Ian Wilson – Recent student-led demonstrations throughout Indonesia show that popular support for democracy remains high. This support is not necessarily shared, however, by political parties who are collaborating in an increasingly cartel-like fashion to shrink electoral competition.
Massive protests that swept Indonesia on 22 August 2024 reflected a tipping point in growing public outrage at increasingly sloppy and blatant attempts by Joko Widodo (Jokowi) in his final days in office to consolidate his political dynasty. In what would have amounted to a constitutional coup, the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR) had moved with uncustomary speed to try to pass a hastily drafted regional elections bill. Their aim was to effectively annul two recent Constitutional Court (MK) rulings, which would have had significant implications for the regional elections scheduled for late November. In the wake of widespread public dissent, the DPR withdrew the Bill, albeit likely temporarily.
The first of these MK rulings clarified the eligible age of candidates, essentially preventing Jokowi's younger son, Kaesang Pangarep, from running for governor this year. The more politically significant ruling, with implications for Indonesia's democratic landscape well beyond the end of the Jokowi administration, was the lowering of thresholds for parties nominating candidates for regional elections. Previously, only parties with 25 per cent of the popular vote or 20 per cent of seats in the local legislature were eligible to nominate such candidates. Aside from limiting the right to nominate candidates to a handful of big parties, this situation created strong incentives for smaller or non-eligible parties to join large coalitions, which in turn further reduced candidate diversity.
The MK's ruling lowered this threshold to between 6.5-10 per cent of the popular vote, depending on the size of the constituency, ostensibly opening up the field of electoral competition. The elephant in the room, however, apparent in the days following the DPR's climbdown, was that most political parties have little interest in increasing competition. For some instances, the reasons are fiscal. Election campaigns are costly and some parties are still recovering from February's presidential and national legislative elections.
The broader context is one where many parties view electoral competition as contingent and instrumental, a mechanism for inter-elite bargaining rather than an integral part of the representative democratic process. This party cartelisation that accelerated under Jokowi is perhaps most evident in the bloated 15-party "Advanced Indonesia Coalition Plus" (KIM Plus) that lined up to support former governor of West Java and Golkar party member, Ridwan Kamil, for the prized governorship of Jakarta.
Initially, KIM had consisted of parties that backed Prabowo's third and finally successful bid for the presidency. Within weeks of his victory, parties that had backed rival candidates were already gravitating towards the president-elect. In early August, the National Democrats (NasDem) declared support for Prabowo, followed soon by the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and the National Awakening Party (PKB). By late August, what was now referred to as KIM Plus consisted of every major parliamentary faction, bar the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P).
In the case of PKS, who hold the largest number of seats in the Jakarta legislative council and were an initial key backer of Anies Baswedan's 2024 bid for governor, this about-face of the party leadership resulted in an internal revolt, putting it at risk of an electoral drubbing. While the exact reasons remain unclear, it reflects the growing tendency of party leaders to gravitate towards executive power even at the expense of alienating grassroots members and voters.
The major beneficiary of reduced thresholds is PDI-P, which as the only major party outside KIM Plus had been prevented from fielding candidates in several key regions, including Jakarta. It jumped at the opportunity, announcing within hours of the MK's ruling its plans to nominate a further 169 candidates. Those hoping that PDI-P would fully embrace the mantle of opposition, however, were soon disappointed. After indicating it may back Baswedan, PDIP-P instead nominated its own man, Pramono Agung, the day before the registration deadline. A Cabinet secretary under Jokowi, Pramono is considered a loyal PDI-P cadre and favourable to the outgoing president.
This led to speculation that PDI-P had decided to throttle a popular candidate and likely lose Jakarta, in order to preserve relations with Prabowo. Similar scenarios have been seen across the country. While a one-horse race in Jakarta has been avoided, Baswedan was ultimately left in the lurch without adequate party support and has dropped out of the race.
By close of registration on 30 August, 43 regions still only had a single candidate, an increase from 2020 despite the lower nomination thresholds. Voters in these regions, with a combined population of over 25 million (author's estimate), will be limited to choosing a lone candidate, an empty ballot, or not voting. If any lone candidate is disqualified or defeated by 'empty ballot box votes' the default, according to the Electoral Commission, will be the appointment of an "interim" leader chosen by the Minister of Home Affairs and President on the recommendation of the regional parliament. Such a leader would serve a full term until 2029.
Due to an anomaly in the 2016 regional election (Pilkada) law, many regions currently have government appointed interim leaders in place, some for as long as 34 months. As such leaders are often more focused on delivering the national government's priorities and interests, rather than those of constituents, this has been criticised as normalising the roll-back of regional elections.
Having previously led a parliamentary coalition that legislated a return to the parliamentary appointments of regional heads, the incoming president is likely to pursue further opportunities to do so, even if via different means. The idea of an 'opposition-less' approach to governing is central to Prabowo's political vision, one he reiterated in recent comments where he claimed that opposition was "not Indonesian culture" and that the reformasi (reform) movement of 1998, which overthrew Suharto and ushered in Indonesia's democracy, was due to "foreign meddling".
What all this suggests is that the trend of post-election cartelisation via the bloated ruling coalitions seen under Jokowi will extend further under Prabowo. However, there will likely be a shift in emphasis to elite pre-election deals that further restrict the parameters of electoral competition.
[Ian Wilson was a Visiting Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He is a Senior Lecturer in International Politics and Security Studies, Academic Chair of the Global Security Program and Co-Director of the Indo-Pacific Research Centre at Murdoch University, Western Australia.]
Source: https://fulcrum.sg/the-twilight-of-electoral-competition-in-indonesia