Sita Dewi – On 22 February 2025, President Prabowo Subianto hosted dozens of chief editors from major media organisations at his private residence in Hambalang, West Java, to discuss his administration's budget cuts and free nutritious meals program.
The six-hour meeting took place at the height of student protests and public outcry over the programs. The meeting quickly sparked criticism over the press's potential failure to serve as an effective watchdog, as well as concerns about its politicisation.
The public reaction to the meeting reflects growing concerns about press independence under Prabowo's leadership. Questions now linger over how his administration will handle press freedom, particularly reporting on dissent and criticism. For decades, the media have played a central role in amplifying both street and online protests, making the government's response to critical coverage a key test of its commitment to democratic principles.
Long perceived as an authoritarian threat, Prabowo has inherited an Indonesia where democracy is already teetering on the brink. His early actions, including his handling of the press so far, suggest he has no intention of reversing this course.
And the fact that the majority of Indonesia's media outlets are owned by a small group of politically connected oligarchs, many of whom openly support the governing coalition, suggests he may face little opposition from the press.
The oligarchisation of media
Indonesian journalists briefly enjoyed freedom and vibrant activism during the momentous period between the New Order's collapse in 1998 and 2004, following introduction of the 1999 Press Law. This abolished censorship and licensing restrictions, and allowed them to expose political scandals and elite conflicts – a significant contrast with what was possible under Soeharto's authoritarian rule.
By reporting on political scandals and intra-elite conflicts, journalists contributed to sustaining uncertainties in political contestation, keeping it competitive and unpredictable. This, in turn, played a crucial role in preventing democratic reversal during this period.
However, under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014), the country's first directly elected president, a small group of oligarchs came to dominate the media landscape, with eight national media groups controlling most mainstream platforms – print, broadcast, and digital. Their owners were affiliated with political ventures and other business groups, limiting the independence of journalists.
While these media moguls were able to wield significant influence, they did not always agree politically. Their competing interests were often reflected in the opposing viewpoints presented by their affiliated media outlets. This was evident in coverage of the bitter 2014 presidential election, where media outlets affiliated with the two competing camps – Joko Widodo's and Prabowo's – tailored their coverage to support their respective candidate and attack the opposition.
Despite the partisanship of these media groups, the media landscape remained relatively pluralistic, as the public could access competing media narratives.
Coercion and cooptation – Jokowi's media strategy
However, under Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo, the political space for elite competition narrowed significantly. During his first term, the former Surakarta mayor used his coercive powers to secure loyalty from political opponents, including media moguls.
For example, his administration filed multiple legal cases against media mogul and politician Harry Tanoesoedibjo, whose media empire, MNC Group, controls Indonesia's largest free-to-air television network (RCTI, MNCTV, GTV). This was part of a broader effort to suppress criticism within influential media groups. Harry, who had supported the Prabowo-Hatta Rajasa pairing Jokowi defeated in the 2014 presidential election, claimed the cases were politically motivated.
Jokowi's attempt to control the media continued into his second term. A case in point is the pressure he put on Surya Paloh, chair of the NasDem Party and owner of Media Group (which includes the Metro TV and Medcom networks). Following Surya's endorsement of Anies Baswedan, widely seen as Jokowi's nemesis, in the 2024 presidential election, Media Group reportedly lost major advertising contracts from government institutions and state-owned enterprises – an essential revenue source for many media companies, particularly amid the post-pandemic economic slowdown.
Jokowi also brought senior journalists into his orbit, regularly inviting members of the Chief Editors' Forum to the presidential palace or other locations, a move widely seen as an attempt to influence, if not control, the narrative in mainstream media.
In addition to these meetings, Jokowi also appointed several prominent chief editors to prestigious government positions or ambassadorships. Appointing retired high-profile journalists to government positions had happened in the past but it was only under Jokowi that active newsroom leaders were granted such positions, a move warmly welcomed by senior figures in the press community.
Jokowi's administration also became notorious for its significant spending on social media influencers, who played a key role in promoting positive narratives about his policies.
Despite Jokowi's efforts to engineer positive media support, his administration's policies contributed to a decline in the protection of journalists. The Independent Journalists Alliance (AJI) reported a sharp increase in violence against journalists during his leadership, with critics arguing that his administration's failure to address these incidents underscored its weak commitment to protecting press freedom.
This, coupled with the continuing and intensifying politicisation of media, has led to an environment where journalists are more vulnerable to attacks. Many independent voices faced repercussions for criticising Jokowi's policies. For example, In August 2024, a Tempo journalist, Hussein Abri Dongoran, was attacked by unknown assailants while driving home from a meeting with a source. The attack happened shortly after Tempo published and aired a special edition criticising Jokowi's 10-year leadership, titled Nawadosa Jokowi (Jokowi's Nine Sins).
'Allergic to protests': Prabowo's enmity against the media
Jokowi may no longer be in office, but Prabowo's own long-standing hostility toward a free and critical press has carried over into his presidency, shaping a media environment that is increasingly controlled and restrictive.
Even before election as president, Prabowo frequently refused to answer questions or grant interviews to media outlets he deemed hostile. Now he is in office, journalists who cover the palace beat can still report on his activities, but press briefings are even more restricted and carefully managed than under his predecessors.
In fact, Prabowo's press briefings are often one-way statements, with no opportunities for Q&A. He has also issued a threat against the critical press, insinuating that they are an extension of foreign interests.
In a recent interview with medcom.id, a digital media outlet owned by Paloh's Media Group, Satryo Soemantri Brodjonegoro claimed that he had been dismissed from his position as education minister due to protests against him, explaining that Prabowo was 'allergic to protests.' Soon afterwards, the video of his statement was removed from the outlet's website for undisclosed reasons (although several other outlets had recorded it, and reposted it on their social media platforms). It is not clear if this was the result of a censorship order from the palace, but if it wasn't, then that raises concerns about self-censorship.
This chilly new media climate clearly adds to the myriad of problems already facing the Indonesian media. These range from extreme concentration of media ownership to various forms of elite cooptation.
Pockets of resilience and the rise of 'guerrilla' media
That said, it is not all doom and gloom for the Indonesian press.
The 1999 Press Law is still generally seen protecting journalists from being jailed for doing their job, though it clearly cannot prevent harassment. There have been attempts to revise the Law, but the prevailing sentiment within the press community is to reject any proposed revisions, fearing that changes could open a Pandora's box and allow vested interests to further undermine the press.
This refusal to consider legal revisions amid ongoing efforts to weaken oversight institutions can be seen as a last stand by the press in defence of its fundamental freedoms.
Moreover, the last decade has seen a steady increase relatively small and potentially independent media outlets across the archipelago, which I tentatively call 'guerrilla' media. They typically operate on small budgets, with minimal staff producing fewer articles compared to mainstream outlets.
These outlets span a broad political spectrum and differ from traditional journalism, particularly in how they blend advocacy with reporting, openly championing marginalised voices – an approach most mainstream media avoid. Based on this definition and my compilation of surviving media outlets, guerrilla media numbers grew from one in 2001 to at least 23 today, with a sharp increase during Jokowi's second term.
Table 1 Growth in the number of guerrilla media outlets in Indonesia (see original article)
The guerrilla media's focus on marginalised issues and use of innovative journalistic formats provides diverse perspectives that often counterbalance mainstream reporting on critical issues. However, the reach of guerrilla media remains limited, often confined to niche audiences already invested in the issues they cover. Despite this, their content often attracts attention from powerful actors, making them targets for cyberattacks and intimidation.
While their potential is clear, guerrilla media outlets face significant challenges. Most have yet to be verified by the Press Council, a common but not compulsory practice, leaving them vulnerable to a lack of legal protection from press authorities. There have been calls to support these outlets, a testament to their important role as sources of independent journalism.
Another test for Indonesia's democratic resilience
Recent events suggest it is unlikely that Prabowo will adopt a more liberal stance toward the press. However, the extent of media suppression under his rule will depend on political pressures, public resistance, and the evolving role of independent journalism.
Pockets of resilience will be crucial in diversifying the media landscape, but they alone will not be enough to prevent democracy from following a declining trajectory. Mainstream media outlets will also play a pivotal role, with the key question being how they will respond to efforts to undermine press freedom.
Ultimately, the issue is not only whether Prabowo will restrict press freedom, but whether the press can withstand political and economic pressures and continue to function as a check on power. Will journalists push back against threats to their independence? And if they do, how will Prabowo's administration respond? This will be another test for Indonesia's democracy.