Maidina Rahmawati and Erasmus AT Napitupulu – The Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR) is reportedly set to ratify amendments to Law No. 2 of 2002 on the National Police after starting deliberations in February this year.
But the Police Bill – initiated by the DPR and the administration of former president Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo last year – will not address systemic problems plaguing the police force such as entrenched corruption and impunity. In fact, if passed in its current form, it will deal yet another serious blow to Indonesia's democracy.
The bill has been widely seen as problematic since it was introduced in July 2024. Critics quickly pointed out that it contained vague provisions apparently meant to expand the powers of the police force. The problem was that it stopped short of putting in place legal guardrails to keep those powers in check, potentially creating a huge accountability gap.
That is why it is of great concern that few, if any, changes, have been made to latest version of the bill now before the House.
Accountability deficit
Because of its entrenched culture of violence and impunity, Indonesia's police force has consistently been regarded by human rights groups as one the most problematic institutions in the country.
Human rights NGO KontraS, for example, recorded 353 cases of police violence that resulted in 410 deaths between 2020 and 2024. Alarmingly, 27 of these deaths occurred during legal proceedings and were classified by KontraS as extrajudicial killings.
The Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI), meanwhile, recorded 35 police shooting incidents that claimed the lives of 94 individuals within the same period.
There is no end in sight to this abuse. According to YLBHI, in 2024, at least 32 men and 3 women were detained without access to legal aid and allegedly tortured during investigations. YLBHI also reported that dozens of police detainees claimed to have been subject to extortion and sexual violence by the authorities.
National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) data support this, showing that the police force is the state institution most frequently reported by the public for alleged human rights abuses. In 2024 alone, Komnas HAM received 2,305 complaints, 663 of which were directed at the National Police. Similar trends can be seen in 2021, 2022, and 2023.
It is no surprise that public trust in the police is low. According to the latest Lembaga Survei Indonesia poll, the police are, in fact, now the least trusted law enforcement institution in Indonesia. They seen as corrupt and prone to being co-opted by short-term political interests.
Another blank cheque for the police
Despite these reports of rampant police abuse, the police bill does not introduce new provisions that could improve oversight mechanisms. It could, for example, have amended Article 38 of the existing law to strengthen the powers of the currently toothless National Police Commission (Kompolnas) to oversee the police.
In fact, there is no robust state-sanctioned police watchdog. The Ombudsman and Kompolnas can only issue non-binding recommendations, and Kompolnas' role is simply to assist the president with policy recommendations. It lacks investigatory powers and can only forward complaints to the Chief of Police. Komnas HAM can investigate gross human rights violations committed by police officers, but that is it.
This means most investigations into police criminal conduct are still in the hands of the police themselves, and this, unsurprisingly, often results in impunity.
The Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) does have power to investigate police, but seems lately to have avoided investigating corrupt police officials, given the potential political and legal backlash that could trigger.
Worse, the bill includes provisions granting the police new powers. Article 14(1)(b, for example, grants the police the power to "supervise" and "secure" cyberspace, even though that authority is already in the hands of the Ministry of Communication and Digital (Kemkomdigi).
Other provisions – Article 14(1)(j) and Article 16(1)(q) – grant the police new intelligence powers such as restricting cyber access for reasons of 'homeland security'. This is a coercive measure that should surely only be exercised with court oversight, but the bill contains no such requirement.
All these provisions are deliberately vague in their wording, with little detail of how they will be implemented, and no accountability mechanisms, risking further unchecked regulatory expansion by the police. They write the police a blank cheque.
It is worth noting that the police have already been able to issue internal regulations that contradict other laws. One example is National Police Chief Regulation No. 6 of 2019, which allows investigators to reject reports of criminal offences and use repressive techniques like stalking or undercover operations during preliminary investigations (penyelidikan). These powers exceed what is permitted under the Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP), which stipulates that no coercive or investigative actions can be taken during preliminary investigations.
National Police Regulation No. 8 of 2021 on Restorative Justice is another example. It allows the police to terminate cases during preliminary investigations without due process.
The latest example is National Police Regulation No. 3 of 2025 on Police Functional Supervision of Foreigners, which grants police sweeping new administrative powers over foreigners.
Politics, not reform agenda, drives the revisions
Following the passage of the new Criminal Code in January 2023 (effective January 2026), policymakers should have shifted their attention to updating the Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP) as well.
This was originally drafted during the authoritarian New Order, when the police were part of the military, but it nonetheless contains some limitations on police powers in criminal cases. It would, therefore, have been much better to make any changes to police powers as part of revisions to KUHAP. By, instead, inserting provisions on criminal investigation procedures into the police bill, not KUHAP, law makers have been able introduce new powers without any real safeguards.
It is unclear why DPR members have chosen to prioritise the Police Law revisions when the bill was not even listed in its 2020-2024 National Legislative Program, but it looks like politics is a major driver of the DPR's legislative agenda.
Jokowi himself that defended the initiation of the Police Bill in July 2024 despite the public's outrage at the substance of the bill and the timing of the deliberations. As outgoing president, he knew then that the military would be major players under Prabowo's administration, due to begin in September that year. Jokowi is very well-known for his strong political ties with the police, and initiation of the Police Bill seems to have been intended to help secure his influence with them, balance the army, and thus maintain his own political clout. During his time in office, Jokowi never showed any interest in fundamental reform of the police. In fact, he politicised the police for his electoral interest.
And that's the problem. Police reform is going nowhere if we fail to address the politicisation of the police institution. The quality of the police bill that will soon become law reflects this exact problem. It falls glaringly short of the democratic and human rights standards expected in a reformed justice system.
Now the spotlight is on Prabowo. Will he shake things up and push for real reform? Or will he stick to the same playbook Jokowi used – keeping things calm on the surface while the real problems of politicisation stay untouched?
Source: https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/indonesias-new-police-bill-more-power-less-oversight