Ahmad Rizky M Umar – In an unprecedented move that has angered climate activists, Indonesia's biggest Islamic organisations, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), have accepted offers of mining concessions from the Joko "Jokowi" Widodo government.
NU was the first to announce its acceptance of the offer in June, arguing that the concessions will fund social and religious activities. Later, in a 'national consolidation' forum in July, Muhammadiyah accepted the offer on the pretext that it would allow better mining practices that accord with religious values.
NU will manage the coal mines previously controlled by Kaltim Prima Coal (KPC). Muhammadiyah is still waiting for confirmation of its concessions from the government, which previously announced that it would grant six previously controlled by KPC, PT Arutmin Indonesia, PT Kendilo Coal Indonesia, PT Adaro Energy Tbk, PT Multi Harapan Utama and PT Kideco Jaya Agung.
Why have these two religious organisations, which have no prior experience in the mining industry, accepted coal mining concessions from the government?
Religious clientelism
To answer this question, it is important to consider the relationship between NU, Muhammadiyah and the Jokowi government over the last ten years. Jokowi's meteoric rise in Indonesian politics coincided with the emergence of social media as a new battleground for political struggle and a rise in right-wing Islamist politics in Indonesia.
In the first years of his presidency, Jokowi was dogged by allegations questioning his credentials as a Muslim. He was accused of being a descendant of an Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) member, anti-Muslim, and a foreign lackey. Jokowi was also embroiled in sectarian political campaigns in Jakarta's 2017 gubernatorial election, which was characterised by blasphemy accusations against Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) his former deputy when he was governor of Jakarta.
It is not surprising that Jokowi therefore turned to Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama for political backing. He appointed the Chair of NU's Supreme Council, KH Ma'ruf Amin, as his running mate in 2019 election, which saw his political support increase. He also offered the position of Education Minister – a position traditionally held by Muhammadiyah figure – to Muhammadiyah.
These moves provided Jokowi with a base of social and political support in an increasingly complex political environment, especially as Jokowi was increasingly marginalised by his own party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) of Megawati Soekarnoputri.
Support from NU and Muhammadiyah continued into the 2024 general election as Jokowi came to the end of his second and final term and planned to hand power to his rival-turned-ally, Prabowo Subianto. Although the central boards of Muhammadiyah and NU did not announce formal support for Prabowo and Gibran Rakabuming Raka (Jokowi's son), ruling elites in both organisations unofficially endorsed them through networks of volunteers.
On the NU side, several leaders – including NU's women leader Khofifah – endorsed Prabowo, either formally or unofficially, and did so without any disciplinary action from its central board. Leaders of the Muhammadiyah youth and student wing, on other hand, formed Brigade 1912 to support Prabowo-Gibran during the election.
But this political backing entailed a quid pro quo. It is important to note that it came at a time when NU and Muhammadiyah were setting up ambitious programs to expand their organisational base, and these would require huge financial support from the government.
Muhammadiyah, for example, has been active in acquiring private colleges in many parts of the country and expanding its large network of universities and schools, as well as building a hotel and conference venue for its mouthpiece, Suara Muhammadiyah, in Yogyakarta. At the same time, Muhammadiyah has been actively internationalising, establishing an international university in Perlis, Malaysia, a school in Melbourne, Australia, and, more recently, converting a church into a mosque on the outskirts of Madrid, Spain.
Similarly, NU is aiming to expand its growing Nahdlatul Ulama University (UNU) in various cities, as well as funding development for its growing pesantren networks across the country and financing branches across the country. NU is also working to expand its international networks through Bayt Ar-Rahmah, a joint initiative based in the United States that aims to globalise Indonesia's version of moderate Islam.
These developments require massive financial support, which might now be available through the new mining concessions. This is the context behind the Jokowi government's mining concession offers: Jokowi needs Muhammadiyah and NU to legitimise his signature programmes, and to ensure a smooth transition to Prabowo-Gibran, and Muhammadiyah and NU need funds.
Nevertheless, it is still unclear how much revenue both organisations could gain from the mining concession, with NU and Muhammadiyah have yet to release cost/benefit and environmental impact statements. The lack of clear, detailed plans about what they will do with the mining concessions reflects the wider clientelism of relations between the Jokowi government and Indonesia's leading Muslim organisations.
Grassroot challenges, elite insecurity
The move to accept mining concessions has generated much criticism, and has created real tensions within NU and Muhammadiyah.
The Gusdurian Network, a national grass-root movement organised by followers of former NU chair Abdurrahman Wahid, has rejected NU's engagement with coal mining, calling it unethical because of its destructive social and environmental impacts.
Likewise, within Muhammadiyah, a member of its central executive board – former KPK Commissioner Professor Busyro Muqoddas – has publicly expressed his disapproval of the mining concessions. He cites the environmental risks, but is also concerned the concessions may foment agrarian conflicts and human rights violations.
Other groups within Muhammadiyah have expressed concern. Aisyiyah, Muhammadiyah's women's wing, rejected the offer primarily because of its detrimental effects on the environment, in line with Muhammadiyah's Treatise on Progressive Islam. The South Kalimantan Provincial Board of Muhammadiyah, a resource-rich and predominantly Muslim area, also criticised the decision to accept mining concessions due to the adverse environmental impacts of mining activities in that province.
It is reprehensible that leaders of both NU and Muhammadiyah reacted harshly to the criticism – even to the point of using anti-communist and climate denial rhetoric to justify their controversial decisions.
A prominent figure on the NU Central Board Ulil Abshar Abdalla criticised the rejection of mining concessions as ideologically motivated against the mining sector, rather than informed by fiqh (Islamic legal reasoning). Ulil accused critics of being 'alarmist' and "incorrectly considering" coal a 'dirty industry' rather than 'god's gift'.
Muhammadiyah chairman Professor Haedar Nashir went much further, accusing critics of coal mining of being influenced by 'NGO left ideology', which he considered a threat to Muhammadiyah's stance of Islamic moderation, citing the left's animosity towards the government and Indonesia's oligarchy. He argued that the so-called 'NGO left ideology' is something that Muhammadiyah should avoid, especially when it comes to managing natural resources.
This outright rejection of environmentalism and progressive climate policies is common among the European far-right movements. Interestingly, in Indonesia, their anti-science rhetoric is primarily reproduced by mainstream Muslim leaders.
These reactions reveal not only the clientelist relationship between Muslim organisations and the Jokowi government, but also a growing sense of insecurity among Indonesian Muslim elites in the wider context of uncertain economic conditions. In particular, both organisations seem to have feared missing out on huge financial support from the government, which they need to fund organisational expansion and the ambitious development agendas of both organisations in the future.
Elites within NU and Muhammadiyah have faced criticism from their members for accepting the coal mining concessions, and a new ideological battle has opened up between progressive and conservative elements in the two organisations. This battle is now no longer dominated just by fiqh and Islamic theology, but is now focusing on mining concessions. Accepting the concessions suggests the conservatives may well end up be on the wrong side of history.