Tim Dodd – Now let us see if we can follow this logic through. According to Defence Minister Robert Hill, in the new uncertain international environment Australians may have to rely on the Indonesian army to protect them from terrorists.

And this Indonesian army is the same outfit whose special forces, the Kopassus, are suspected by many of being involved in the murder of three teachers in an armed ambush near the Freeport mine in Indonesia's Papua province last month. The killings, in which two of the dead and many of the wounded were American, are the most serious incidents which could be classified as terrorism that Americans have experienced in Indonesia for many years.

We do not know whether or not the army was involved in the killings. However, police are suspicious of the story put forward by Papuan army commander Major-General Mahidin Simbolon (a former Kopassus officer), about one of the suspected killers they claim they killed in a firefight the following day. Briefly, the body – supposedly killed only a couple of hours earlier when it was examined by the police investigating the case – was already stiff and police believe it had been dead for least 12 hours.

But the most telling point against Kopassus is that no seasoned observer of Papuan affairs has ruled out the possibility that this so-called elite unit, or other soldiers for that matter, were involved in the killings.

The reason why is that the Indonesian army is, at best, an ill-disciplined, poorly trained and badly equipped military force. And at its worst it can only be described as a group of brigands specialising in protection rackets, robbery and corruption.

So why would the Australian Defence Minister resort to a counsel of desperation, saying that Australians may need to rely on this institution for protection? The answer is elsewhere in Senator Hill's speech to the C.W. Bean Foundation in Canberra last Wednesday night.

Hill sees a new security threat facing Australia, an "arc of militant Islam" to add to the well-canvassed arc of instability. This new orb, one which is "albeit at the margins of society, stretches across the region, from Malaysia and Singapore across into the southern Philippines and Indonesia, including Sulawesi and Maluku".

And what is the first line of defence against this new threat? It is the Indonesian army, which Senator Hill says will remain a "fundamentally important institution" in Indonesia. He is correct on the latter point. The army is the nation's most powerful single institution and cannot be ignored in Australia's dealings with Indonesia. He also correctly pointed out that the army "will remain the main repository of a viable counter-terrorist capability in Indonesia pending development of an effective police role".

But the minister's analysis goes astray when he suggests that the army has an important role to play in calming the potential for religious division and reducing the attractiveness of violent Islamic extremism in Indonesia. "As a secular organisation [the army] will remain key to the government's efforts to promote tolerance and harmony between Indonesia's many different faiths," Senator Hill said. "This is particularly important in the context of current concerns about the potential attractiveness of radical forms of Islam in the region."

However, the Indonesian army has shown no ability whatsoever to promote tolerance and harmony. In fact, it is a prime mover in fanning Indonesia's most dangerous ethnic and religious conflicts. In Maluku, army units allowed the militant Laskar Jihad to enter the province in 2000, an act which took the civil conflict to a new level. In Aceh, the army shows no understanding whatsoever of legitimate grievances by the strongly Muslim population. The unrelenting abuse and exploitation by army units is a major reason why most Acehnese want to leave Indonesia.

The key to tackling the "arc of militant Islam" is not the army. The fundamental feature of Indonesian Islam is that it is overwhelmingly moderate in nature, and generously mixed with Indonesia's longer-established religions and cultures. The vast majority of Indonesia's approximately 170 million Muslims have no truck with extremism.

So rather than reaching out to the army and relying on its dubious credentials to quell the perceived threat from extremist Islam, perhaps it would be better to set a policy of engagement with Indonesia's moderate Muslim leaders and work with them to achieve a shared goal of limiting the influence of the few unrepresentative radicals.

The minister might think that dialogue with Muslim clerics is outside his beat. But it would do a lot more for Australian interests than waiting for the Indonesian army to become a standard bearer for tolerance and harmony.