Burhanuddin Muhtadi – The honeymoon is clearly over for Indonesia's president as he begins his second year in office, even if a majority of the public still supports him.
When Prabowo Subianto assumed Indonesia's presidency in October 2024, public expectations were exceptionally high. Once a controversial figure in the country's political landscape, he entered power with a promise of "continuity with change" to maintain stability while delivering bold economic reforms. His first year in power, however, coincided with shifting global conditions: a recovering post-pandemic economy, rising food and energy prices, and heightened geopolitical uncertainty in Southeast Asia.
Domestically, the Prabowo administration inherited a mix of optimism and scepticism. Many Indonesians viewed him as a strong leader capable of ensuring order and decisive governance. Yet others questioned whether his leadership style would deepen the centralisation of power or sideline democratic institutions. After his first year in office, the central question occupying political elites and the public has become: how strong is Prabowo's public support, what drives it, and where are its limits?
The most recent Indikator Politik survey registered an approval rating of 77.7 per cent for President Prabowo, marking a significant recovery from the public discontent that followed the widespread social unrest in late August. Many analysts had predicted a sustained decline in his performance ratings due to the demonstrations' intensity. Yet the late October data reveal a dramatic reversal. Rather than eroding public trust, the turbulence appears to have been followed by a consolidation of opinion in favour of the president, driven by a combination of perceived political stabilisation and the government's targeted social assistance policies.
Survey results show that by late October, most Indonesians believed national conditions had become more stable. Immediately following the late August 2025 disturbances, 40 per cent of respondents had rated the national economy as 'bad' or 'very bad', whereas in the more recent polls, only 26 per cent did so. A similar improvement is evident in political assessments: in the aftermath of the August demonstrations, nearly half of the respondents viewed the political situation negatively, but this has since declined to 25 per cent. Perceptions of security have also strengthened: in early September, just 44 per cent considered security conditions as 'good' or 'very good', which by October increased to 56 per cent.
This restoration of perceived control aligns closely with retrospective approval theory, which posits that citizens evaluate leaders primarily on their perceived competence in managing crises and maintaining order. Prabowo's long-standing public image as a strong, decisive leader likely magnified this effect. Public discourse in many political contexts tends to reward leaders who are seen as capable of 'restoring order', even when the underlying structural challenges remain unresolved. This dynamic echoes research on authoritarian responsiveness in competitive democracies, where perceptions of (a leader's) decisiveness can temporarily override concerns about procedural norms or institutional integrity. In the name of restoring order in Indonesia, many activists were arrested, yet the public showed virtually no resistance.
This stabilisation was further reinforced by the government's extensive distribution of food assistance and direct cash transfers (Bantuan Langsung Tunai) nationwide. In response to the unrest, President Prabowo introduced a food aid initiative consisting of 20 kilogrammes of rice and 4 litres of cooking oil, allocated per household for two consecutive months (October and November 2025) for lowland communities. The government also expanded its Direct Cash Assistance programme, providing 300,000 rupiah (US$17.91) per month to more than 35 million beneficiary households from October through December 2025.
The latest Indikator survey revealed a high level of public awareness of these policies. Approximately 50.5 per cent of respondents were familiar with the food assistance programme, with 93 per cent expressing support for it, while 63 per cent were aware of the cash assistance programme and 92 per cent approved of it. The rapid public uptake of information about these programmes suggests not only broad dissemination but also effective coordination between those in policy implementation and the government's political communications apparatus.
Nevertheless, a fundamental challenge persists for the president and his government. Rates of underemployment continue to rise, pushing growing numbers of workers into informal employment as the country's once-expanding middle class contracts. Many individuals who had previously ascended into the middle class have fallen back into economic vulnerability or even poverty. With their purchasing power weakening, even modest increases in inflation are felt acutely by most Indonesians. Furthermore, the latest populist assistance programmes are scheduled to end in December 2025 due to fiscal constraints. The government's decision to reduce regional fiscal transfers by as much as 270 trillion rupiah (approximately US$16 billion) and reallocate these funds to central ministries is also expected to have economic repercussions at the regional level, beginning in 2026.
It is important to note that, despite the Prabowo administration's recent success in restoring public confidence, public sentiment has not fully returned to the levels observed during its first 100 days in office. President Prabowo's approval rating has declined by approximately three percentage points compared to January. More striking is the sharp drop in his electability as a presidential candidate from 68.9 per cent in January to 46.7 per cent by late October. Over the same period, support for Prabowo's party Gerindra fell from 36 to 29 per cent. Although Prabowo still maintains a substantial lead over the other potential candidates, his closest competitor is Dedi Mulyadi, the West Java governor, who is clearly emerging as a potential alternative for the 2029 elections.
These patterns suggest that, while public approval for Prabowo's performance has shown signs of recovery, the public demands deeper structural reforms by the government, particularly in the economic domain. Short-term populist measures are unlikely to sustain the president's long-term political support, as these programmes cannot reach the entire population and therefore cannot substitute for more comprehensive and sustainable policy solutions.
[Burhanuddin Muhtadi is a Visiting Senior Fellow in the Indonesia Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, and Senior Lecturer at Islamic State University (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah.]