Jane Perlez, Jakarta – When the United States recast the Central Asian states from dubious dictatorships to necessary allies in the war on terrorism, Indonesia's generals took heart. Having enjoyed American aid during the cold war and then lost it when American policy stressed human rights in the 1990's, the top military officers in the world's largest Muslim nation began to hope that the United States would soon come calling again.

This week, in fact, Indonesia's defense minister, Matori Abdul Djalil, will be in Washington to talk up the need for reviving military relations. But he will be entering a tricky debate, in which Washington is unsure which way to step.

Should the United States back a military with a history that includes deep corruption and atrocities committed in East Timor three years ago? Some in the Bush administration argue that, whatever the history, the army is the only institution that can keep Indonesia together during the messy transition to democracy.

Or should the United States keep its distance, demanding that Indonesia's military show accountability for its past? According to this argument, popular in Congress and the State Department, only an army leadership that showed contrition could be trusted to strengthen, not weaken, democratic gains.

The sudden interest in the Indonesian military stems, of course, from the war on terrorism. Indonesians in general practice a moderate version of Islam, but a growing number of extremist Islamic groups have emerged in the last few years. Their activities, including the massacre of 14 Christians on the Molucca islands 10 days ago, appear to be tolerated by the military; some American officials point out that the army leadership has not condemned the groups.

Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz, who was ambassador here during the Reagan administration, is likely to give Mr. Matori the most sympathetic hearing. He has said the best way to promote Indonesia as a model moderate Muslim country is for the United States to have influence over the military and help it hold the center together.

"I think it is unfortunate that the US does not today have military-to-military relationships with Indonesia," Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld said last week.

Those who disagree say that the Indonesian military shows few signs of reform. Dana Dillon, a retired American army officer and a policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation, notes that the violence in East Timor three years ago stopped only when the Indonesian Army left. "They had 20 years to reform," said Mr. Dillon. "It didn't work with American military assistance then. Why now?"

Others, like Robert B. Oakley, a former ambassador to Zaire and Pakistan, harbor few illusions about how far American training and money can push Indonesia on the path of reform. But Mr. Oakley takes the pragmatist's view that the United States cannot afford to keep itself shut out of the military. "We can influence them a bit," he said. "we can't revolutionize them."

The history of American involvement with the Indonesian military is one of steady contraction after a high point in the 1970's and 80's.

During the cold war, Indonesian officers trained in the United States. When Indonesian troops fired in 1991 on marchers in East Timor, which was then an occupied territory of Indonesia, Congress placed human rights conditions on training. In 1994, the Clinton administration stopped the sale of small arms, and in 1998, Congress ended all American training of Indonesian soldiers after it learned that a special forces organization whose units had fired on student demonstrators had had American training.

More restrictions were added after army-backed militiamen rampaged through East Timor in 1999 after the area voted for independence. Over 1,000 East Timorese were killed, according to United Nations estimates. This week, after three years of United Nations tutelage, East Timor will gain its formal independence.

The most recent restrictions, which basically outlaw contact with the Indonesian army, are at the heart of the debate in Washington.

Senator Patrick Leahy, Democrat of Vermont, has insisted that the military be held accountable for atrocities in East Timor. The trial of four mid-level army officers, under way now, is the most significant government effort to meet the demand.

But American officials who oppose the renewal of military ties dismiss it as a sham. Most of the defense lawyers also represent the family of Indonesia's deposed dictator, Gen. Suharto. And generals sit in the spectators' gallery, with their presence seen as an effort to intimidate the judges and prosecutors.

In the very short term, the Pentagon may be satisfied with restoring only modest ties. It plans to push Congress for $8 million to equip and train a counterterrorism unit in the Indonesian police force and $8 million to train a peacekeeping force. The members would be vetted by the F.B.I. to weed out human-rights violators.

Gonawan Mohamad, an Indonesian weekly columnist and respected commentator, believes that in the long run the United States should try to work with the army, especially to train young officers. Now, he says, is not the moment to start because the military still needs to acknowledge its mistakes in East Timor.

But the army cannot be left to its own devices forever, he said. If that happens, he predicts, the result will be a rotten army that would only suffocate a nascent democracy.