Ian Story – Indonesia's recent announcement that it was considering buying the China-made J-10 fighter raises more questions than answers.
Indonesia's recent announcement that it was considering procuring 42 J-10 "Vigorous Dragon" fighter jets from China was frustratingly short on details. All Defence Minister Sjafie Sjamsoeddin would say was "They will be flying over Jakarta soon".
In the absence of specifics, his terse comment raised a host of geopolitical, fiscal, technical, and operational questions. This article will attempt to answer four of the key ones.
The first question is which model of the J-10 does Indonesia want to buy?
The single-engine, medium-weight, multi-role fighter was first developed in the 1980s, with help from Israel. It went into production in the late 1990s and entered service with the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) in the early 2000s. As improvements were made to the engine, radar, avionics and weaponry, the J-10 evolved through three models: A, B, and C. The J-10 has been called China's answer to America's F-16 Fighting Falcon.
Many people assumed that Indonesia had its sights set on the latest model, the J-10C, a 4.5-generation aircraft. As Indonesia seeks to modernise its air force " and keep up with its neighbours' new fighter acquisitions " buying the latest model would make sense.
But according to the well-respected defence publisher Jane's, Indonesia wants to buy 42 second-hand J-10Bs previously in service with the PLAAF, and is looking for a US$1.6 billion credit line or loan to finance the deal (presumably China will provide that loan). On the face of it, this does not seem like a good deal as the J-10B is a 4th-generation aircraft that would not improve the capabilities of the Indonesian air force. However, it may be that Indonesia is simply looking for a stop-gap fighter until it receives its 5th generation fighters on order from South Korea and Turkiye which are scheduled for delivery in the mid-to-late 2030s.
The second question is why buy from China?
" if Indonesia does go ahead and formally agrees to purchase the J-10, it would be the first time China has broken into a regional market long dominated by Western and Russian aerospace companies.
Since the early 2000s, Indonesia has sought to avoid becoming dependent on one country for its military equipment by diversifying the sources of its procurement. Jakarta had learned from the bitter experience of the 1990s, when US sanctions left many of Indonesia's US-built aircraft grounded due to a lack of spare parts.
As defence minister and now president, Prabowo Subianto has taken the diversification policy to extraordinary lengths, sourcing fighter jets from the US, France, South Korea, Turkiye, possibly Russia and now China. Indonesia argues that diversity enhances its strategic autonomy. But it also creates multiple and costly logistical, training, and maintenance streams. Interoperability will be a big problem as the communications, sensor networks, and datalinks of Chinese and Russian planes are not compatible with Western aircraft. Solving that problem will be technically complex and expensive, and may only achieve partial success.
In addition to strategic autonomy, geopolitics appears to have been another factor. Prabowo has signalled that in keeping with the country's "active and independent" foreign policy, it should not choose sides in major power competition and should balance its relations with West and East. Apparently, that includes operating US, Russian, and Chinese warplanes.
Cost and capabilities will also have informed Indonesia's decision. At US$30-40 million per plane, the J-10C is less than half the price of analogues such as the F-16 and the French-built Rafale. Second-hand J-10Bs would presumably be even cheaper.
Jakarta appears to have been mulling the J-10C since mid-2024. The aircraft's reportedly excellent performance in the aerial dogfight between Pakistan (the only foreign operator of the Vigorous Dragon) and India on 7 May 2025 may have accelerated the decision.
Pakistan says it shot down five Indian jets, including up to three Rafales, a claim rejected by India and by Dassault, which makes the plane (similarly, Islamabad has also rejected India's claim to have shot down six Pakistani jets). It may have been that the Indian air force underestimated the range and firepower of the J-10 and its PL-15 air-to-air missiles. But whether it was a triumph of Chinese over Western military technology, or a failure of Indian tactics and intelligence, will probably never be known. But both Pakistan and China have portrayed the J-10C as the victor in the biggest confrontation between modern fighter jets in recent times. But if Indonesia buys the older J-10Bs, they will not have the same capabilities as the J-10Cs which performed so well against India. Interestingly, the reported shooting down of the Rafales did not put Indonesia off ordering more of the French aircraft two months later.
The third question is whether Indonesia's purchase of Chinese fighter jets will negatively affect its defence ties with the US. This is not a given. The US Air Force conducts exercises with its Pakistani counterpart (though only with the Pakistan Air Force's F-16s, not its J-10s). But the Trump administration may view it as an unfriendly act and take a 2023 agreement with Jakarta to buy 24 F-15EXs off the table.
The fourth question is what it means for China's defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia.
Chinese defence equipment has a patchy reputation in the region. Myanmar grounded its fleet of JF-17s (a joint venture between China and Pakistan) due to structural problems. But China's FTC-2000G light fighter has been helping Myanmar's armed forces regain control of areas lost to anti-government forces.
The other Southeast Asian countries that operate fast jets have stayed clear of Chinese planes. Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia will not buy warplanes from a country that has competing maritime claims in the South China Sea (this does not appear to have put Indonesia off, which is also a party to the dispute). Singapore and Thailand prefer Western-made fighters.
But if Indonesia does go ahead and formally agrees to purchase the J-10, it would be the first time China has broken into a regional market long dominated by Western and Russian aerospace companies. That in itself would be cause for celebration for the makers of the Vigorous Dragon.
[Ian Storey is Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and author of Putin's Russia and Southeast Asia: The Kremlin's Pivot to Asia and the Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War (ISEAS, May 2025).]
Source: https://fulcrum.sg/why-did-indonesia-decide-to-buy-chinas-j-10-fighter-jet
