[Note that this article was written a while before publication so may be a little out of date]

Paul Barber – The Indonesian government's response to the breakdown of peace talks with the separatist Free Aceh Movement, GAM, in May 2003 was immediate and rapid. Within 24 hours it had declared martial law and launched its largest military offensive since the invasion of East Timor in 1975.

British-supplied Hawk jets were used to escort transport planes carrying troops to Aceh. Armoured vehicles made by the British company Alvis were deployed to the province as part of the war effort.

By contrast, Jakarta's initial response to the catastrophic disaster caused by the killer earthquake and tsunami, which struck Aceh on 26 December, was slow, uncoordinated and even obstructive. For political reasons associated with the war against GAM, the Indonesian government and its military were at first extremely reluctant to involve the international community in the relief effort.

The British government's response was similarly tardy. An initial commitment of £15 million to the disaster fund for the region was increased to £75 million only after it became clear that it would be exceeded by donations from the British public. The amount pledged by the government still pales in shameful comparison to the billions spent on the war in Iraq.

The disaster in Aceh has been componded by the legacy of decades of violent conflict and repression. Indonesia's war with GAM has been raging since the mid 1970s. Thousands of people have been killed, imprisoned and tortured, the majority civilians.

The Indonesian authorities severely restricted access to Aceh by international humanitarian organisations, journalists and foreigners following the imposition of martial law in May 2003. This partly explains why news about the scale of the disaster, which has claimed over 110,000 Acehnese lives with a similar number still missing, was slow to emerge.

In the critical early aftermath of the tsunami the government sent out mixed messages about the lifting of restrictions with the result that desparately-needed aid and assistance was held up.

Intimidation and violence against local NGOs by the security forces have incapacitated civil society and curtailed its ability to respond to the crisis. There is concern also that corruption, which is endemic in Aceh and throughout Indonesia and a major source of income for the military, will dissipate the aid effort.

Britain's contribution to the Aceh conflict, which has already caused so much suffering and exacerbated the current crisis, is little understood by the British public who have given so generously. The use of British-supplied military equipment in Aceh, the British government's ineffective monitoring of exported equipment and its reliance on end-use assurances "not worth the paper they are written on" were heavily criticised by a committee of MPs earlier last year.

The British government actually facilitated the use of British military equipment in Aceh by agreeing to relax undertakings which would have prevented the deployment of jets and tanks to the province.

A recent High Court case in London revealed the payment of a £16.5 million bribe to secure a contract for the export to Indonesia of some of the British tanks subsequently used in Aceh. The cost is being met by British and Indonesian taxpayers. Indonesia still owes Britain over £550 million for the equipment purchased under this corrupt transaction and other deals underwritten by the taxpayer through the Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD).

International aid agencies and foreign governments are now engaged in the relief effort, but there are understandable fears that in the longer term, after the international community has diverted its attention, the Indonesian military will use its increased presence in Aceh to consolidate its control of the territory and step up its offensive against GAM.

The government has insisted that foreign troops providing humanitarian assistance must leave by the end of March. In the meantime, military operations have continued despite the humanitarian crisis. Disturbing reports have emerged about unprovoked attacks on civilians resulting in a number of deaths.

The relief and reconstruction of Aceh will be a long and painful process which cannot be achieved without a commitment to peace by both sides.

Military operations should cease immediately and international humanitarian organisations, aid workers and journalists should be allowed unrestricted access for an unlimited period. Aid should be chanelled through international agencies and local NGOs so that it is not controlled by the military or corrupt intermediaries.

The British government can contribute far more to the aid effort by cancelling all "odious" debts relating to arms sales so that Indonesians and Acehnese are not obliged to pay for weapons which have been cruelly used against them. Debt relief should be conditional upon a permanent cease-fire in Aceh and upon the establishment of mechanisms to ensure that the funds released are disbursed to the most needy, are not affected by corruption and are not misallocated to fuel the conflict or benefit the military.

The political dynamics of the Aceh conflict may have changed since the tsunami disaster, but the search for common ground between the parties continues to be elusive. GAM is intent on independence whereas the government will not countenance any move which would undermine the territorial integrity of Indonesia and will not go beyond an offer of special autonomy. Recent peace talks in Helsinki came to nothing although further talks are scheduled for 21 February.