Greg Fealy – Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and its high-profile chair, Kiai Yahya Cholil Staquf (commonly known as Gus Yahya), have for many years presented themselves to the world as champions of peace and moderation. It is ironic, then, that in recent weeks NU has been mired in bitter internal conflict, with Yahya battling against opponents on the central board who have demanded his removal.

The stand-off between Yahya and his critics shows no signs of abating. It is causing significant damage to the public standing of NU, Indonesia's largest Islamic organisation, and its leadership. The conflict is multi-layered and reveals much about NU's internal dynamics and also the political economy of Indonesia under the Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and Prabowo Subianto presidencies.

Formally, the attempts to remove Yahya are driven by accusations of his pro-Israeli sympathies and mismanagement of NU's finances. But looming behind this is a high-stakes and increasingly acrimonious disagreement over who should operate NU's newly acquired coal mine in East Kalimantan.

The conflict raises issues as to whom has ultimate authority within NU: the ulama (Islamic scholars), who are traditionally regarded as the spiritual pillars of the organisation, or the five-yearly congresses in which a broad array of representatives mandate key leadership positions.

The ultimatum to Gus Yahya

The conflict first emerged in public on 20 November when NU's supreme religious council (syuriyah), released a statement declaring that Gus Yahya, who heads the central executive board (tanfidziyah) had three days to resign or face dismissal by the president (rais am), Kiai Miftachul Asykar (Kiai Miftach), who chairs the syuriyah.

Two grounds were given for the ultimatum: first, Yahya had invited a speaker linked to the 'International Zionism network' to address NU's Leadership Academy (AKN NU), thus breaching NU's long-standing position on Israel; and second, that there had been financial mismanagement under his chairmanship, which posed an existential threat to the NU's legal foundation.

The Zionism accusation concerned Yahya's invitation to the Stanford academic, Peter Berkowitz, to give a series of kectures in Indonesia in August, including at the NU Academy and the University of Indonesia, of which Yahya is the Council chair.

Although Berkowitz did not mention Israel or the Gaza War in his lectures, activists soon uncovered evidence of his prior support for the Netanyahu government and its policies in Gaza. Yahya quickly apologised and claimed he had not known of Berkowitz's views. This was a sensitive issue for Yahya as he had controversially visited Israel in 2018 and been photographed meeting Prime Minister Netanyahu. Although he claimed he was pursuing peace initiatives, there was widespread criticism that he had played into the hands of Palestine's enemies.

The financial mismanagement allegations related to a preliminary auditors' report that found that several million dollars in funds for the NU-organised R20 international religious conference, which preceded the G20 Summit in Bali in 2022, and also NU's centennial celebrations that same year had not been accounted for. The auditors also raised the possibility of large-scale money laundering through an account in the name of a former NU treasurer, who is currently under Anti-Corruption Commission investigation for graft. NU claims the funds were returned to the ex-treasurer's account soon after being deposited and that no money laundering occurred.

Yahya rejected the accusations and refused to resign, declaring that the syuriyah had no authority to remove him and that the syuriyah statement of 20 November was invalid. He argued he had received a mandate to chair the executive board from the 2021 NU congress, the highest decision-making body in NU, and contended that only a congress could remove him. In effect, he was saying that the congressional mandates given to him as tanfidziyah chair and Kiai Miftach as syuriyah rais am were of equivalent status and that Mifthach had no special powers to remove him.

The rais am's allies responded that NU was, by its very nature, an ulama-led organisation and that, as its most senior ulama, Mifthach had the right to dismiss anyone who he felt had behaved unethically or incompetently.

The syuriyah issued another statement on 25 November declaring that Yahya was now removed as chair and that a full plenary board meeting would be held on 9 December to decide on a new chair.

Yahya disregarded these syuriyah statements and retaliated on 28 November by removing key opponents from their positions on the executive board. The most important of these was Saifullah Yusuf (Gus Ipul), the NU secretary-general and also Minister for Social Affairs. Ipul, a veteran politician and practised NU powerbroker, had been part of the team that secured Yahya's victory at the 2021 congress and had been rewarded with the pivotal role of secretary-general.

Yahya and Ipul had been allies until around the middle of this year, when relations soured and Ipul began undermining Yahya. One tactic he used was deferring approval of documents, particularly confirmation of new executive appointments at provincial and branch levels, supposedly in order to extract pledges of loyalty from incoming local leaders for the next congress, due in 2027. It is not clear if Ipul wanted the chairmanship for himself or was seeking to play a king-maker role – either way his power would be greatly enhanced.

Yahya's sacking of Ipul was not without risk given that Ipul is on good terms with Sufmi Dasco Ahmad, one of Prabowo's most trusted advisors. Ipul had also assisted Miftach in moving against Yahya.

The Zionism and financial discrepancies do not, at face value, appear to warrant the syuriyah taking such sudden and drastic action against Yahya. There seems to have been no formal warnings to him beforehand, nor was he given an opportunity to answer the allegations.

Removing an NU chair mid-term is extremely rare. To my knowledge, the only precedent was in 1982-1983 when the then rais am, Kiai Ali Ma'shum, instructed the long-serving Idham Chalid to stand down as tanfidziyah chair, which he initially agreed to do. But after his indignant supporters rallied behind him, Idham withdrew his resignation and declared the rais am position void. That sparked more than two years of rancorous in-fighting, which was only resolved with the election of new leadership at the 1984 congress. Attempting to force Yahya out carries a similar risk of prolonged tumult.

This brings us to what may well be the key factor in the dispute, and one not mentioned by the syuriyah: the conflict regarding management of NU's coal mine.

The mine

In 2023, Jokowi issued regulations allowing his government to offer mine concessions to major religious organisations, so they would have a substantial and reliable source of revenue for their socio-religious activities and community development. NU immediately declared its eagerness to obtain a licence, with Yahya adding that his organisation was 'desperate' for funding to inject into its poorly resourced educational, health and welfare institutions. In short, coal mining appeared to be a solution to NU's historical impecuniousness.

NU's licence was for a 26,000-hectare mine in East Kutai district, which reportedly contains some 140 million tonnes of high-quality coal. To develop the mine and manage the flow of funds into NU, the central board established PT Berkah Usaha Muamalah Nusantara with 99% of shares owned by an NU cooperative and 0.5 percent each going to Yahya and Miftach, who were respectively appointed managing director and principal commissioner. NU received its permit in April 2025.

In order to realise the project's potential, NU faced two challenges: it lacked the vast capital required to bring a mine of this size into production; and it had few members with the necessary technical expertise in this field. The only way to proceed was to contract a company with proven mining experience to operate the mine for NU.

In mid-2024, Yahya sought the advice of Jokowi and his mining minister, Bahlil Lahadalia, on a suitable partner company. Eventually PT Anugerah Perdani Nusantara, which reportedly is linked to the magnate Garibaldi (Boy) Thohir, was chosen, and Yahya signed a cooperation agreement witnessed by Miftach. Discussions on the contractual details then commenced.

With Prabowo's inauguration in October 2024, Yahya decided he would be wise to discuss the matter directly with the president, no doubt aware of Prabowo's reluctance to support oligarchs who were close to Jokowi, as Thohir was. Prabowo advised Yahya to seek an alternative partner, which resulted in NU choosing PT Arsari, owned by the president's younger brother, Hashim Djojohadikusumo.

This is where major disagreements began to occur. Tempo magazine has reported that the due diligence on PT Anugerah's offer revealed that NU's PT Berkah could incur losses on the venture because Anugerah refused to cover some of the start-up costs. By contrast, PT Arsari agreed to pay all infrastructure and operational expenses. Yahya, therefore, baulked at signing off on the next stage of the Anugerah deal seeing it was less attractive than Arsari's offer.

This angered Miftach and Ipul, who believed that NU should honour its commitment to the Thohir agreement, and this would expedite the commencement of mining. They were worried that delays might allow the mine's opponents within NU to push for cancellation of the venture.

Indeed, since NU first accepted the offer of a coal mining concession, the issue had aroused strong opposition within the organisation and among environmental groups and the progressive media. Critics pointed to the massive environmental and social problems wrought by coal mining across Indonesia and questioned the ethics of NU being involved in an industry that contributed heavily to global warming. They noted NU's inexperience in running a project of this size and complexity and also pointed to the many past failures of NU enterprises.

Even conservative NU leaders were worried about the high risk of reputational harm to NU, should the mine result in serious pollution or conflict with local communities. Activists feared that exposing NU to the massive financial and regulatory demands of coal mining would make the organisation more beholden to the state and oligarchs, while reducing accountability to ordinary members.

The level of polarisation within NU over the mining issue is evident from the exchanges between pro-Yahya board member and erstwhile progressive intellectual, Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, and various green and leftist activists.

Ulil declared there was no scientific consensus on global warming and lauded coal extraction as a means of bringing development to the world and prosperity to Indonesia. He attacked environmentalists who opposed the mine as 'puritans' and 'Wahhabists' (a reference to the severe Islamic variant practiced in Saudi Arabia). Activists returned fire, accusing him of being a climate science-denialist and flooding social media with vituperative ridicule.

A protracted stand-off?

At the time of writing, NU is at an impasse, with both sides behaving as if they have prevailed over the other. The syuriyah acts as if the chairmanship is vacant and is preparing to appoint a replacement for Yahya. Meanwhile, Yahya repudiates the syuriyah's decisions as illegitimate and continues to behave as if he has full authority as NU's executive chair.

Several options have been proffered to break the deadlock. Some senior kiai are promoting islah or reconciliation between the opposing sides, but neither Yahya nor Mifthach's camps have embraced this. Others have raised the possibility of an extraordinary congress to resolve the matter, again attracting a lukewarm reaction. Judging by their public statements, both Yahya and Miftach are convinced of the rightness of their position and also confident that they have majority support.

Exactly who has greater support is difficult to judge at present. Each side has called meetings of the central board and regional representatives, but usually at short notice and with minimal details conveyed to the public about what transpired and who attended. Many of the most respected ulama outside the current board bemoan the in-fighting but are reluctant to take sides.

Some commentators believe Miftach is ascendant by virtue of his standing as president. There is some merit to this argument. Such is the reverence for eminent kiai within NU, it would be astonishing if the rais am was ignored on such a decisive matter – a humiliation for him and a blow to the principle that NU follows the wise and erudite guidance of ulama.

Nonetheless, Miftach has engaged in brinksmanship. To have given Yahya only three days to resign and not offer him an opportunity to explain himself was always likely to galvanise the pro-Yahya forces into trenchant defence of their leader. Miftach has turned this matter into a showdown between NU's ranking ulama and its chief executive.

Yahya appears to have strong support but is not unassailable. He was elected chair at the 2021 congress by a handsome margin, helped considerably by the generous backing of the Jokowi government and the lobbying of his younger brother, Yaqut Cholil Staquf, the then Minister of Religious Affairs. Many of those who had enthusiastically supported him at that time are now disappointed with his attainments and frustrated with his leadership style.

Yahya had won victory at the congress by positioning himself, somewhat ambitiously, as the next Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), NU's charismatic and intellectually brilliant chair (1984-1999), who served as Indonesia's fourth president (1999-2001).

Gus Dur was well known globally as a gifted advocate of peace and religious tolerance. Yahya had been Gus Dur's presidential spokesperson and had worked assiduously in recent years to lift his international profile. Upon becoming chair, Yahya devoted much time to global peace initiatives, including the R20 in 2022, but these have had little longer-term impact.

One particularly controversial aspect of Yahya's foreign outreach was his involvement of the Indonesia-based American Muslim convert, C. Holland Taylor, who did much to connect the NU chair with international peace and religious dialogue networks as well as funding sources. Taylor's overbearing manner and idiosyncratic ideas on Indonesian Islam soon made him a much-disliked figure within NU.

Anti-Taylor sentiment intensified after Yahya appointed him his personal envoy. Many in NU who were committed to interfaith advocacy and peace promotion were unimpressed by Yahya and Taylor's international efforts, particularly their willingness to associate with foreign leaders who were known for their repressive or sectarian tendencies, such as Hungary's Viktor Orban or Ram Madhav from India's BJP. Miftach terminated Taylor's envoy status with NU in late November.

Meanwhile there were also concerns at Yahya's political positioning of NU. He had been a close ally of Jokowi, making NU the president's primary basis of support in the Muslim community. In return, Jokowi gave preferential treatment to NU, one instance of which was the mining concession and another was a record number of NU seats in cabinet. But Prabowo's coming to power has seen a major reset of political relationships, particularly as tensions between Jokowi and his successor have mounted and former Jokowi loyalists have been sidelined.

While Prabowo has shown no hostility towards NU, nor does he show favouritism. For example, Yahya has found it difficult to get direct access to the palace, something that had never been a problem during Jokowi's time. This has left NU feeling vulnerable. Many believe that Yahya over-committed to Jokowi and thus placed the organisation at a disadvantage with Prabowo.

Last of all, Yahya's refusal to give recommendations for NU cadres seeking appointments or promotions within the bureaucracy, tertiary sector and state-owned enterprises has rankled with many. Yahya claims to want NU members to win selection on their own merits, but prospective candidates respond that the leaders of rival organisations usually provide recommendations for their own members and that Yahya's 'hands-off' approach, regardless of relative merit, had eroded NU's influence.

Despite these frustrations with Yahya, many of those who supported him in 2021 still back him today, their ambivalent feelings notwithstanding. Ultimately, they regard him as a high-minded and honourable chair with genuinely progressive motivations, although at times naive.

NU is now facing two grim prospects: first, the possibility of a protracted stalemate in which both sides run competing administrations; and second, that one or both of the opposing parties will take the matter to court, leading to drawn-out and expensive legal proceedings, deepening divisions rather than healing them.

Whatever the outcome, the prudence of NU accepting the mining concession from the government now warrants serious scrutiny. Rather than the Yahya-Miftach conflict being a messy internal matter, it now involves oligarchs, one of whom is the president's brother, and resource extraction operations worth hundreds of millions of dollars.

NU may be Indonesia's biggest civil society organisation, but that counts for little when weighty economic and political interests are involved.

Source: https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/nahdlatul-ulama-mining-and-oligarchs