Alvino Kusumabrata – In Decision 01/PHPU.PRES-XXIV/2026, Indonesia's Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi, MK) considered a petition challenging the validity of the high school qualifications that Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka claimed he had in order to be eligible to contest the 2024 presidential election.
The court rejected the petition on the grounds that the petitioners lacked legal standing to file an electoral results dispute petition (Perselisihan Hasil Pemilihan Umum, PHPU). Here, it referred to Article 74(1)b of Law 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court, which stipulates that petitioners in an electoral results dispute involving a president or vice-president must themselves be a presidential or vice-presidential candidate.
At first glance, the Decision seems unremarkable because the petitioners – who comprised a lawyer, retired military officers, private-sector individuals, an educator, and representatives of political and election-monitoring organisations – clearly lacked formal legal standing to challenge election results. However, a closer look at the judges' legal reasoning suggests the decision reflects both the court's judicial activism and, unfortunately, its limits.
MK's limited judicial activism
In the 'legal considerations' part of its decision, the court, in fact, accepted some of the petitioners' arguments.
It even declared that there is no convincing evidence that Gibran possessed a document in the form of a certificate or diploma proving he completed education abroad that could be deemed equivalent to at least senior high school education, as required under Article 169(r) of Law 7 of 2017 on General Elections (as amended by Law 7 of 2023).
The court justified making this important finding (which could conceivably become the basis of a future attempt to impeach Gibran) by affirming the existence of 'special circumstances' (keadaan khusus). It said these allowed it to examine the petition despite Article 74(3) of Law 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court, which says electoral dispute petitions must be filed no later than three days after the General Elections Commission (KPU) announces the election results. The petition in this case had missed that deadline by many months.
This was impressive, but it is a shame the court stopped there, dismissing the petition because the petitioners lacked legal standing.
The court's identification of 'special circumstances' that gave it legal grounds to examine the petition and make its finding about the missing high school diploma should also have enabled it to go beyond the petitioners' legal standing by treating the case contextually and substantively. It could have been even more progressive and developed a broader interpretation of the legal standing requirements that would have allowed it to accept the petition.
This is because electoral result disputes are not solely the concern of presidential and vice-presidential candidate pairs; they are also the concern of citizens who may have suffered harm as a result of the outcome of the election. For instance, election results validated through procedural violations from the outset render citizen's voting rights meaningless. The Constitutional Court, as the guardian of the Constitution, should have understood this and gone beyond a merely procedural approach.
Instead, the court continued to confine itself to its formal authority even when Indonesia's democracy was at stake – the very circumstances that provided a legal basis to consider the petition. In my view, this reflects the court's persistent pragmatism in issuing its decisions: combining limited judicial activism with strict legal-formal reasoning. This pragmatism is most pronounced when it is handling electoral dispute cases.
MK's political pragmatism
Although the Constitutional Court must be independent as stated in Article 24(1) of the 1945 Constitution, judicial institutions are never completely immune to power dynamics.
The influence of political power on the Constitutional Court can be seen most clearly in the appointment of Golkar politician and legislator Adies Kadir as a Constitutional Court justice earlier this year. This was achieved through a sudden political manoeuvre by the national legislature, the DPR, and an expedited, opaque selection process.
In fact, there is plenty of evidence that the Constitutional Court has engaged in institutional pragmatism over the years.
One example is Decision 91/PUU-XVIII/2020, which, rather than annulling the Job Creation Law entirely, declared it conditionally unconstitutional. This decision must be understood within the context of dominant politico-business groups, including domestic and foreign investors, whose capital accumulation is sustained by investment liberalisation and the simplification of business licensing. As the decision itself acknowledged, the Job Creation Law was intended to accelerate investment.
The court's decision on Gibran's diploma reflects that pragmatism, but, at the same time, the limits of its activism.
It aims to achieve a number of different goals at once: demonstrating that there is a serious constitutional problem in Gibran's case, but also observing the formal limits of the court's authority and avoiding a direct confrontation with the political power configuration that enabled his candidacy.
But the decision remains a missed opportunity. The case offered the court a way to correct its past mistake of allowing Gibran to run for vice president through Decision 90/PPU-XXI/2023. This scrapped the age limit for presidential and vice-presidential candidates but was considered highly problematic and improper because Gibran's uncle, Anwar Usman, was then Chief Justice and refused to recuse himself from deciding the case.
With its new decision on Gibran, the Constitutional Court continues to 'confine itself' within the cage of pragmatic political formalism rather than freeing itself from it. And it does this even though Indonesia's constitutional democracy is now facing the sort of enormous challenges that require real judicial courage and creativity to protect it.
