Ary Hermawan – In a dramatic turn of events, the Indonesian State Palace has announced that Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka intends to resign amid controversy over the legality of the educational credentials that he relied on to be eligible to run in the 2024 presidential election.
The 39-year-old vice president reportedly expressed that intention during a 2.5-hour meeting with President Prabowo Subianto in the Widya Chandra housing complex in South Jakarta, on Tuesday morning, 10 November 2026.
Gibran has neither confirmed nor denied the palace's claims. He told the press the night after the palace's announcement, held shortly after his meeting with Prabowo, that he had no plan to prolong the controversy over his educational credentials. But he also said that he planned to challenge a Supreme Court decision invalidating his claims of having completed secondary education overseas in the State Administrative Court (Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara, PTUN), although it is not clear how this could be done.
In Decision 742 K/TUN/2026, the Supreme Court found that there was no evidence suggesting that Gibran had completed secondary education overseas, saying that he only had a 'certificate of attendance', 'academic records', and 'explanation of grades', documents that the court stated should not be deemed to be equivalent to a high school diploma.
This Decision echoed an earlier Constitutional Court decision and sent shockwaves across the country, sparking calls for his impeachment and resignation.
However, the question of whether Gibran eventually resigns does not hinge solely on whether he holds a legitimate high school diploma, although that could be used as a pretext for impeachment (dozens of the House of Representatives members have signed a petition supporting this move). The political quagmire he faces is much bigger than just administrative issues.
A political purge in action
The reality is that rumours have circulated among journalists and activists since the week before that Gibran would either resign or be impeached on 9 or 10 November 2016.
What triggered the rumour, however, was not the 30 October 2026 Supreme Court decision (although this was clearly also a big part of it), but the arrests of several police top brass, including former police chief Gen. Listyo Sigit Prabowo. They face allegations of wiretapping President Prabowo and other leading political figures.
The arrests are historically unprecedented and politically seismic in so many ways. They have widely been seen as a major escalation in the longstanding power struggle between Prabowo and former president Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo, Gibran's father, whose political support in his last days at the State Palace was instrumental in Prabowo's huge 2024 election victory.
Jokowi, a businessman from Surakarta (also known as Solo), is the patriarch of a powerful political 'dynasty', dubbed by social media commentators as 'the Solo Gang' or 'Solo faction', that analysts believe could pose a serious threat to Prabowo ahead of the 2029 presidential election. The Solo faction mainly comprises Jokowi's sons and some of his former Cabinet members, including Listyo. Many had kept their old jobs or had been given new positions within Prabowo's cabinet.
Listyo kept his position in cabinet until 1 October 2026, when he was replaced by Gen. Suyudi Ario Seto, and moved across to become Presidential Chief of Staff.
His removal was seen by many as the first strike by Prabowo against Jokowi, who is believed to have relied heavily on Listyo and his deep influence within the police (Polri). In fact, the police are popularly known as Jokowi's 'Brown Party' (reflecting the colour of their uniforms), as they are seen as helping him assert his political power. The police force, for example, reportedly provides Jokowi with the logistical support to campaign in the regions for his political party, the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI).
Listyo's arrest on spying charges is thus a major blow to Jokowi. It has clearly tarnished his image and could potentially implicate him in what officials say could be a treason case. More importantly, it has stripped him of any form of control over the police, especially after their new chief, Suyudi, carried out a bureaucratic purge in October against hundreds of Listyo's loyalists within the force.
With his influence over the police now much diluted, Jokowi has had to rely mainly on his VP son, Gibran, to assert influence within the state. However, Gibran's position is now hanging in the balance. If Gibran resigns or is ousted from his post, the Solo faction will lose another major political asset.
The implications could be even more far-reaching.
With Gibran's position at stake, the PSI, Jokowi's main political party support, now led by his son, Kaesang Pangarep, has now started to falter. Three PSI members of Prabowo's Cabinet – Forestry Minister Raja Juli Antoni, Deputy Culture Minister Giring Ganesha, and Deputy Minister of Population and Family Development Isyana Bagoes Oka – have either resigned from the PSI or left their positions in the party.
At this point, the future of Jokowi's political dynasty is looking grim indeed.
Prabowo's pre-emptive strikes?
While Prabowo's latent conflict with Jokowi has been widely reported, and analysts have long warned of the risks Jokowi faces after choosing to ally with his former election rival, one question remains: why did Prabowo choose to 'neutralise' Jokowi now?
Prabowo has clearly decided to take a zero-risk approach to handling Jokowi.
With the election season scheduled to begin in less than two years, Prabowo seems to have decided he could not afford to give Jokowi more time to shore up support for PSI and his political heirs, Gibran and Kaesang.
That said, Prabowo's decision is likely also driven by a more imminent threat. With oil prices skyrocketing because of the war in the Middle East, global geopolitical conflicts are putting fiscal pressure on Prabowo's administration. These pressures are even more suffocating for Prabowo, because of his astronomically costly populist programs such as the Free Nutritious Meal (MBG) Program and the Red and White Village Cooperatives (Kopdes) Program.
Meanwhile, Prabowo's vision of state capitalism has pitted him against foreign capitalists and many big domestic capitalists, most of whom are of Chinese descent, over how the state manages Indonesia's resources. This has led several Chinese capitalists, known as 'cukong', to move their assets abroad, and some foreign investors have simply walked away from Indonesia's capital market.
In October, the global rating agency MSCI announced it planned to downgrade Indonesia's stock market from an 'emerging' to a 'stand-alone' market, dealing another blow to Indonesia's investment credibility – and to the rupiah, currently at a low of Rp 18,000 against the US dollar.
This means Prabowo now faces an economic crisis that his elite rivals could easily exploit to orchestrate riots and political turmoil that could lead to his ouster. For a president who repeatedly claims that foreign powers are conspiring to topple him, Prabowo may take this threat seriously.
Rumours have been circulating on social media that major rallies will take place in Jakarta that could destabilise the capital, if not the country. That the Indonesian Military (TNI) deployed 21,000 members of the Navy to Jakarta shortly after the arrests of Listyo only fueled speculation that the political conflicts among the elite will soon also be fought on the streets.
Beyond Jokowi vs. Prabowo
The political chaos now unfolding in Indonesia is, in fact, bigger than a power struggle between a former military general from the New Order era and a former furniture businessman with a cunning ability to exploit digital technology to win elections.
It is another episode in the ongoing political struggle between two camps representing different powerful forces in Indonesian politics and economy.
One is the military, now led by its de facto leader, Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, and several native capitalist allies such as business tycoon Syamsoeddin 'Haji Isam' Arsyad and senior members of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kamar Dagang dan Industri Indonesia, KADIN).
They include former KADIN chairman Rosan Perkasa Roslani and former deputy head of KADIN's energy committee Pandu Sjahrir (they now serve as Chief Executive Officer and Chief Investment Officer of Indonesia's state-owned super-holding company, Danantara, respectively), as well as Hashim Djojohadikusumo, President Prabowo's younger brother, who now serves as Chief Patron of KADIN.
The other is the police force, which institutionally remains suspicious of Prabowo's military backers, and the country's richest families, who, under Prabowo, seem to feel they can no longer stand above the political fray. These business families, locally known as 'Sembilan Naga' or the 'Nine Dragons' because of their Chinese ethnicity, control the largest business conglomerates in the country, such as the Djarum Group and the Salim Group.
Given the link between Chinese capitalists and the PSI, and Jokowi's close relationship with the 'Nine Dragons', Jokowi may be seen as a viable political proxy for them to challenge Prabowo. But given the latest political developments, it is unclear whether that view still holds water.
What will happen if Jokowi no longer has the potential to challenge Prabowo?
It remains to be seen what this means for the Indonesian people. Prabowo's political and economic recentralisation seems mainly to benefit members of his ruling political coalition, and has yet to improve the lives of ordinary Indonesians. However, his efforts to politically emasculate Jokowi may enable him to complete his consolidation of power and rule the country with an iron fist.
External pressures, misgovernance, and new elite conflicts within Prabowo's coalition may prevent Indonesia from falling into a full-blown military autocracy. But, at this point, the fate of Indonesia's democracy seems to rest on its progressive but stressed civil society forces, themselves under huge pressure from Prabowo's regime.
These now seem to be the only sources of opposition and accountability left in the country.
