Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir and Rafiqa Qurrata A'yun – Fears of an authoritarian reversal in Indonesia have gained traction, especially after Prabowo Subianto, a former military general known for his record of alleged gross human rights violations, assumed the presidency in Indonesia.
There is ample evidence that seems to support this view, notably the passing of major amendments to the existing Law No. 34 of 2004 on the Indonesian military (TNI). Article 7(2b) of the amended Law, for example, justifies the expansion of military operations other than war, including allowing soldiers to undertake operations against perceived cyber threats. Such operations no longer require a political decision from the national legislature; they can be authorised solely by the president.
For these reasons, the amended Law is seen by many as reinstating the military's dual function doctrine (dwifungsi), which allows the military to once again engage in both security and socio-political matters, as it did for decades under Soeharto. Many are concerned that it will reinforce authoritarian rule.
But, in reality, dwifungsi did not end with Soeharto. It persisted despite democratisation. The Indonesian military has never completely returned to the barracks and security sector reform has stagnated.
Furthermore, the military is not monolithic. It is not entirely under the control of a single ruler, not even aspiring dictator Prabowo. Like other state institutions, various actors compete to exert control over the military, creating factions and tensions within the institution that are linked to power contests. The new TNI law reflects this ongoing contest, particularly over former President Joko Widodo's (Jokowi) continued dominance of key state institutions.
This means establishing military-backed authoritarian rule remains a challenge for political elites in Indonesia, including both Prabowo and Jokowi, and site of contestation – even with the new TNI law in place.
Stagnated security sector reform
Since Reformasi (reformation) began in 1998, many retired army generals and active military officers have continued to take civilian roles in bureaucracy, political parties, and businesses. This confirms that the military remains a significant political faction and that reform agendas aimed at ensuring civilian supremacy over the military have largely failed.
The only real success of the military reform process has been the separation of the police from the military through Decree of the People's Consultative Assembly (Tap MPR) No. VI/MPR/2000.
This means that the 2025 TNI law does not pave the way for the military to return to its dual function, as soldiers already occupy many civilian positions. It merely strengthens the legal foundation for these practices, already justified by a range of different laws, presidential regulations and memoranda of understanding with private and public sectors.
For example, the army's role in border security is outlined in Regulation of Defence Minister No. 13 of 2014 on Border Security Policy. In the context of disaster management, Article 73(3) of Presidential Regulation No. 29 of 2021, which amends Presidential Regulation No. 1 of 2019 regarding the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB), allows active TNI officers to serve as the Deputy for Emergency Management of the agency.
Meanwhile, Article 43I Law No. 5 of 2018 on the amendment of Terrorism Law allows TNI officers to be involved in combating terrorism as part of "military operations other than war".
Another provision that allows TNI officers to hold civilian positions includes Article 62A of Presidential Regulation No. 15 of 2021 on the Second Amendment of Presidential Regulation No. 38 of 2010 on the Organisation and Work Procedures of the Attorney's General Office. This allows an active TNI officer to hold the role of Junior Attorney General for the Military (Jaksa Agung Muda Pidana Militer), a new position introduced by articles 5g1 and 25A, 25B and 25C of the 2021 regulation.
Importantly, the revised TNI law preserves the existing power structure that already provides privileges and impunity for soldiers, particularly the elite ranks. The maintenance of the New Order's Law No. 31 of 1997 on Military Court, for example, allows military personnel to remain largely exempt from criminal prosecution in courts of general jurisdiction (peradilan umum), where sentences are generally heavier.
Meanwhile, the extensive command posts of the territorial army, particularly the Regional Commands (Komando Daerah Militer) and their associated institutions, as outlined in Articles 60 and 106 of Presidential Regulation No 66 of 2019 on Organisational Structure of the Indonesian National Army, continues to overshadow government bureaucracies.
Responding to Jokowi's dominance
The new TNI law enhances legal justifications for the military's dual function, but it does not inevitably lead to a return to military authoritarian rule under Prabowo. This is because attempts to centralise power in a single ruler inherently threaten to reduce the share of power and resources available to other contending political-economic elite players.
For these reasons, as Jokowi remains a powerful political actor, he is likely to thwart any ambition by Prabowo to centralise power in his own hands. Although he is no longer in power, Jokowi will cast a shadow over Prabowo so long his son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, serves as vice president.
Jokowi also continues to have influence over law enforcement institutions, including the Indonesian National Police (Polri), the Attorney General's Office (AGO) and the anti-graft body (KPK), whose top officials were appointed during his presidency. Over the past few years, Jokowi weaponised these institutions to tame political rivals, ensure loyalty from his allies, and silence critics.
He also still retains a degree of control over the military, especially through the TNI Commander, General Agus Subiyanto, and Army Chief of Staff General Maruli Simanjuntak, both also appointed during his administration. Additionally, Maruli is the son-in-law of retired Army General Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, a close ally of Jokowi.
It is premature for Prabowo, who is still consolidating power with different actors, to simply replace top officials in law enforcement and the military with his own loyalists. Such actions would incite direct confrontation with Jokowi's factions, and Jokowi's ongoing control over many branches of state power would enable him to retaliate against the threat to his power posed by the strengthening of the TNI.
However, by revising the TNI law, Prabowo may have an opportunity to start exerting greater influence over this coercive institution. This new Law provides stronger legal justification for the expansion of military roles, which Prabowo would hope to use to win greater loyalty from key military personnel.
The challenge to establishing military authoritarian rule
Before the end of Jokowi's administration in 2024, he demonstrated a desire to extend his presidential term through a constitutional amendment. However, this proposal was rejected by his own party, PDIP, primarily because it conflicted with the agenda of the party chair, Megawati Soekarnoputri, who intended to nominate her daughter as the 2024 presidential candidate. In the end Jokowi simply walked away from PDIP to back Prabowo. This has led to fierce rivalry between Jokowi and Megawati.
The revised TNI law makes it clear that Prabowo now wants to concentrate more power in his own hands. This would require him to distance himself from Jokowi's influence. He could do this partly by consolidating the military, and perhaps by forging an alliance with Megawati.
Megawati, the Chair of PDIP, had previously rejected proposals to revise the 2004 TNI law, but it turned out that her daughter, Puan Maharani, who is a speaker of the House of Representatives (DPR), took the lead in revising it. As the revised Law clearly favours military interests, PDIP's manoeuvres are likely to win it leverage over the military and Prabowo.
This is especially important for PDIP, since the KPK (under Jokowi's influence) finally arrested the party's Secretary General Hasto Kristiyanto, in February 2025. Hasto had been named a suspect in a bribery case in December 2024, but had not been arrested, allegedly as a result of negotiations between Megawati and Prabowo. However, Hasto's arrest now demonstrates that Prabowo cannot be a fully trusted ally of Megawati. In response, Megawati has instructed PDIP cadres to postpone attending a government retreat for local leaders.
Hasto's arrest is also a potent reminder to all the other players that Jokowi has weaponised the KPK for his own purposes and is willing to deploy it – in this case to undermine his bitter enemies, Megawati and her party.
Proposals to amend the Police Law, the Prosecutor's Law, and the Criminal Procedure Code now offer another opportunity for Prabowo and Megawati to offer a major challenge to Jokowi's dominance, just as they did with the TNI law. These bills aim to reconstitute the investigative powers of law enforcement agencies, which will create a whole new arena of contention. As has been demonstrated by Jokowi for the last few years, whoever controls law enforcement agencies with substantial investigative authority has real power – the ability to fabricate criminal cases for political ends.
Simply put, the amended TNI law is more than just about dwifungsi or a return to authoritarian rule. It reflects power negotiations at play among contending powerful actors, none of whom is dominant – at least not yet.