Ary Hermawan – The recent raid by members of the National Police's (Polri) corruption eradication unit on the private residence of Febrie Adriansyah attracted global attention – not least because it led to the seizure of Rp 476 billion (US$26.3 million) and 74 kilograms of gold bars. Febrie resigned soon after as assistant attorney for special crimes (Jaksa Agung Muda Pidana Khusus, or Jampidsus).
These events were dramatic in themselves, but they are also a clear sign of intensifying power struggles among Indonesia's major political-economic forces.
The spectacular televised raid was part of a series of police operations in Jakarta in connection with a number of corruption cases that allegedly implicated Febrie, who stepped down shortly after the raid, once he was formally charged with corruption and money laundering. The police have handed over Febrie's case to the prosecutors, raising concerns about whether the Kejagung will be able to investigate and prosecute its own top prosecutor.
The cases revolved around investigations by the Attorney General's Office (Kejaksaan Agung, Kejagung) into separate high-profile corruption cases involving several state-owned enterprises (SOEs): electricity company PLN, steelmaker PT Krakatau Steel, and insurers PT Asabri and PT Jiwasraya.
The discovery of vast hidden wealth in in a luxury house belonging to Febrie in an affluent South Jakarta residential area shocked many, given that Febrie was the prosecutor leading investigations into 'mega' corruption cases in recent years. As well as the SOE cases, these included the case of Gojek founder Nadiem Makarim, recently controversially convicted of corruption for the school laptops policy he instituted when serving as Minister for Education.
Moreover, Febrie also served as the head of the Forest Area Enforcement Taskforce (Satuan Tugas Penertiban Kawasan Hutan, Satgas PKH). This task force is a key coercive instrument used by the administration to discipline large businesses in the extractive sector. It under the supervision of Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, one of President Prabowo Subianto's closest and most powerful allies.
While details of Febrie's alleged corruption have yet to be revealed, many are asking a critical question: why was a powerful prosecutor like Febrie targeted by the police?
Police vs prosecutors in MBG graft scandal
In fact, the police operations against Febrie are just the latest incident in a long-running tit-for-tat battle between the Polri and the Kejagung. This is a conflict that was visible even before Prabowo officially took over national leadership from former president Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo.
According to Tempo magazine investigations, Febrie has long been targeted by the police. Tempo cites a May 2024 incident in which several members of the Polri anti-terror squad, Detachment 88, were caught spying on him, purportedly in an attempt to dig dirt on the top prosecutor.
According to Tempo, Febrie is believed to have had business dealings with Ferry Hongkirawang, a businessman known as a 'makelar kasus' (case fixer or broker) who could help those entangled in criminal cases handled by the Kejagung to avoid prosecution.
Police arrested Hongkirawang in July 2025 on charges of assaulting the police officers assigned to investigate him. He was not then being investigated for his alleged role in fixing criminal cases handled by Febrie, according to the police.
However, the latest escalation was likely triggered by the Kejagung's decision to name a senior police official, Brig. Gen. Lalu Muhammad Iwan Mahardan, a close ally of Police Chief Gen. Sigit Listyo Prabowo, a suspect in the Free Nutritious Meals (MBG) graft case.
The police accused prosecutors of deliberately targeting MBG providers affiliated with the Polri, according to a Tempo report. This created apprehension among police officers in the regions and further fueled animosity between the two law enforcement institutions.
That the Kejagung decided to charge Brig. Gen. Mahardan without notifying the police chief on July 1, which is the police's anniversary or the Bhayangkara Day, only aggravated the conflict between them.
The Kejagung has charged at least six other people in the MBG corruption case, including former National Nutrition Agency (Badan Gizi Nasional, BGN) head Dadan Hindayana, former BGN deputy head Lodewiyk Pusung, and former BGN deputy head Sony Sanjaya. Lodewyk is a retired military general, while Sony is a retired police general.
The conflict between the police and the Kejagung, however, is bigger than the MBG scandal. It long precedes the corruption case and involves major actors in Indonesia's oligarchy.
The broader conflicts behind the Polri-Kejagung showdown
Certainly, President Prabowo has made attempts to prevent conflicts among Indonesia's oligarchic powers through accommodation and coercion.
But despite his authoritarian tendencies, he has proven incapable of preventing even the simmering conflict between his closest allies, Gerindra Party stalwart Sufmi Dasco and Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, let alone crushing once and for all challenges coming from his own oligarchic rivals, mainly those aligning with former president Jokowi.
The case of Febrie reflects not only the institutional rivalry between Polri and the Kejagung. It also exposes the broader conflicts involving major oligarchic factions in the country.
The rise of the Kejagung as a major 'graft buster' under Prabowo was made possible by political support from the Indonesian military (TNI), the main state agency Prabowo has relied on to consolidate power. This means Polri is not waging war against the Kejagung alone; it is also facing its TNI backers.
As mentioned earlier, Febrie and Sjafrie co-led the Satgas PKH, a key coercive tool in Prabowo's centralising economic policy. This reflects not only a personal alliance between them but also structural interdependence between the Kejagung, as a law enforcement institution, and the TNI, which has gained more political and economic power under Prabowo's presidency.
The Kejagung is a natural ally of the influential military generals. This is because the TNI has long had a rivalry with Polri, which, under Soeharto, was a minor branch of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI). Polri become far more powerful politically after reformasi (reformation) made it an independent agency answerable directly to the president.
Under former president Jokowi, a civilian leader with limited influence over the TNI, the police served as his primary state apparatus for intimidating his political rivals, not only among the elite but also the Islamist grassroots. The police are still led by Jokowi's close ally, Gen. Listyo Sigit Prabowo. The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), the other key law enforcement institution, is currently led by a senior police official and ally of Listyo, Setyo Budiyanto.
It was no coincidence that a number of armed TNI personnel guarded Febrie's house when the police first made an attempt to search it in 2024. This led to the police backing down.
Armed TNI personnel were also present at Febrie's house during the latest raid, but this time the police went ahead regardless.
However, soon afterwards dozens of military members, including Brig. Gen. Wahyo Yuniartoto, a director at the military's strategic intelligence agency (BAIS), and Brig. Gen. Anggiat Napitupulu, a deputy commander of the Satgas PKH, reportedly 'visited' the Jakarta Police to 'secure' a witness in the case.
It is safe to say that the raid on Febrie's properties signals a dramatic escalation in the longstanding conflict between TNI and Polri, whose interests overlap with those of Jokowi and Prabowo, respectively.
The case may also reflect ongoing tensions between Defence Minister Sjafrie, who, as mentioned, is close to Febrie, and another close ally of Prabowo, Gerindra politician Sufmi Dasco. This is because Dasco's brother-in-law, Redha Mantovani, now serves as the deputy attorney general for intelligence (Jaksa Agung Muda intelijen, Jamintel). Redha has been tapped as a potential replacement for Febrie.
What does it mean for Indonesia?
The ongoing elite contestation under Prabowo shows that the president is still far from fully consolidating his power.
Polri's move against Febrie, a key official within the Satgas PKH led by Sjafrie, could be interpreted as a direct challenge to Prabowo's attempts to rearrange the patronage system that has long sustained the oligarchic system that reformed after Soeharto's fall and, in particular, the system Prabowo inherited from Jokowi
This political-economic rearrangement is most visible and consequential in the extractive sector, such as nickel and coal mining and palm oil plantations, which heavily rely on political and legal protection from law enforcement institutions and the military.
Indonesia's big capitalists, including those of ethnic Chinese backgrounds (known as the nine dragons), have become increasingly uncomfortable with Prabowo's state-led economy. And as long as law enforcement institutions remain co-opted- or at least influenced – by these vested interests, Indonesia's judicial sphere will continue to serve as an arena of struggle among the oligarchic elite. In other words, under Prabowo, Indonesia is in for an extended period of political and economic instability.
This is by no means to suggest that the oligarchic elite will constrain Prabowo's authoritarian and centralising tendencies, thus preventing Indonesia from descending into a full-blown autocracy. If anything, the case of Febrie is a clear demonstration of the structural processes by which the oligarchic elite negotiate – or fight – between themselves for political and economic power in the absence of a strong rule of law.
Whatever the outcome, the oligarchic elite will still be the ones calling the shots.