Muhammad Yoppy Adhi Hernawan – On 27 January 2026, Indonesia saw two political appointments that will test the independence of two of its most important state institutions.
One was the appointment of Gerindra Party politician Thomas Djiwandono, a nephew of President Prabowo Subianto, as deputy governor of Bank Indonesia (BI, the central bank of Indonesia). The other was the selection of senior Golkar Party politician Adies Kadir as a Constitutional Court justice.
The House of Representatives (DPR) confirmed these appointments despite mounting public concerns about potential conflicts of interest arising from the two men's political and family backgrounds.
Investors were particularly jittery about Djiwandono's appointment, which was made while the rupiah was under pressure against the US greenback. Critics, meanwhile, questioned Kadir's appointment to the Constitutional Court. They claimed that Inosentius Samsul, the former head of the DPR's expert advisory staff (Badan Keahlian DPR), had already been chosen to be the new judge, but was mysteriously replaced at the eleventh hour.
In both cases, policymakers defended their decision, claiming that Djiwandono and Kadir had both resigned from their respective political parties. By this logic, they argued, any concerns about their independence should be dismissed. However, this argument is flawed.
Why Djiwandono's appointment is problematic
A conflict of interest does not require proof of actual wrongdoing. It exists when there is a reasonable risk that private ties or political loyalties could divert a decision-maker from the office's public purpose.
A hardline application of this principle would make it almost impossible for former politicians to accept any kind of public appointment once their party career is over, even though they might have the skills necessary to make a valuable contribution.
A compromise in the form of a 'cooling-off' rule is the simplest way to deal with this dilemma. It requires time and separation between a political or executive role and a public post that demands independence. Many systems treat cooling-off periods as basic integrity tools, because public trust depends on both actual integrity and its appearance.
For BI, Indonesia's own legal design shows that it at least understands part of the problem. The 1945 Constitution, for example, requires the state to have a central bank whose 'independence' is regulated by law, and the BI Law frames it as free from government or other-party interference. That is the right starting point, but at politically sensitive moments, the law on paper is not enough to carry the institution; credibility is essential.
The credibility risk intensifies because appointment pathways matter as much as formal mandates. Djiwandono was chosen over two career central bankers. That makes it hard to ignore his own admission that he does not have experience in managing monetary policies, and his familial relationship with President Prabowo, let alone his previous job as a deputy minister of finance in Prabowo's cabinet. Djiwandono will now be holding a top position in the country's peak monetary body and must be able to resist fiscal and political pressures.
That is where the 'I have resigned from my political party' argument fails. It only deals with formal membership. It does not address the ongoing ties, obligations, loyalties, gratitude, or expectations that have been built over years through political and bureaucratic networks.
Will Kadir represent the public or DPR's interests?
Kadir's appointment is equally problematic because, despite holding a doctoral degree in law from Surabaya's Universitas 17 Agustus 1945, his public record shows a career built primarily within party and parliamentary structures rather than adjudication or sustained constitutional scholarship. He has served as a senior figure in the Golkar party, and as a member of the DPR leadership, including as Vice Speaker.
His recent public standing has also attracted controversy. In August 2025, his public remarks in support of extravagant DPR housing allowances triggered widespread backlash and demonstrations because of nonsensical calculations, and an ethics complaint followed.
Nevertheless, the problem is not 'eligibility on paper', but credibility. A newly-appointed Constitutional Court judge who is party-parliament operator formerly embedded in the DPR and selected by the DPR is likely to be seen as an extension of the DPR. This will be particularly the case when the Court reviews the constitutionality of politically salient statutes, and resolves election disputes that directly affect the parties and the legislature.
The Constitutional Court's authority depends almost entirely on its independence, its key source of legitimacy. With Kadir sitting on its bench, the public is more likely perceive the court as an extension of parliamentary politics rather than an impartial referee.
This same credibility problem has surfaced before, when Arsul Sani, then an active DPR member, became the DPR's judicial nominee and was sworn in on 18 January 2024 after only resigning from his party in early December 2023. Civil society groups criticised his selection, citing the opaque process and the risk that he would be seen as the DPR's 'extension' in the Constitutional Court.
That the DPR replaced its original candidate, Inosentius Samsul, with Kadir at the last minute only reinforces the perception that his appointment is little more than a parliamentary manoeuvre.
Clear cooling-off period for politicians needed
Indonesia needs to quickly adopt a clear cooling-off period for appointments to independent technocratic institutions, including BI and the Constitutional Court, among others. At present, Indonesia often treats formal resignation as sufficient.
A cooling-off model is used for the General Elections Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU). Law 7 of 2017 on Elections requires a candidate for the Commission to have resigned from party membership at least five years before registering.
The Constitutional Court did once have a tough cooling-off rule. Article 15 of Law 4 of 2014 on the Constitutional Court required a nominee to have not been a party member for at least seven years before being proposed. Article 15 of Law 7 of 2020 on the Constitutional Court, however, later revised the eligibility rules and removed the party-distance requirement from the statutory criteria, thus enabling the DPR to appoint its members to the court.
Article 40 of Law 23 of 1999 on Bank Indonesia as amended by Law 4 of 2023 on the Development and Strengthening of the Financial Sector states that a member of the Board of BI Governors must not be a political party official or member. But it does not set any waiting period.
A sensible minimum cooling-off period for BI would be five years (matching the KPU provisions). This would create real distance, not leaving independence dependent on voluntary promises of neutrality.
Indonesia should also require the structured disclosure of relevant ties and recent roles for shortlisted candidates, so the public can assess the risk landscape before an appointment is finalised.
Lastly, appointing bodies should publish written reasons and a basic selection record for each appointment they make. For the DPR, this means explaining why a candidate aligns with the target institution's independent mandate. And if an earlier chosen candidate gets replaced, the public deserves more than a vague explanation of why this happened.
The public requires more than mere formalities. They need the assurance that decision-makers sit at arm's length from the political networks that stand to benefit from their decisions.