Muhammad Fajar – Can the current president, who seems politically stronger than his predecessor, sustain the big-tent coalition that brought him power?
Following his ruling coalition's dominance in Indonesia's 2024 regional and local elections (pilkada), President Prabowo Subianto has an opportunity to set up a political order in the form of a stable political coalition. Does Prabowo have what he needs to solidify his coalition for the long haul? Will he build a resilient political order in Indonesia, like those initiated by the United Malays National Organisation in Malaysia (UMNO) and the People's Action Party (PAP) in Singapore, or will Prabowo's Indonesia follow the Philippines' pathway, plagued by fragmentation?
Prabowo's odds will depend on how he overcomes two sources of potential instability: his big coalition and the state bureaucracy. As president, he must keep his coalition members happy within the government by maintaining their presence in his cabinet. Meanwhile, he must whip up the slow-moving bureaucracy to deliver his campaign promises.
Although Indonesian civil society has recently challenged Prabowo through mass protests, he started his presidency arguably in a stronger position than his predecessor, Joko Widodo (Jokowi). Jokowi commenced his presidency as a cadre politician who had to rely on former president Megawati Sukarnoputri's Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) to support his candidacy. Jokowi lacked the finances for his 2014 race. In contrast, Prabowo won as chair of Gerindra party and is a tycoon with businesses in mining and plantations, supported by his tycoon brother. The president remains well respected by the military, given his past appointment as defence minister, his honorary four-star general status, and his military service. Compared to Jokowi, Prabowo's power base arguably puts him in a better political bargaining position vis-a-vis his coalition members.
Yet Gerinda, founded in 2008, is a relatively new party with less seasoned politicians than other parties like Golkar and PDI-P. This could affect how Prabowo secures political consensus for his strategic policies and tempers his leverage over other coalition members. Nonetheless, Gerindra is the third-largest party (and growing), and under Prabowo's control.
Prabowo potentially faces power-hungry politicians who might abandon the coalition and challenge him come 2029, the next presidential and general election (PE and GE) year. The nomination of former Jakarta governor and 2024 presidential contender Anies Baswedan by the National Democrats (NasDem) and the National Awakening Party (PKB) in 2024 was an indication of such politicking. The incentive for even ruling coalition members to nominate one of their own for the 2029 race is now stronger following the Constitutional Court's 2024 decision to void the previous (vote-share) threshold for political parties to nominate their candidate for PE2029.
Prabowo has sought to instil discipline early on in his team. For instance, he personally reprimanded Yandri Susanto, the minister for villages and development of disadvantaged regions, and "Gus" Miftah Maulana, the former special presidential envoy for religious harmony and religious facility development, for stirring public controversy. Susanto was rebuked because he misused his official letterhead, while Maulana was scolded for insulting a tea seller and has since resigned. In the face of recent demonstrations, Prabowo replaced one minister on 19 February. It is possible more adjustments to his cabinet may come.
Separately, the unity of Prabowo's coalition might be threatened through possible fragmentation due to electoral competition at the sub-national level. During Jokowi's tenure, he made some effort to align competing interests: mainly, the national coalition's political intervention ensured that the same coalition won key races in the pilkada. From last November's races, Prabowo's continuation of the same strategy paid off: his coalition won in several significant and large provinces, including South Sumatra, Banten, West Java, Central Java, and East Java.
Yet these wins may not necessarily mean a solid foundation for a durable grand coalition. Ironically, ambitious governors and regents among the winners in 2024's pilkada may challenge the coalition by joining other parties (and coalitions) in the next few years. Thus, Prabowo needs to control them by co-opting them into his coalition. The nomination of Ridwan Kamil by the Onward Indonesia Coalition-plus (KIM Plus) as their gubernatorial candidate for Jakarta epitomised such a strategy. However, Ridwan lost the election to Pramono Anung, PDI-P's candidate.
Another challenge will come from the beleaguered state bureaucracy. Prabowo's priority agenda items, such as his "free nutritious meals" (MBG) programme and improving budget efficiency through austerity, require robust bureaucratic capacity. Unfortunately, the quality of Indonesian bureaucracy is poor and marred by corruption. When the public service cannot deliver, the people's grievances emerge: the "Dark Indonesia" protests exemplify this problem.
Prabowo's solution for now is to rely on using the military and retired soldiers to achieve his policy agenda. For instance, he has assigned Aries Murdiyanto, a former Kopassus (special forces) officer, to monitor development projects. Among Aries' responsibilities are surveilling the free meals programme and instilling fiscal discipline for governors and regents. Prabowo's reliance on military elements will likely increase when his coalition's move to revise the law governing the military succeeds. The revised law will provide the president with more power: for instance, draft clauses 47 and 53 allow the hiring of active military personnel to fill civilian posts at the president's discretion.
On paper at least, Prabowo should have more leverage than Jokowi ever did in implementing his agenda as president. However, after this initial phase of his first presidential term, Prabowo's challenge will be figuring out how to maintain the same large coalition to support him in 2029.
[Muhammad Fajar (Ph.D.) is a research fellow at the Institute for Advanced Research (IFAR), the Atma Jaya Catholic University of Indonesia.]
Source: https://fulcrum.sg/indonesia-towards-a-durable-political-order