Allan Behm – The pundits might want to dismiss Alexander Downer's thinking out loud on a security agreement with Indonesia as a volte-face or the cynical repackaging of a Keating legacy. But, before they do, they might consider just how far Australia and Indonesia have travelled during the Howard years, and the opportunities that present themselves with this month's re-election of the Howard Government and tomorrow's inauguration of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as President of Indonesia.

Recent opinion polls in Indonesia and Australia suggest there is considerable popular mistrust on both sides of the Arafura Sea.

For each Australian who thinks that Indonesia is the country most likely to attack Australia in the future, there are 10 Indonesians who think that Australia's intentions are not so benign. East Timor has been the defining moment, and now is definitely the time to restore balance and trust, and to design a long-term strategic relationship.

John Howard's overwhelming mandate affords him the chance to recreate Australia's image in Southeast Asia as an engaged and co-operative partner, reinforcing economic prosperity and strategic stability. And make no mistake, there is a lot of ground to cover.

Australia's propensity for self-congratulation after the successful Interfet deployment in 1999 was seen by many in Southeast Asia especially in Indonesia as triumphalism and arrogance. And it does not help that reference continues to be made to the "liberation" of East Timor.

During the second half of the 1990s, Australia and Indonesia quietly built an effective consultative and training relationship between their defence forces. Yudhoyono, then a lieutenant-general, was very much a part of this process, which culminated in a conference between the military leaders of the two countries in March 1999.

The subject of that conference? Civil-Military Relations in the 21st Century, a subject of fundamental importance to the new President as he movves to reform the Indonesian armed forces and reposition them as a national asset in a 21st-century democratic society.

Many in Jakarta and Canberra were disappointed when, amid the tragic events in Dili and elsewhere in East Timor in 1999, the bilateral security relationship largely fell by the wayside. The suggestion that Australia and Indonesia might move to restore a substantial security relationship will do much to heal the resentments of the past couple of years.

Moreover, it will instil a new sense of confidence that our strategic interests actually converge, and that we can work together to address the new problems facing us terrorism and the social and economic discontinnuities that feed it.

The security agreement negotiated in 1995 had its critics. Hasnan Habib, a retired general and Indonesia's former ambassador to the US, thought that the agreement was a rejection of Indonesia's non-alignment (it was not), while Downer thought it was merely symbolic and rhetorical (it was not). But the agreement did have more the character of the end of something (Suharto and Paul Keating, as it turned out) than a beginning.

The strides that have been made in building linkages between the AFP and the Indonesian police, and between our respective intelligence services, in the aftermath of the Bali bombing need consolidation. A more broadly based security agreement encompassing police, intelligence and defence arrangements, putting them on a clear footing, makes eminent strategic sense.

It would be a pity, however, if the Howard Government's new-found energy stopped there. A security agreement is but one element in a complex of initiatives that now present themselves to the Prime Minister and the President.

For a security agreement to gain and maintain traction, it needs an effective economic and political relationship characterised by tolerance, cultural sensitivity and plenty of hard work by both sides.

Howard and Yudhoyono have a historic opportunity to construct a new partnership that addresses security issues collaboratively and, at the same time, forges a political and social dialogue that supports Indonesia's democratic reforms and Australia's engagement with Southeast Asia.

Indonesia and Australia should see each other as allies and collaborators in realising these new opportunities. Yudhoyono has already signalled his intention to put the bilateral relationship on a more businesslike basis.

He is not hankering after the good old days. Nor is he given to sentimentality. Rather, he recognises that Australia and Indonesia notwithstanding the dissparity in population size complement each other in significant ways.

In many respects, Australia's ability to manage its relationship with the world's largest Muslim country is the benchmark by which our relationships with the rest of Asia will be measured. But one thing is certain: the fourth Howard Government will need to reduce the volume on its megaphone and pursue a much more subtle diplomacy.

[Allan Behm is a director of Knowledge Pond, an international group advising on strategy and risk. From 1996 to 2001 he was head of international policy and strategy at the Department of Defence.]