Ary Hermawan and Usman Hamid – The horrific acid attack on Andrie Yunus, the deputy coordinator of the Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (KontraS), is another grim reminder of how far Indonesia has drifted from the ideals of reformasi (the post-Soeharto reformation movement)
Andrie is not the first Indonesian human rights defender to face such violent intimidation. Even in the heyday of reformasi, Indonesian human rights defenders continued to face various forms of harassment and intimidation for speaking truth to power.
But the attack on the 27-year-old activist marks an alarming shift.
It is clearly horrific and shocking for its brazenness. He was attacked just before midnight in the heart of Jakarta, with at least 16 CCTV cameras capturing the apparently 'well-organised' attack.
That the public can now see the incident in its entirety, including the painful cry Andrie made after acid was hurled at him that burned his face, arms, and body, seems to suggest that the location of the attack was carefully chosen to create a wider, chilling effect.
While it is too early to say that state actors were behind it, it is critical to highlight that the incident may signal a resurgence of New Order-style fascism.
The spectre of New Order fascism
Soeharto's New Order featured elements of fascism as defined by Hugh Purcell. According to him, fascism is a social and political order characterised by extreme nationalism, racism, aggressive patriotism, and a pledge of loyalty to one state (ein reich), one nation (ein volk) and one leader (ein fuehrer).
The New Order was more than just a political entity; it was also, as Robison and Hadiz define it, a social order. It was created on the notion that Indonesia is an organic (or 'integralist') state, grounded in the ideology of Pancasila (the five principles) and the communalism of gotong-royong (mutual self-help).
Under the New Order, the opposition was suppressed – any form of confrontational activism was seen as a threat to the organic state that must be crushed or co-opted under state-corporatism.
The latest political developments in Indonesia indicate that a Soeharto-esque fascism is reemerging.
Since his 2024 inauguration, Prabowo has sought to consolidate his power by expanding state control over the country's political and economic life. He does this primarily by accelerating the military's expansion into civilian affairs. More and more active serving military members are taking up positions at state-owned enterprises, now controlled by the newly-established superholding company, Danantara (which answers directly to the president).
The military also plays a significant role in implementing the free nutritious meal (makan bergizi gratis, MBG) program, Prabowo's main populist initiative, and one that is prone to rent-seeking practices.
The latest, yet important, step in Prabowo's power play has been to whip up fears about 'foreign lackeys' controlling non-governmental organisations (NGOs) challenging his policies. Just a few hours after the attack on Andrie, Prabowo called out on his critics for their 'unpatriotic' attitude, and claimed he had intelligence reports on them and would 'put them in order'.
A week before, Ahmad Sufmi Dasco, a House of Representatives (DPR) deputy speaker and a prominent figure within Prabowo's inner circle, called on civil society forces to rally behind Prabowo in the name of 'national unity'. Such rhetoric bears a striking resemblance to fascist ideologies that seek to integrate civil society into a singular, unifying narrative, often at the expense of dissenting voices and eroding democratic pluralism.
With the absence of an organised, mass-based progressive movement, NGO activists have long been the main pro-democratic forces in post-reformasi Indonesia. By labelling them disorderly and unpatriotic, the former military general is making a case to the public that the activists – and their democratic ideals – are not only against him, but also against the nation and the state.
This approach helps explain why there has been little pushback from the population against the mass arrests of many activists who took part in the anti-government protests last August. in effect, the state has created an ideological buffer that enables it to round up its critics.
In this context, the terror attack against Andrie is particularly chilling.
A state-sponsored terror attack?
Given the circumstances of the attack, it is safe to assume that it was no random incident and was likely orchestrated by members of the ruling elite to silence Andrie's activism.
Andrie is known for challenging remilitarisation under Prabowo. He was among the activists who stormed a closed-door meeting of lawmakers to discuss revisions to the Indonesian Military Law. He was also among those who testified in support of the cancellation of the new military law at the Constitutional Court.
In fact, prior to the attack, Andrie had reportedly received threats that are believed to have been related to his activism against the rising influence of the Indonesian military. It is also worth noting that the acid attack took place shortly after he was interviewed at the Indonesian Legal Aid Institute (YLBHI) for a podcast on the dangers of remilitarisation.
It is unclear if Andrie was working on a particular campaign that would threaten the interests of certain people in the military. This makes his case even more unsettling. In post-Reformasi Indonesia, intimidation of activists has often been carried out by individual oligarchic actors who feel directly threatened by their activism.
For example, two former KontraS coordinators, Haris Azhar and Fatia Maulidiyanti, were prosecuted for allegedly defaming mining oligarch Luhur Binsar Pandjaitan. An earlier acid attack on Novel Baswedan was also believed to be linked to his position as a leading investigator in a high-profile corruption case implicating certain police generals.
It is also often the case that intimidation of civil society actors occurs when conflicts among the elite intensify. NGO activism could be used by one elite player against another, leading the latter to take measures to silence them – judicial and non-judicial.
But while intra-elite conflicts may have set the conditions for the attack against him, we cannot rule out the possibility that Andrie was targeted because he was threatening not one military oligarch but the entire institutional interests of the military.
Given the military's vital role in Prabowo's organicist state, it may not be far-fetched to assume that Andrie might be a victim of extrajudicial violence by a government that is increasingly showing disturbing features of the New Order's fascism.
The struggle for Indonesia's democracy has just become a whole lot more dangerous.