Rizal Sukma – This article examines recent changes in Indonesia's politics, perceived and real, since the election of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, affectionately called SBY, as Indonesia's sixth president in October 2004.
These changes have brought about additional elements to the already complex political scene in the country. In such a circumstance, the need to create change is easier said than done.
The first, and most significant change, is the peaceful conclusion of year-long elections. While not perfect, the process was relatively smooth. The 2004 elections clearly reflect a greater maturity of the Indonesian people, the institutionalization of the rules of the game.
When disputes regarding the results occurred, for example, participants in the elections took the case to the newly established Constitutional Court, instead of to the streets, which adjudicated on the disputes in a civilized manner. A degree of maturity was proven when the decisions by the Court were all accepted by parties involved in the disputes. Indeed, the elections suggest that we, as a nation, have come to realize that we need to abide by the democratic rules of the game.
Second, while the majority of voters were still filled with emotional allegiance to parties and individual leaders, the 2004 elections marked the beginning of a new pattern of voting behavior in society. The results of legislative elections, for example, demonstrate the growing number of autonomous voters who played an important role as a bloc of "swing votes".
The new political parties, the Islamic-based Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and the Democratic Party (PD), owe their surprising rise to this bloc. Most of these swing votes come from the middle-class in urban areas.
Given this phenomena, political parties can no longer assume that they can continue to draw support from traditional support bases. The voters have now demonstrated the ability to "reward" good candidates in the elections.
The third is the breakdown of traditional and patrimonial authority in politics. Despite their affiliation with mass-based organizations such as the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, a significant number of voters no longer feel compelled and obliged to vote for candidates who their parent organization and leaders officially endorse. Despite the call by Abdurrahman Wahid for members of the NU to vote for the duet of Gen. (ret) Wiranto-Solahudin Wahid, it was Susilo-Jusuf Kalla who won the election in the NU stronghold of East Java. A survey also found that despite the official endorsement by Muhammadiyah of Amien Rais, less than 70 percent of Muhammadiyah members and sympathizers voted for Amien.
Fourth, an embryonic "balance of power" relationship between the executive and the legislative branches has emerged. The results of the elections, while it is still too early to say, seems to have created a foundation for a stronger check-and-balance system between the President and the House. The House, in which the coalition of pro-government parties constitutes the minority, would be in a better position to play a greater oversight role. The problem, however, is that the basis of coalition in the legislature is not always based on party lines, but can also be based on certain issues, personalities and vested interests.
The fifth is the phasing out of the so-called reformed generation of leaders. Since the ouster of President Abdurrahman Wahid from office, and the defeat of both Amien Rais and Megawati in the presidential elections, the key leaders of reformasi no longer hold any government positions. While they are still in a position to influence the political process, the election of SBY as president clearly marks the beginning of the emergence of new generation of leaders in Indonesia.
However, it is important to note that SBY himself does not represent a new generation of leaders, but he certainly can be seen as a bridging figure between the reform era and the next one; an era which will probably take a clearer form by 2009.
The implications of these changes have been significant, and lead to the emergence of a more complex political landscape in Indonesia. Indeed, there is a greater proliferation of political actors and power centers. Before the 2004 elections, the structure of constituencies in Indonesia's politics tended to be characterized by division along ideological and party preferences. Now, while the previous structure remains intact, we begin to witness the emergence of more diversified political actors.
For example, the role of the House of Representatives, wherein the supporters of President SBY are a minority bloc, and the House has clearly become more important in balancing the power of the executive. Non-ideological groups of voters – the swing voters – will grow larger. New political figures, such as People's Consultative Assembly Speaker Hidayat Nurwahid, House Speaker Agung Laksono and media baron Surya Paloh, can be expected to play greater political roles in the months to come.
The effects of such political complexities became evident soon after President Susilo took office on Oct. 20. For example, the context for decision-making processes has become more difficult for an authoritative process.
The President, despite the direct mandate from the people, seems unsure of how to use his victory and political capital. The process of presidential institution-building is a case in point.
The formation of the Cabinet, for example, was reported to have been dictated by the imperative of compromise. Despite his earlier promise to strengthen the presidential office, the plan has not been realized. The President, for example, has yet to establish the National Defense Council and National Economic Council. Not much is heard now about the "West Wing" of Indonesia.
How, then, can the new government lead the changes? First, it is imperative that the government, especially the President, changes the mode of governing. The period of campaigning has ended, and it is now the period of working. The government should not see the five-year term as merely a period of campaigning for the reelection in 2009.
In conducting business, the government should not merely base its decisions on the overriding need to preserve the regime's popularity and maintain the regime's security, at the expense of state survivability. This will require the government to tackle major issues head-on, including making unpopular decisions such as the reduction in fuel subsidies and the privatization of ineffective state-owned companies.
Good policies, along with delivering on campaign promises, would by themselves provide the political capital needed by SBY should he wish to run again in the next election.
Second, there is a need for the government to facilitate the emergence of a constituency for change. While parliamentary support is imperative, President Susilo should also make use of his popularity to get direct support from the people for his policies.
This will require a greater precision in prioritizing what changes the government wants to target. For example, if the president is really serious about the eradication of corruption, he should strengthen the constituency for the anticorruption drive within the society. The support and active participation from mass-based organizations, such as the Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, is clearly essential in this regard.
Third, there is a need to strengthen the communication strategy. The explanation of the government's policies, for example, should be done professionally and with greater precision. The habit of giving excuses, which has become too frequent, has to be avoided. Otherwise, the public trust in the government will rapidly deteriorate.
Indonesia can no longer afford a government that does not know how to govern. The cost of muddling-through and indecisiveness, as we have experienced over the last four years, would be too great. Indonesia needs to recover the lost years, and recover them fast. At this point, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is still in a position to do so.
[Rizal Sukma, Director of Studies of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).]