Agus Widjojo, Jakarta – The term de-politicization is central to the whole concept of reforming the Indonesian Military (TNI). However, it should be mentioned that this reform is not only about de-politicization.

What then, is TNI reform all about? Basically the reform starts from the principle that any roles and consequential authority given to TNI should be based on the principles of democracy, given the assumption that the 1945 Constitution mandated a democratic political system. In a democracy, political authority is entrusted in elected public officials. At an executive level it is the president, at the regional levels, it is the governors, mayors and regent. It is these elected public officials who make the political decisions that are then implemented by their administrations and public institutions.

The TNI is one of these institutions, charged with defending the nation in accordance with the wishes of the elected political authorities. The TNI chief is not an elected public official but is appointed by the president. It logically follows that the TNI chief does not hold the authority to make political decisions and is forbidden to act unilaterally to use the military to respond to national issues. The TNI should have no positions on political issues and should only act in accordance with the wishes of the people's elected representatives, personified by the President who has the authority to deploy the TNI in emergencies.

If the TNI is misused by the politicians, therefore, they are able to be held accountable by the voting public.

Based on the above principles, TNI reform is about both general de-politicization and structural reform. Positioning the TNI chief under the auspices of the Department of Defense, relieving the TNI of its powers as the primary institution responsible for internal security, and adjusting its territorial command structures by limiting their authority to national defense matters are essential moves.

The military must also have clearly set out requirements and restrictions as to how it deals with the civilian population and non-defense matters, and must conform to general democratic principles of accountability, transparency and civilian control.

If we assume that the above concept depicts the scope and objectives of TNI reform, then they should also be commonly understood by the political authorities. In this case regarding the executive powers, it is the president who has the authority to establish national defense policies; which are scrutinized by the legislative powers – the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) consisting of the House of Representatives (DPR), and the Regional Representatives (DPD) – the TNI and the public. All groups must agree to this system if it is to work.

If a common understanding is not reached, then there may be no real hard reform in the TNI. But confusion, ambivalence and disorientation are typical conditions of a democratic transition, and Indonesia is not immune. While the old arrangements are being torn down, the new structure has not yet been completely established and the effectiveness of the political institutions that have replaced the TNI's dwifungsi (dual function) role has yet to be realized.

This kind of situation creates uncertainties and people are prone to looking back favorably to the stable but undemocratic past.

This is not surprising in a traditional society that values the status quo more than change and orients more to the past than to the future because the future implies uncertainty.

The historical fact that the TNI has long been an important player in Indonesian politics with a solid and effective organization helps it continue to be a force to be reckoned with in Indonesian politics and the military establishment seems keen to keep its powers through its support of presidential candidates.

This was evident when Art. 19 of (the previous) TNI draft bill, which in crucial issues gave the military independent powers to act, was publicly supported by high-ranking civilian political figures, regardless of the fact that it contradicted fundamental principles of civil supremacy.

This is only one obvious example; there are many others that have missed public attention. The public and the politicians often still subscribe to the point of view that the military is still the sole guardian of the nation and that only TNI can hold the country together, without being aware that doing so is tantamount to recognizing the TNI as a political power.

We should not forget that whatever happens to the country, political accountability rests in the power of the President, not the military, because the TNI chief has no direct relationship to the people, because this chief is not elected by the people.

The historical record of civil-military relations in Indonesia does not make the idea of military reform look likely. With hindsight, there is a main thread running through Indonesian history, that at every instance Indonesia launches an experiment of democratization, establishing civil supremacy in the context of civil-military relations, there is a tendency that civilian authorities lack the confidence to exercise their constitutionally acquired political power effectively, and in turn they tend to turn to the military for political support.

From the military's point of view, their reluctance to let go of their guardianship role, has not been helped by the inferior performance of the political institutions to come up with effective governance.

This ineffective performance of political institutions in the minds of many justifies the military elite's desire to cling to power. This, however, is a typical symptom of a democratic transition, and it would be unrealistic to expect instant results.

The correct identification of the problem and an understanding of the issues are therefore vital.

A major problem that occurred after the separation of the police and the TNI was the issue of the authorities and roles of both law enforcement agencies.

In the past, when the police were part of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI), this blanket organization was responsible for internal security. After the separation it seemed natural to divide the powers of both institutions.

However, this division ended up deepening the gap between the TNI and the police. But what those in both institutions forget is that they are supposed to exist as instruments of state power answerable to the courts and the political authorities.

No role given to TNI or the police exist as automatic, bypassing the political decision making.

Both bodies have explicit set out roles and may only intervene in the other's affairs in cases where they are ordered to do so by politicians or other civil authorities, as in cases of national disasters, where the military capabilities will better handle the extreme nature of the threat.

The writer is a senior fellow at Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and a senior advisor of the UNSFIR – a joint project between the Indonesian government and the United Nations Development Program. He is also a former Indonesian Military chief of territorial affairs.

While it is unlikely to satisfy all parties concerned, the Indonesian Military (TNI) has made some progress in ensuring its soldiers are held to account for criminal or human rights abuses they commit. A significant step was the trials in a military court held in the operations zone in Aceh, relating to soldiers accused of misconduct and human rights violations. Never before have such trials been conducted in an operations zone.

Still being debated are past cases when soldiers were acquitted or received light sentences for other abuses. It is not our place to judge whether these court decisions were right or wrong, but from the point of view of the TNI, some progress has been made.

It is important to note that the many of these trials the military never obstructed the court, preventing it from gaining access to its members and never interfered in the judicial process.

This is unlike the Semanggi I or II trials when the military leadership did not give its officers permission to appear in court.

There are now increased pressures on the TNI such as the politicization of judicial issues, the lack of public trust to judicial institutions, and the lack of scrutiny into the political strategy as the precondition for formulating the military strategy, and political accountability. These aspects are also reflections of the general situation pertaining to law enforcement in Indonesia.

How serious is TNI in carrying out its reforms? The TNI exists not in isolation, and the national context will influence its reform.

The decision to reform the TNI and to repaint the national defense landscape is a political decision.

The elected authorities are politically accountable to the public regarding their policies, and the TNI is supposed to act in accordance with them as is spelt out by the nation's amended 1945 Constitution.

Often, however, politicians ignore the law and give in to the wishes of the TNI. The reasons for doing so are not always easily distinguished; they are often a mixture of incompetence, ignorance or a self-serving desire for military support or patronage.

A good example of this collusion was the establishment of new military area commands (Kodam) in Ambon and Aceh, which escaped hearings in the House of Representatives and were never discussed during the annual budget deliberations.

Establishments of structures should be a result of defense planning analysis rather than a cloudy back-room political deal.

However, the recently passed Indonesian Military Bill gives hopes to those who want a sense of direction to the military reform. The bill is promising in that it has undergone a fundamental change since the initial draft was submitted by president Megawati Soekarnoputri's administration.

But however promising it is, it is still ambiguous with some loose definitions and a compromised understanding of the issues involved.

The military's crucial territorial command function had some vague limits imposed on it while the function itself was never properly defined. While the bill did address the issue of the TNI leadership coming under the president's authority and later under the Ministry of Defense, it set out no clear time frame for change.

Many in the military establishment wish to retain the organization's older, more powerful socio-political role as "guardian of the nation", reflected by the recent launch of a book – Modern War – by the Army, justifying the military in this role.

Although much has been done to reform the TNI in the past, the complete de-politicization of the TNI will only occur with the will, commitment and understanding of both the military and politicians.

And any real hope of reforming the TNI will depend on the efforts of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to initiate this process and to rally the public's support.

House of Representatives members also must be serious about pushing the change agenda and not use the issue to further their own partisan, selfish interests.

In times of transition, the executive must also work to ensure the instruments that take over the old roles of the TNI are effective, otherwise there is unlikely to be a smooth change.

Another requirement will be to increase the defense budget in proportion to the national budget and set national priorities to support the TNI's program to enhance professionalism in its new role as an instrument of national defense.

We should not forget the need to educate people about the principles of democracy, specifically those that relate to the civilian control of the military.

Over the last six years the military has already undergone a series of fundamental changes. This places us in better position to continue this process of moving toward a truly democratic society.

It is important to understand that there is no going back to the institutional structures of the past. Those structures may have worked well enough in the past but now there is a new world order.

Today we need to think collectively about our future challenges. Military reform is not a unilateral process and both military and civilian authorities must make key commitments to the process, the former in promoting a professional, non-political military, the latter in laying down precise guidelines for TNI deployment and ensuring full funding of the institution.

What hopes and expectations do we have of Susilo's administration? The President's military background, and his role in the early phases of TNI reform is an asset to his understanding of the issues.

But we should not forget that policy making and implementation will always be a political process, and the first and foremost challenge to be met is the ability of the government to communicate the intent of the policy and to rally public support for it.

Positive foundations have been laid with the passing of the Indonesian Military Bill; follow-up implementation will require the government's vision, political will and commitment.

The writer is a senior fellow at Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and a senior advisor of UNSFIR – a joint project between the Indonesian government and the United Nations Development Program. He is also a former Indonesian Military chief of territorial affairs.