Yanuar Nugroho – There is serious disquiet among Indonesia's civil society actors and academics, who support the two candidate pairs that lost last month's election. Much work lies ahead if there is to be an effective national reckoning of alleged electoral misconduct – yet it may be a case of too little, too late.
The outcome of the 14 February 2024 election – perhaps the worst since reformasi – has disappointed the majority of civil society organisations (CSOs) and academics in Indonesia. There were not only alleged ethical breaches and violations of laws, but also, state-level interventions were significant. Following protests and criticism by CSOs after voting day, university academics voiced their concerns about alleged political interference in favour of the presumptive winners, Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto and Gibran Rakabuming Raka (President Joko Widodo's eldest son). Protests have started in Yogyakarta and Jakarta, and other cities are expected to follow. The protestors worry about the state of Indonesia's democracy, including what appears to be the worsening practice of money politics.
Meanwhile, the losing candidate pairs (paslon) Anies Baswedan-Muhaimin Iskandar and Ganjar Pranowo-Mahfud MD are preparing to take legal action. Their first option is to file lawsuits to the Constitutional Court (MK). The political parties supporting these two pairs – particularly Ganjar's home party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and Muhaimin's National Awakening Party (PKB), are also considering the second option, which is exercising their right of inquiry (hak angket) into the election process.
Many CSOs support these legal and political actions. They have also demanded a digital forensic audit of the IT system of the Commission for General Elections (KPU), which they believe and allege had deliberately been designed to conduct electoral fraud. These CSOs have exposed alleged electoral violations, cheating, and other breaches of ethics and laws, despite various intimidatory actions against them.
Some questions arise: How effective is Indonesia's civil society movement today? What are the realistic outcomes they could achieve and what strategies do they need for success?
The KPU will announce the official election results today (20 March). Any candidates objecting to these results could theoretically start filing their disputes with the MK from 23 March 2024. Thereafter, an investigation would be conducted from 2-5 April, while the final deliberation of the Court will take place from 8-15 April, with the verdict due on 16 April. Civil society and campus movements now plan to intensify their actions around these dates and will not likely stop until the swearing-in of the new president expected on 20 October 2024.
Yet, how effective is the CSOs' movement?
First, Indonesia's civil society and CSOs are not monolithic. Scores of civil society studies in Indonesia show how wide the spectrum of CSO concerns and orientations are; what is referred to as "civil society" by this author encompasses informal groups and formal organisations whose political or societal orientation is, broadly speaking, advancing democracy and justice. Although they are not officially associated with any paslon, these CSOs and the campus movements are generally seen as opposing Prabowo-Gibran and critical of Widodo (Jokowi). However, not all university chancellors support their academics who have made political statements or criticised the current government or the KPU post-election.
Second, the effectiveness of CSO movements is intertwined with that of the political parties and paslon. No matter how intense the CSOs' and academics' speeches and actions are, the crux rests on the opposing parties and politicians advancing their legal rights or challenging the KPU's decision and final announcement of the election result.
Even if "structured, systematic, and massive" violations (which are the election monitoring agency's own conditions for disqualifying candidates) in the elections could be proven, it would probably be insufficient to stop the MK from legitimising Prabowo-Gibran's victory. Hence, the range of realistic outcomes would vary. For election watchdog CSOs, their aim is straightforward: to continue calling out and preventing the normalisation, toleration, and institutionalisation of potential electoral violations or fraud. This seems to have worked partially: the CSOs' continual demands for transparency have now forced the KPU to admit that some election data was stored by a foreign entity – in the Chinese company Alibaba's cloud, which goes against Indonesia's regulations.
For others, their main task is to keep voicing demands for the restoration of ethics and law in society and politics, to preserve Indonesia's democracy. One dramatic call, as uttered on the campus of Yogyakarta's renowned University of Gadjah Mada (UGM), was for holding Jokowi accountable in a people's court (pengadilan rakyat), which sparked a strong reaction from the presidential palace.
The CSOs and academics aim to raise public concern about the decline of democracy and to delegitimise the election result. At the practical level, they probably must create a platform for civil society and academics to work together, supporting the opponent paslons and the relevant political parties to exercise their legal rights regarding the 2024 election results. Even if it comes too late for 2024, demanding a digital forensic audit of KPU's IT systems will be essential for ensuring the integrity of future elections.
Instead of being fragmented or distracted by internal weaknesses and disagreement, there is a chance now for Indonesia's civil society and academics to focus on the transition from Jokowi to Prabowo. Before Prabowo is sworn in, civil society can examine whether Jokowi's government has truly delivered on its promises. After that, it can act as a watchdog against the new government.
In the longer run, their main strategy should be to consolidate their forces, allowing CSOs, universities, and other elements of the post-1998 reform movement to collectively strategise on how to function as an effective check-and-balance for the government. Any political parties not in Prabowo's future coalition can ideally act as viable opposition, working with civil society. Enhancing civic political education and strengthening public institutions are also necessary steps for more societal transformation and to nurture future civic leadership.
[Yanuar Nugroho is a Visiting Senior Fellow, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He was the former Deputy Chief of Staff to the President of Indonesia 2015-2019.]
Source: https://fulcrum.sg/an-urgent-need-for-post-election-civil-society-consolidation-in-indonesia