Ary Hermawan – If there ever was a honeymoon period between President Prabowo Subianto and former president Joko "Jokowi" Widodo after the 2024 elections, it is without doubt over now. As Prabowo enters the second half of his first year in office, tensions between the two former bitter rivals have only grown, making their fragile alliance more toxic by the day.
It is true that neither Prabowo nor Jokowi has publicly shown enmity against the other, at least not since Prabowo joined Jokowi's cabinet as defence minister in 2019. In fact, on many occasions, both leaders have traded compliments in efforts to counter any suggestions that their relationship is not strong. Yet, recent political events may indicate that it is anything but.
Jokowi as 'shadow president'?
As a politician steeped in Javanese statecraft and power plays, Jokowi clearly has little appetite for a direct confrontation. But this does not make him any less assertive than Prabowo.
The former president made headlines recently after some of his former ministers who now serve as members of Prabowo's 'Red and White' cabinet separately went to Jokowi's residence in Solo, Central Java, to seek his advice about the pressing problems they face. Among them were Maritime and Fisheries Minister Sakti Wahyu Trenggono, Energy and Mineral Resources Minister Bahlil Lahadalia, Health Minister Budi Gunadi Sadikin, and Trade Minister Zulkifli Hasan.
While it is common for Indonesians to make visits to their friends and relatives after Idul Fitri celebrations (which fell in late March this year), the meetings have sparked much speculation, for at least two reasons.
First, they were made while Prabowo was on a tour the Middle East from 9 to 16 April 2025, which made Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka, Jokowi's eldest son, the man in charge at home.
Second, at least two ministers told reporters that they had to meet Jokowi because they still considered him their 'boss'. 'I was just touching base with my former boss. He's still my boss now,' said Sakti, a key member of Jokowi's campaign team in 2014 and 2019.
It did not stop with the ministers. On 17 April, Jokowi welcomed students and staff of the police training college, and they talked about the issue of leadership. This was a public reminder that the former president has long enjoyed such strong influence in the police force that his political enemies accuse him of using it as a political vehicle.
These are clearly not regular meetings, and that has created the impression that Jokowi is somehow still in charge as a "shadow president". In fact, they seem to be part of 'theatre of power' moves by Jokowi to show his rivals – particularly Prabowo and the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) establishment – that he still maintains political authority. It is worth mentioning that the meetings took place shortly after a widely publicised meeting between Prabowo and PDI-P chairwoman Megawati Soekarnoputri at the latter's residence on April 7.
The Prabowo-Megawati meeting may alarm Jokowi. Not only does it show that Megawati, who has become more reclusive in recent years, is now willing to meet eye to eye with Prabowo, but it also indicates that the PDI-P leader is open to the possibility of joining the Prabowo administration. Jokowi, who was fired from the PDI-P after supporting Prabowo's presidential candidacy, cannot afford to have the PDI-P in the Cabinet and concede power to one of the largest political forces in the country – and one that strongly opposes him.
Calls for Gibran's impeachment
Jokowi's manoeuvring may have ruffled the feathers of Prabowo's supporters. On 17 April 2025, the Former Indonesian Military (TNI) Members Forum released a statement demanding that President Prabowo remove Gibran as his deputy. The statement, signed by 100 former TNI members, including former vice president Try Sutrisno, argued that Gibran should be ousted because his nomination as a vice-presidential candidate was unconstitutional.
The election of Gibran has always been controversial. Jokowi stands accused of influencing the Constitutional Court through his brother-in-law, Chief Justice Anwar Usman, to issue a ruling that would allow Gibran to run as Prabowo's running mate in 2024. However, this was the first time that the State Palace was forced to respond to a call for Gibran's impeachment, and it only did so because it was made by military veterans, including Prabowo's allies.
In addition to 'removing' Gibran, the veterans are also calling on Prabowo to cancel the signature infrastructure projects declared "national strategic projects" (PSN) by Jokowi, including his flagship new capital city (IKN) project in East Kalimantan.
It is clear that Prabowo does not have the capacity to fire Gibran. It would take long and complicated legal and political procedures to impeach him. While Prabowo is said to be reviewing some of the PSN, he has no intention of pulling the plug on the IKN project, which would be akin to declaration of war on Jokowi.
So, these calls appear to be made by the veterans to remind Prabowo that he needs to show Jokowi who's the boss. In this case, Gibran's presence is seen as symbolic of Jokowi's lingering influence in Prabowo's cabinet.
Will the tensions eventually explode?
Prabowo's political statements and decisions indicate that he is not ready to part ways with Jokowi, although he has certainly carefully taken measures to limit Jokowi and Gibran's influence.
Political pundits, for example, have noted the shrinking role of Gibran in Prabowo's government. This policy was likely meant to reduce his visibility for the elections 2029. Jokowi did the exact same thing to his two former VPs – Jusuf Kalla and Ma'ruf Amin – during his 10-year tenure. Prabowo's meeting with Megawati could also be interpreted as a veiled threat by him against Jokowi.
That said, Prabowo has yet to make drastic measures to keep his predecessor at the margin of politics and governance, though it is not clear why he is waiting. One of the biggest puzzles in Indonesian politics after the 2024 elections is why Prabowo chose to retain Jokowi's men in strategic posts, especially in critical security and law-enforcement agencies such as the police, the Indonesian military, the Attorney General's Office, and the State Intelligence Agency (BIN).
Several analysts and senior journalists I have talked to said that it was just a matter of time before Prabowo puts his men in those strategic posts and consolidates his power. However, recent incidents indicate that Jokowi may still have a card to play against Prabowo. After all, Jokowi remains highly popular among the electorate, and many of his oligarchic backers still consider him politically useful. This perhaps makes Prabowo reluctant to confront him.
If so, it is likely that Prabowo and Jokowi will stay stuck in their toxic alliance – which is based on practical considerations rather than overlapping visions and ideologies – for quite some time. And it also likely that the alliance will become even more toxic as the end of Prabowo's first term approaches. There is no ruling out of the possibility that the tensions may one day explode, but if that does happen the outcome won't be pretty for either side.