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After the honeymoon, where will President Prabowo take Indonesia? A governance perspective

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Fulcrum - February 10, 2025

Yanuar Nugroho – How have Indonesia's new president and his administration fared in its critical first 100 days?

President Prabowo Subianto's first hundred days in office have been closely watched by his supporters and critics. The first 100 days of a new administration is often called a "honeymoon phase" for incoming leaders; the Prabowo administration's transition has created mixed feelings for many. On the one hand, there is a sense of optimism for more socio-political and economic stability; on the other, there is confusion about government policy in various areas and scepticism about whether Prabowo's more ambitious political promises can be achieved.

Prabowo's early rhetoric leaned heavily on promises to extend the legacy of his predecessor Joko "Jokowi" Widodo. Prabowo's pledge to maintain key infrastructure projects, such as Nusantara Capital City (IKN) and downstreaming, signals alignment with Jokowi's economic nationalism. However, this claimed continuity is problematic: Jokowi prioritised macroeconomic growth but faced criticism for weakening democratic institutions, environmental negligence, and centralising power. If Prabowo follows Jokowi's path, he might well end up leaving Indonesia worse, not better.

Prabowo's decision to keep Jokowi's son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, as his running mate and then vice president – widely seen as transactional politics – has fuelled civil society's concerns about dynastic governance. The awkward marriage of Prabowo's militaristic past with Jokowi's technocratic populism creates stability but at the cost of democratic accountability.

All this has given birth to a bigger problem: the tricky governance of development programmes.

First, on Indonesia's development priorities, one aim that has been achieved is the relative stabilisation of the economy. This is to help Prabowo achieve eight per cent annual growth by the end of his term (in 2029), although the growth target itself is questionable. The government has managed to keep food and fuel prices stable for now. Infrastructural development continues despite significant budget cuts, with progress under Prabowo seen in the expansion of key transport networks and digital infrastructure. The expansion of social assistance, including Prabowo's much-publicised free nutritious meals (makan bergizi gratis or MBG) programme, has started to materialise but is still in "pilot project" mode with some teething issues.

Generally, current public sentiment towards Prabowo is positive. However, concerns persist regarding Indonesia's widening socioeconomic inequalities, which cannot be addressed simply by expanding social assistance. Regional disparities in development will continue to be a challenge.

Second, questions remain about how sustainable Prabowo's priority programmes will be, particularly from a fiscal perspective. For example, the budget estimates for MBG alone range from 100-150 trillion rupiah (US$6-US$9 billion) annually (with 71 trillion rupiah allocated for just 2025), while the overall budget for six social assistance programmes: MBG, the Family Hope Programme (PKH), non-cash food assistance (BPNT), Smart Indonesia Programme (PIP), rice assistance, and health insurance for the poor (JKN) increased from 496.8 trillion rupiah for 2024 to 504.7 trillion rupiah this year. This has raised the alarm that this may compromise the implementation of other government programmes, including Prabowo's priorities in infrastructure, bureaucracy reform, health, and education. Without structural tax reforms or cuts to inefficient subsidies (like for energy), this increased spending could strain Indonesia's fiscal resilience. Without fiscal consolidation, the current spending trajectory could pose significant budgetary risks in the longer term.

Third, Prabowo's appointment of some politically affiliated ministers rather than professionals has seen them being criticised early on as underperforming, lacking initiative, poor in executing programmes, or unethical. These include the minister of human rights for policy stagnation, lack of decisive action, and controversies surrounding human rights issues; the minister of cooperatives for failing to deliver on a roadmap to reform support for micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), with no clear direction on cooperative sector development; the minister of forestry for ignoring deforestation concerns, the mismanagement of conservation, and policies that prioritise economic activities over environmental sustainability; and the minister for villages and disadvantaged regions for lacking clarity in rural development strategies and abusing his official position for personal advantage.

Finally, this uneven cabinet performance has resulted in ineffective inter-ministerial collaboration, something that Prabowo himself has criticised. Although the new administration inherited the situation, there remain overlapping regulations, slow decision-making processes, misaligned budgets and priorities, and weak administrative oversight. This has hindered policy execution and reduced the effectiveness of government programmes. Several key initiatives, such as the delivery of MBG, the acceleration of industrial downstreaming, and digital transformation, have encountered bureaucratic inertia. This signals miscoordination across the cabinet, in addition to some cases of ministerial incompetence.

Given all this, as Prabowo has emphasised the need for an efficient bureaucracy to drive his ambitious policy agenda, it will not be surprising if he soon reshuffles his cabinet. Addressing the above challenges will be crucial for Prabowo to maintain public trust, ensure his agenda remains on track, and retain political support. In politics, he has pragmatically engaged with the main opposition element – the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle or PDI-P. This is even if the move complicates his relationship with Jokowi or comes at some expense of consolidating his Gerindra party's alliances within the ruling coalition.

Meanwhile, concerns remain regarding Prabowo's stance on democratic governance and civil liberties. His government's handling, thus far, of dissent and criticism, particularly in relation to recent protests on national strategic projects (PSN) and media restrictions, drew criticism from civil society groups and international watchdogs.

The first 100 days of Prabowo's administration have provided a glimpse into his priorities and governance style. They reveal a mixed performance, with a handful of notable achievements alongside troubling weaknesses in governance, coordination, and policy execution. Despite his high personal popularity, without the president swiftly correcting (or removing) underperforming ministers, public dissatisfaction with his government may grow. The following 100 days and more will be critical in determining whether President Prabowo can improve efficiency under his administration to fully deliver on his campaign promises.

[Yanuar Nugroho is Visiting Senior Fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore and Senior Lecturer at the Driyarkara School of Philosophy, Jakarta, Indonesia.]

Source: https://fulcrum.sg/after-the-honeymoon-where-will-president-prabowo-take-indonesia-a-governance-perspective

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