Aristyo Darmawan and Jeremia Humolong Prasetya – Much has been said about the controversial amendment of the 2004 Indonesian Military (TNI) Law. Critics say is meant to revive the dual function (dwifungsi) of the military that underpinned Soeharto's authoritarian regime.
Many have focused on how the law would pave the way for potential abuses by active military officials in civilian institutions. In this article, we highlight the ways in which the new TNI law could also hamper Indonesia's long-term maritime security.
The new, amended TNI law increases the number of civilian institutions where an active military personnel member can serve, from 10 to 14. Among the new ones is the Indonesian coast guard (Badan Keamanan Laut or Bakamla), the maritime security agency. Thus, under the new law, active Navy personnel can serve as Bakamla coast guards, while still remaining members of the Navy.
How will this affect the operations of Bakamla?
Anatomy of Indonesia's coast guard
Bakamla was established in 2014 under the Coordinating Ministry for Politics, Law and Security. Its main responsibility is to ensure Indonesia's maritime security at sea. This includes policies, patrols, and coordinating all institutions with authority for maritime law enforcement.
Under Presidential Regulation 178 of 2014 on the Establishment of Bakamla, there are two types of Bakamla personnel: Bakamla officers (civilians recruited by the agency), and auxiliary officers (officials seconded from other institutions, mainly the Navy).
It is worth noting that under the previous TNI Law, all naval officers seconded to Bakamla were supposed to resign or be suspended from the military. However, in reality, most remained active military members. This explains why the current leadership of Bakamla – the chief, deputy chiefs, and the directors – is dominated by serving naval officers.
This has created problems, particularly when Bakamla officials are suspected of a crime. In 2019, for example, one of the suspects in a corruption case involving Bakamla officials was prosecuted in the military court due to his status as an active military member, while the rest were tried in civilian courts. Critics argue that military personnel serving in civilian positions should not be brought to the military court where sentences are typcially lighter.
The amended TNI Law now legalises the current practice by which active Navy personnel serve in the Coast Guard without resigning from the Navy. However, it is wrong to assume that nothing will change because of this. We think formalising the seconding of active military officers to Bakamla as coast guards will only intensify the creeping militarisation of this supposedly civilian institution.
Marginalisation of civilian coast guards
The new TNI law will also undermine Bakamla's career merit system by granting naval officers a legal boost up the promotions ladder.
Bakamla has already recruited and trained civilians as Coast Guard officers. However, civilian-recruited officers are second-class members of the agency. As mentioned, high-level positions within the institution are currently held by ex-naval officers or even active naval officers. The new Law will likely just make this problem worse.
We acknowledge the fact that the limited resources at Bakamla's disposal have been used as a pretext to allow active naval officers to serve in the agency, and that it could help improve coordination between the agency and the Navy as maritime authorities. However, to have a civilian institution in charge of maritime security, it needs to have civilian officers in charge. They should be recruited, trained, and equipped solely as members of a civilian institution that is separate from the Navy, and can act independently of it.
Undermining civilian governance at sea
As members of a civilian institution in charge of maritime law enforcement, coast guard officers do not need the same skills and capabilities as naval officers.
Naval officers are primarily trained to ensure national defence in dealing with security and external threats at sea, despite also having a secondary constabulary role in maritime law enforcement. Coast Guard officers, meanwhile are primarily in charge of maritime law enforcement. There are meant to be the front line dealing with civilians and a range of serious maritime crimes, including human trafficking.
Their skill sets and training and should therefore be quite different. Coast Guard officers should be trained to deal with non-military threats, while the Navy should be trained and prepared for a military threats at sea including war.
In many countries, Coast Guard officers have their own training and academy. In the United States, for instance, the US Coast Guard is under the auspices of the Department of Homeland Security, despite being the sixth armed force in the country alongside with the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and the Space Force. US Coast Guard officers have their own Coast Guard Academy as a training institution to provide them with skills that are different to those taught at the US Naval academy.
Another example is the Indian Coast Guard. Although the Indian Coast Guard was supported by the Indian Navy in its early years, it now has its own academy, separated from the Naval Academy.
The need for a strong, professional Bakamla
The Indonesian government needs to build and strengthen Bakamla's infrastructure to become the leading civilian maritime security institution, as mandated by domestic laws and regulations.
Enacting a policy to further militarise the agency – effectively enabling a military takeover – is exactly the wrong thing to do.
[The opinions of the authors do not necessarily reflect those of institutions with which they are affiliated.]