Made Supriatma – Indonesia's new Criminal Procedure Code might make it harder for justice to be done.
Last month, Indonesia's House of Representatives (DPR) passed the draft Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP) bill into law. This is a comprehensive Code that regulates the criminal justice process, and the latest version represents the most significant overhaul of Indonesia's procedural criminal law in over four decades. This Code will complement the Criminal Code (KUHP), enacted on 6 December 2022 (Law 1/2023) during Joko Widodo's presidency. The new version of KUHAP will likely come into force on 2 January 2026.
The Civil Society Coalition has criticised the legislators' lack of transparency and claims the draft bill was made public only a few hours before its ratification during the DPR's plenary. Other civil society organisations claim their names were fraudulently used (dicatut) to falsely convey broader public participation in deliberations. Chair of DPR Commission III, Gerindra's Habiburokhman, who presided over the process, dismissed these criticisms as unfounded while attacking the Coalition, deriding them as "lazy".
The Coalition is urging President Prabowo Subianto to issue a Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perppu) to revoke the newly ratified KUHAP before it becomes fully effective. The President must sign each bill into law, but even if Prabowo chooses not to sign it, the KUHAP will automatically take effect 90 days after the DPR ratified it. As the Minister of the State Secretariat Prasetyo Hadi stated during Commission III's deliberations, the government supports the bill. It is highly likely that the President will sign it into law.
The KUHAP's most contentious elements concern which state institutions are authorised to perform the functions of investigation and criminal justice, particularly the division of authority between the Prosecutor's Office and the National Police (Polri). A long-standing tug-of-war exists between these two institutions over who holds primary investigative power.
There are significant differences between the 2025 KUHAP and the 1981 version. The most notable change is that the new KUHAP explicitly designates the police as "primary investigator" in a wide range of criminal cases. The rationale is to streamline the handling of criminal cases by consolidating them under a single authority, to make investigations more efficient and reduce red tape. However, the revised KUHAP grants Polri broad investigative authority and strengthens and expands powers they already possess. Civil society and legal analysts warn that concentrating such extensive authority in Polri's hands would create institutional imbalance, weaken oversight, and enable police abuse of power.
Another point of contention is whether Polri should supervise all other investigative bodies, including those within ministries and specialised agencies, or whether the latter should retain their independence. A. 93(3) illustrates this shift clearly, stating that civil service investigators (PPNS) and "certain investigators are under the coordination and supervision" of police ones. This means that the new KUHAP places PPNS and other specialist investigative units (such as those handling taxation, forestry, customs, narcotics, and environmental crimes) under direct police coordination and oversight. For example, forestry PPNS must coordinate with Polri when investigating illegal logging or other forestry-related crimes once the new KUHAP comes into force. Ironically, Polri lacks the expertise for handling crimes in these areas.
The revised KUHAP expands police investigative powers, particularly for detention authority, search and seizure, and undercover operations. This has intensified concerns about the erosion of checks and balances, the opacity of investigative decision-making, and how victims' and defendants' rights can be protected if investigative power becomes concentrated in a single institution.
A clear contradiction has thus emerged: rather than strengthening oversight over the police, the new Code is likely to further consolidate police authority while weakening external accountability mechanisms...
The new Code reaffirms that Indonesia's Prosecutor's Office serves as the public prosecutor in the criminal justice system, but unlike the previous version (Law 8/1981), significantly limits this Office's investigative authority. The draft bill stated that prosecutors may conduct advanced investigations only in cases of serious human rights violations, while their broader investigative powers, particularly in corruption cases, are curtailed. Under the 1981 KUHAP, the Prosecutor's Office could issue an Investigation Commencement Order (SPDP) but in the revised version, investigations can begin only through a police order. Furthermore, prosecutors previously supervised investigations and could direct additional inquiries but under the new Code, investigative supervision will rest entirely with Polri.
The revision places search and seizure, surveillance, and wiretapping exclusively under police authority, which removes prosecutorial oversight and eliminates checks by other institutions. It expands police detention powers, contradicting UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) standards. Other changes weaken the Prosecutor's Office's ability to conduct further investigations, authorise extended detention, request additional investigative actions through case file reviews, and exercise dominus litis (prosecutorial control over legal strategy and indictment).
Taken together, these shifts diminish the independence and supervisory role of the Prosecutor's Office. A deeper concern is that the new KUHAP restricts the Prosecutor's Office from conducting in-depth investigations into complex criminal cases, as these cases typically require specialised prosecutorial prerogatives and independence. Now, the division of roles seems increasingly ambiguous: coordination between investigators and prosecutors is mandated, yet the prosecution's independence and discretionary authority are constrained by Polri's dominant position.
This centralisation of investigative power (within Polri) may generate political and operational challenges for Prabowo's administration. The president has relied heavily on the Attorney General's Office to investigate and prosecute violations of forest-area regulations by plantation and mining companies, for instance. His administration has established a Forest Area Enforcement Task Force, led by the Attorney General for Special Crimes, and supported by the armed forces (TNI) and Polri. By limiting prosecutorial investigative authority, the revised KUHAP could disrupt the inter-agency balance on which this task force depends and potentially weaken the government's ability to pursue powerful corporate violators.
The most serious concern relates to police reform. While President Prabowo has established a National Police Reform Commission, he has not clarified what reforms the Commission will recommend. Meanwhile, the Civil Society Coalition for Police Reform (RFP Coalition) has identified nine problems that must be addressed, including the police's excessive use of force, torture; custodial deaths; fabricated cases; corruption and extortion. A clear contradiction has thus emerged: rather than strengthening oversight over the police, the new Code is likely to consolidate police authority while weakening external accountability mechanisms, which the Civil Society Coalition has repeatedly highlighted. This does not bode well for the realisation of the president's claim to back police reform.
[Made Supriatma is a Visiting Fellow in the Indonesia Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Made's research focus is on Indonesian politics, civil-military relations, and ethnic/identity politics and he is also a freelance journalist.]
Source: https://fulcrum.sg/indonesias-problematic-criminal-procedure-code-revision