowo-Gibran ticket. Volunteers who once fought for participatory democracy now found themselves absorbed into the same dynastic and oligarchic power structure they once opposed.

This phase marked a fatal blow to democratic institutions. The 2024 election fits a key feature of a competitive authoritarian regime – a system where democratic institutions exist but are exploited by those in power to retain control. Such regimes eventually lose even minimal democratic traits, with declining civil freedoms and increasingly unequal political playing fields.

Signs of competitive authoritarianism in the 2024 election included state apparatus and bureaucracy being used to maintain Jokowi's post-presidency influence. Police and welfare programs (used as political tools through social aid) benefited Jokowi-backed candidates. Police efforts to "cool tensions" during student and academic protests over presidential ethical violations included pressuring university officials to publicly oppose the grassroots dissent.

Descent into darker Indonesia

The Indonesia Gelap movement is the historical product of Jokowi's predatory populism. Jokowi's political manoeuvres that have eroded democracy over time – products of executive-legislative alignment, weakened opposition, and diminishing public participation – have culminated in policies benefiting oligarchs and creating crises in development. These include the destruction of Indigenous land rights, mounting public debt, and an austerity that burdens the people.

The concentration of power through Jokowi's political dynasty, the rise of competitive authoritarianism, and his meddling in the democratic process has dismantled civil supremacy, shattered anti-corruption institutions, and compromised the impartiality of law enforcement – all outcomes of his ten years of power consolidation.

In the midst of the Indonesia Gelap protests, Indonesia is entering a transitional crisis. The political order created by Jokowi's predatory populism is no longer trusted, while civil society groups struggle to create a democratic alternative. As Gramsci famously said, 'the old is dying and the new cannot be born'.

Source: https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/dark-indonesia-and-jokowis-legacy-of-predatory-populism