Gita Putri Damayana – Since the large-scale anti-government protests of August 2025, indications of Indonesia's pivot toward a more autocratic regime have become more apparent. Arrests and (some claim) disappearances have created the impression that activists were responsible for inciting student protestors to ransack government buildings and public facilities throughout the country.
But the evidence indicates that state repression in Indonesia is not uniformly applied but rather selective and strategically targeted. Authorities have concentrated their efforts on grassroots actors, particularly vocational high school (STM) students and activists, while extending relative leniency toward online influencers.
For example, while many STM students and activists have been arrested, the investigation of influencer Ferry Irwandi, initially suspected of criminal activity by the army's cyber security unit, was rapidly de-escalated and then resolved by a mere phone call with the army official involved.
Student agency: the marginalised in solidarity
STM students, long stigmatised as 'unruly,' have historically cultivated solidarity through subcultures. They also represent the second-largest group of unemployed in Indonesia, making them particularly vulnerable to economic pressures. This strengthens their bonds of solidarity and drives them to participate in collective action.
Now social media platforms have amplified their voices. Accounts such as Blok Politik Pelajar (Student Political Bloc) have articulated grievances that range from the repressive content of the new Criminal Code (RKUHP) to police violence, offering students highly effective new spaces for political expression.
But during the August protests, it was STM students and activists, not influencers, who faced heavy-handed state responses. Police detained 276 students in Jakarta and barred another 120 from entering the capital, as well as arresting activists including Muzaffar Salim, Syahdan Husen, and Delpedro Marhaen for 'inciting minors'. Delpedro countered that their advocacy simply focused on safeguarding student rights and ensuring legal assistance for those detained.
The arrest of these activists reflects the government's unease over student mobilisation. By characterising them as 'inciting minors,' it signalled that student activism for social justice is seen a threat to be contained, as Education Minister Abdul Mu'ti seemed to suggest, when he encouraged students to channel their aspirations without leaving school.
This selective enforcement suggests a calculated attempt by political elites to weaken protest movements by undermining their capacity for grassroots mobilistion, while avoiding confrontation with highly visible influencers whose platforms could amplify backlash.
Influencers, CSOs, and the struggle for public attention
The targeting of STM students and their activist supporters is emblematic of the contentious nature of civic space in Indonesia. It is a space of contestation not only between pro- and anti-government actors, but also among social forces critical of the ruling elite. The struggle for visibility between social media influencers and NGO activists illustrates this dynamic.
As protests raged across the country, a group of social media influencers known as '17-8' – including Andovi Lopez, Afutami, Jerome Polin, and Abigail Limuria – released a set of demands. While these demands largely echoed long-standing civil society agendas, their rapid circulation online quickly gave them significant visibility.
The influencers' campaign demonstrated a new form of political engagement, with influencers leveraging digital platforms and large audiences to exert political pressure. This strategy soon attracted political attention, leading DPR legislators not to attack them but rather to adopt three of the 17 demands.
This drew criticism from those who argued that celebrating such limited concessions risked undermining the push for deeper structural reforms. But the role of influencers in advocating for social justice, while not new, deserves recognition despite their vulnerability to co-optation.
By contrast, civil society organisations (CSOs), are in a very different situation to influencers. They are often painted negatively by government officials, increasingly so under Prabowo, further narrowing civic space in the country. This is possible because their multifaceted activities – including advocacy, research, and community engagement – often make it difficult for the broader public to clearly grasp what they do.
Indonesian CSOs, like their counterparts in India and The Philippines, pursue individual organisational mandates and address specific issues such as legal aid, climate change, legal reform, urban poverty, anti-corruption efforts, and indigenous rights. And, since Reformasi (Reformation) began in 1998, they have also engaged, albeit indirectly, in governance processes through collaboration with government agencies at national and regional levels.
Consequently, CSOs' relationship with the state has shifted from being solely oppositional to selectively collaborative. Over time, some government officials have become part of CSO networks, and CSO leaders have occasionally gained access to policymaking arenas (although such involvement remains limited and issue-specific).
This does not imply that CSOs have been fully co-opted by political elites; rather, it points to a more complex and polycentric governance landscape. This consists of multiple, independent decision-making centres that interact in coordinated yet non-hierarchical ways. It is an approach particularly suited to complex issues such as climate change and legal reform.
This marks a departure from the centralised civic order under the New Order, where many CSOs and activists were framed as partners in development, tasked with monitoring government agendas and policy implementation rather than seeking regime change. To be sure, some CSO activities today are confrontational, particularly on sensitive issues such as Papua, but these efforts still aim to hold power accountable rather than to overthrow the government.
Without a single unifying adversary like Soeharto, CSOs today assert their presence through diverse strategies. Gaventa's notion of 'claimed spaces,' where less powerful groups challenge established power holders, suggests the interactions among actors within these spaces become crucial. The 17-8 campaign, for instance, advanced demands long championed by NGOs, but the way influencers claimed this space produced different outcomes.
The political elite's preference for engaging with influencers over activists is not entirely new, but the present situation – where influencers amplify CSO agendas – represents a novel dynamic that may reshape relations among these actors.
The prominence now achieved by influencers risks generating tensions between them and activist CSOs, which have long struggled for visibility and resources. Mainstream media reinforce this imbalance by prioritising influencer campaigns while overlooking the sustained reform efforts of CSOs and their leaders – such as Delpedro.
Influencers, with their millions of followers, require minimal additional promotion, whereas CSOs must actively seek funding and media coverage. This imbalance allows influencers to overshadow organisations dependent on public platforms, which can further fragment the public sphere and exacerbate divisions among social actors.
What can progressive forces do now?
After recent major demonstrations, including #PeringatanDarurat (EmergencyWarning), #IndonesiaGelap (DarkIndonesia) and #ResetIndonesia, the public sphere in Indonesia has become increasingly fragmented.
The outcome of the 17-8 demands revealed a deep division between those suspicious of influencers' potential to be pragmatic and self-serving and those disillusioned with traditional CSOs for their perceived ineffectiveness in driving progressive policy change. This has led to a growing but flawed demand for a return to a unified civil society front to confront the government, like that which emerged under the New Order.
Progressive ideals and demands for social justice do not emerge from a vacuum. Given the fragmented nature of Indonesia's ruling elite, which operates at various levels and on many fronts, it is more productive for activists to try to bridge the gaps between influencers, CSOs, and grassroots vocational students than focusing on a centralised power challenge.
One possible step is to broaden existing CSO coalition meetings currently used to monitor policy implementation or specific bills by inviting influencers or holding dedicated briefings for them, similar to diplomatic or media briefings. Activities such as sharing experiences and ideas in a workshop with participants from various social groups could break down barriers.
Initiatives like these would serve as a test of how aligned influencers are with progressive and social justice goals. Regular – preferably in-person – communication could also help narrow gaps.
Bridging such gaps does not imply complete unity; differences will persist. However, it opens space for meaningful communication beyond the CSOs themselves. By reducing these divisions, civil society can foster a stronger sense of public accountability and become more resilient in facing potential challenges from a regressive regime.
The key challenge for a resilient Indonesian civil society lies not in achieving a static, unified front, but in fostering strategic collaboration among diverse actors – from grassroots vocational students and influencers to CSOs, to create a more dynamic and interconnected network calling for public accountability.