Alfin Febrian Basundoro – Indonesia is reportedly close to acquiring Chengdu J-10 fighters from China, after Indonesian Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin signed a contract during an October visit to Beijing. While Jakarta urgently needs new aircraft for military deterrence, this procurement is logistically questionable and fiscally unwise.
The J-10 has attracted Indonesian officials' interest since Pakistan's J-10s reportedly outperformed India's French-made Rafale fighter jets during a clash in May. The J-10's price also appeals to Jakarta. At roughly US$40 million per aircraft, it appears to be affordable compared with other aircraft, such as the US$94 million Boeing F-15EX. Indonesia's Ministry of Defence has acknowledged that cost and availability are key factors, with some Indonesian pilots reportedly already undertaking training in China since June.
Indonesia's air force is indeed under strain: it has only 62 operational fighters. Spare parts for Russia-made Sukhoi Su-27s and Su-30s have become scarce, and US-made F-16s are showing their age. Since 2020, Indonesia has attempted to address these gaps through several significant acquisitions, including 42 Dassault Rafales from France and 48 TF-Kaan fighters from Turkey. The country is also still committed to the South Korean KF-21 joint development program. If all these acquisitions are realised, Indonesia would have combat aircraft from six different countries.
Regardless of the J-10's air-combat capability, we must consider Indonesia's overall military capability and other constraints to see how the type would fit in.
Procurement doesn't end when the new equipment arrives: lifetime maintenance demands proper maintenance facilities, spare parts storage and a maintenance crew trained on that specific equipment type to ensure it remains combat-ready. Since different aircraft may have varying maintenance and spare parts requirements, particularly if they are from different countries, Indonesia's air force would need to maintain as many as six different maintenance ecosystems.
While procuring the J-10 may contribute to Indonesia's diversified (https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/incontested-region-indonesia-diversifies-arms-imports/) foreign policy, it would be a logistical nightmare for Indonesian air force engineers. Introducing another system from yet another supplier would multiply logistical burdens. Pilots, technicians and weapons officers would all require fresh training on the new platform, and maintenance chains would need to be expanded.
This diversity undermines the efficiency of the Indonesian air force's aircraft maintenance systems and would consume a more significant proportion of Indonesia's defence spending. More money would have to be spent on buying and stockpiling multiple types of spare parts and maintaining equipment to service six different aircraft. In contrast, if Indonesia had purchased aircraft from just two countries, it would have to maintain only two different spare part stocks and two different sorts of maintenance equipment to service the same number of fighters.
Sure, some of these constraints could be reduced to a certain degree by technical fixes, such as the production of bilingual instruction manuals and labels. However, such technical fixes would not help Indonesian engineers to gain the high degree of expertise and know the intimate details of one aircraft type to be able to conduct maintenance in a speedy and high quality manner, a skill that will come useful if Indonesia is ever put in a real combat situation to increase the number of fighter jets available for combat and avoid long maintenance.
Indonesia's defence budget is projected to increase from 167.4 trillion rupiah (US$10.1 billion) in 2025 to 185 trillion rupiah (US$11.6 billion) in 2026, with 40 percent allocated for arms modernisation. We have always been proponents of increasing Indonesia's abysmally low defence share of GDP, but such an increase must be prudently spent to beef up defence.
Since the government has already committed to procuring fighter jets from France and potentially from Turkey (https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/indonesia-and-turkey-sign-contract-for-48-kaan-fighter-jets-atidef-2025) and South Korea (https://breakingdefense.com/2025/06/indonesia-south-korea-sign-revised-kf-21-development-agreement/), it would not be wise to spend more on building a new maintenance ecosystem to procure and maintain the J-10.
Directing public funds toward another new aircraft that requires a substantial investment in a new maintenance ecosystem is neither strategic nor responsible. What Indonesia needs now is not more suppliers or symbolic military modernisation, but a focused defence procurement that balances security imperatives with budgetary prudence. Buying a new fighter jet from a totally new maintenance ecosystem is anything but.
[Alfin Febrian Basundoro holds an advanced master's degree in strategic studies from the Australian National University, Canberra. Currently, he serves as a research coordinator at the Center for National Defense and Security Studies in Surabaya. Trystanto Sanjaya is a visiting fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs in Oslo.]