Rizky Ihsan – The unilateral attack by the United States and Israel on Iran that risks a costly regional war in the Middle East has raised scrutiny over Jakarta's move to join US President Donald Trump's Board of Peace (BoP), which critics saw as aligning too closely with Washington.
Yet, although domestic anger over the US-Israeli aggression was high, Jakarta's response was defined by reluctance to make a decisive break by either condemning the attack or quitting the BoP – a caution that I argue is shaped by competing pressures at home and abroad.
In its statement, the Foreign Ministry, for example, only expressed "deep regret" over the military escalation in the oil-rich region and called on all parties to "exercise restraint and prioritise dialogue" to resolve disputes. President Prabowo Subianto immediately offered to mediate the conflict, saying that he was willing to travel to Tehran to help de-escalate the crisis. The government then announced the suspension of its participation in the BoP.
While these responses were intentional signals of concern to the public, each was clearly calibrated to avoid open confrontation with Washington. This reflects Jakarta's main balancing act: addressing domestic expectations without tipping into external fallout.
Fragmented public response
Prabowo's guarded approach to the Middle East crisis has drawn criticism from lawmakers, Muslim organisations, and opposition figures who expected a stronger response. These critical voices, however, have yet to translate into clear and cohesive demands.
Some lawmakers in Commission I of the House of Representatives (DPR), which oversees foreign policy, called on Jakarta to withdraw from the BoP and adopt a tougher stance against the US.
The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), the only opposition party in the parliament, criticised Prabowo's delayed response to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's death, arguing that Indonesia had failed to extend even "basic diplomatic courtesy" to a close partner.
Muslim-based organisations have voiced their concerns, too, though not with the same policy prescription. The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) strongly condemns Israeli and American attacks, stating they are inhumane and contradict the spirit of the 1945 Constitution.
Muhammadiyah, likewise, urged the United Nations to impose sanctions on the US and Israel for launching military attacks on Iran. It also encouraged the government to abandon the BoP. Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), however, took a different position. While also criticising the US-Israeli attack, NU calls on Indonesia to use its place in the BoP to push for de-escalation and help end the war.
Street protesters were also demanding different things, from the withdrawal from the BoP to the cancellation of the recently signed US trade agreement, showing that anti-US mobilisation was indeed fragmented.
Domestic pressure on Prabowo to take a clearer, stronger stance on the Middle East crisis is clearly mounting. However, it has not translated into a single, clear demand, which helps explain the partial shift in Jakarta's strategic approach in the Middle East.
To date, the government has managed the backlash first by absorbing it, then by making tactical modifications, including suspending BoP talks and intensifying contacts with Islamic leaders
It is clear that public anger alone is not enough to drive a decisive shift in foreign policy. Prabowo would act only when domestic pressure threatens political stability by undermining the unity of his coalition or his political legitimacy. So far, fragmented demands have enabled the government to maintain a cautious, minimally disruptive approach.
Prabowo's calibrated response
More specifically, the Prabowo administration implemented two strategies to contain the pressure. First, it aims to show sufficient action to demonstrate that it is not indifferent to public concerns, but stops short of making policy changes.
On March 4, Foreign Minister Sugiono reached out to the Iranian ambassador to Indonesia, Mohammad Boroujerdi, to send Prabowo's letter expressing his condolences on Khamenei's passing. It was the first official condolence message from the Indonesian government since the leader's death on 28 February. While some considered this delayed response ironic, it may also reflect Jakarta's reluctance to turn the crisis into a confrontation with Washington.
President Prabowo also offered his services as a mediator. The Foreign Ministry even stated that the President is willing to fly to Tehran to facilitate talks between the US and Iran. Although appreciated by the Iranian representatives in Indonesia, the suggestion was swiftly dismissed, as Tehran insisted that "negotiation is no longer at the table."
These policies show that Jakarta adopted a high-visibility approach for its domestic audience while limiting exposure for its international audience, especially Washington.
Second, the issue can still be managed through elite consultation and political management. In this context, the government stated that Indonesia's participation in the BoP is currently "on hold" due to the military escalation in the Middle East.
The government also stated that the decision was made to monitor the dynamics and safeguard the safety of Indonesian citizens in the region. Sugiono said Jakarta will consult with its Gulf partners prior to making any formal decisions.
Prabowo also intensified outreach to Islamic leaders. On 5 March, Prabowo hosted an Iftar gathering with leaders of Islamic organisations at the Merdeka Palace, Jakarta. Among the attendees were three top Islamic leaders from the PBNU, Muhammadiyah, and MUI.
No sign Jakarta will quit the BoP
At the Iftar gathering, Prabowo repeated his promise that Indonesia would leave the BoP if it no longer served Palestinian or Indonesian interests. Like the decision to suspend its participation in the BoP after the Iran war broke out, the rhetoric is clearly intended to help Jakarta keep the matter from becoming a major domestic liability.
It is unlikely that Jakarta will quit the BoP anytime soon. The Prabowo government will likely continue its strategy of containing the political costs of joining the grouping through tactical adjustments and domestic outreach, while avoiding the higher costs of open confrontation abroad.
Jakarta may have contained the backlash for now, but doing so through tactical delay risks giving the impression that Indonesia is more willing to manage public outrage than to speak with clarity.
The question is, if domestic political costs increase, will that strategy still work? Soaring fuel and commodity prices driven by the war's disruption of global oil supplies might soon make the administration's delicate balancing act unsustainable.