Usman Hamid – The recent move by Indonesia's Attorney General's Office (AGO) to sign a wiretapping pact with four local major telecommunications operators has put around 350 million cellular users at much greater risk of being watched by the government.
The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed on June 24 between the AGO and PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia, PT Telekomunikasi Selular, PT Indosat and PT Xlsmart Telecom Sejahtera will potentially allow prosecutors to access communications by cellular users without legal safeguards. These companies will now be required to 'install wiretapping devices, share telecommunications data and real-time information' at the request of the AGO for 'law enforcement purposes.'
Due to rising criticism, the AGO has attempted to justify the MoU by promising that prosecutors will use their wiretapping power 'carefully.' However, fear of abuse of power continues as the MoU, drafted with loose and vague stipulations, does not provide sufficient safeguards for the human rights of 352 million customers using the services of the four cellular companies.
Under the gaze of the state, this new policy functions as a mass surveillance dragnet, enabling authorities to indiscriminately monitor nearly anyone in Indonesia.
What is surveillance?
'Surveillance' in this context refers to the monitoring, interception, collection, selection, retention, analysis, sharing or other use of communications data of all sorts.
Under international human rights law and standards, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance), surveillance must be restricted, as it can interfere with a range of human rights, particularly the rights to privacy, freedom of expression, and non-discrimination.
That is why any surveillance regime should include robust safeguards and oversight mechanisms to protect human rights. Safeguards should include requirements for warrants issued by independent authorities for targeted surveillance, and other strict criteria that include limitation periods as well as clear prescriptions for destruction of material.
Surveillance should only be permitted when it is lawful, necessary, proportionate, and subject to oversight. It should only be allowed after a serious crime has taken place, or for the protection of national security or other legitimate aims as laid out in international law and standards, including Article 17 of the ICCPR. Any interference by surveillance must be in the least intrusive form possible to achieve the government's legitimate aim.
Accordingly, human rights, including the rights to privacy and freedom of expression, must be at the core of any surveillance legislation or policy. Mechanisms must be available to prevent abuses and protect human rights. These typically include the right to challenge the legality of surveillance before an independent court, the right to access and rectify unlawfully collected data, and the right to compensation for harm caused by unlawful surveillance.
Violation of privacy and freedom of expression
Unfortunately, the new wiretapping MoU does not specify basic and critical elements of lawful surveillance, such as the need for a court order, the maximum duration of surveillance, the people who can authorise it, the period of surveillance, or what mechanisms exist to prevent abuse.
This is an invitation to prosecutorial overreach and a miscarriage of justice. In a country with a history of authoritarianism and state abuse of power, this is not just a legal technicality – it is a serious threat to human rights of all persons living in Indonesia.
The way the new MoU bypasses legal requirements for wiretapping is worrying. It signals a dangerous shift in the protection of privacy and freedom of expression in the country.
What drove the AGO's appetite for direct access to the communication data of hundreds of millions of people using cellular services in Indonesia remains a mystery. However, recent initiatives by the AGO are worth highlighting for insight in to its position.
The AGO moved to sign this pact just weeks after prosecutors said that they would investigate actors behind two of this year's popular protests: the Dark Indonesia (Indonesia Gelap) movement and protests rejecting revision of the Law on the Military.
The AGO said that prosecutors found evidence of money transfers to fund the dissemination of 'negative content' during these two protests that had discredited the government. Prosecutors controversially made these revelations after arresting a lawyer, Marcella Santoso, whom prosecutors said had financed the dissemination of 'negative content' about a palm oil graft case involving court officials that the AGO was investigating. The AGO also claimed the same lawyer admitted to funding the dissemination of 'negative content' undermining the government during the two popular protests, as well.
The military quickly joined the fray. It said it is working closely with the AGO to map actors spreading 'negative content' about the controversial revision of the military law, laying the blame on NGOs and buzzers (who are paid to flood social media with negative content targeting the AGO).
Without sufficient regulatory safeguards and effective oversight, the wiretapping pact could become a new tool for the AGO and the military to delegitimate and criminalise people supporting legitimate protest movements such as the Indonesia Gelap movement and the Military Law revision protests.
Indiscriminate mass surveillance and self-censorship
The AGO's new wiretapping pact means hundreds of millions of Indonesians are now left in fear of their calls being tapped, private photos inspected, and text messages scrutinised whenever they use their mobile networks.
By empowering the AGO to exchange real-time data with telecom providers and install its own surveillance equipment, the MoU paves the way for mass surveillance – where everyone is watched and no one is safe. Indiscriminate mass surveillance can never be considered proportionate interference with the rights to privacy and freedom of expression.
These fears are far from groundless. In addition to its role as a law enforcement body, the AGO has another function; it is also a state intelligence service, supplying information to the government under Law 17 of 2011 on State Intelligence. This dual function makes AGO's wiretapping power prone all the more prone to abuse as it could be used for state surveillance.
If that happens, it could lead to the establishment of the architecture of a surveillance state – one that resembles George Orwell's dystopian 'Big Brother' scenario.
The feeling of being monitored will create an environment of self-censorship for not just activists, journalists and human rights defenders but also ordinary citizens, who now know their communications may be monitored.
History shows that unchecked surveillance powers are more often misused to control societies than to fight crime. Digital surveillance technologies, including spyware, may be used to target and intimidate human rights defenders and journalists, silencing dissent and sanctioning criticism.
Amnesty International has documented such abuses globally – from spyware in Vietnam and Thailand, to censorship in China and Iran, and military surveillance in Latin America. In 2024, Amnesty International revealed that Indonesian authorities, including the police and BSSN, obtained invasive spyware through opaque procurement processes.
This is especially alarming as civic space in Indonesia continues to shrink amid ongoing attacks on freedom of expression, peaceful protest and association, personal security and protection from arbitrary detention.
The need of a surveillance law to protect human rights
The AGO must cancel its wiretapping MoU immediately – it is incompatible with Indonesia's existing legal protections and constitutional rights, as well as international human rights law.
The parameters of any surveillance program must be established by laws accessible to the public, not an MoU. The transparency and accessibility of a law is a bedrock principle of human rights law.
It also contradicts domestic telecommunications law, particularly Article 40 of Law 36 of 1999 on Telecommunications. It guarantees the protection of confidentiality of telecommunications information. Any exception must be strictly regulated and judicially approved.
Moreover, the ICCPR, to which Indonesia is a party, explicitly protects the privacy and confidentiality of correspondence, and, of course, Article 28G(1) of Indonesia's Constitution explicitly guarantees the right to privacy.
What Indonesia urgently needs is a comprehensive surveillance law – a unified legal framework that ensures all wiretapping activities are subject to judicial authorisation, clear procedural safeguards, transparent implementation and robust independent oversight.
A state that monitors its citizens without restraint is no longer protecting its people – It is using its panoptic gaze to assert control over them. Law enforcement must never come at the cost of civil liberties