Made Supriatma – Less than two months before stepping down, the outgoing president of Indonesia's plans to hang onto power are at risk of unravelling. What is worse, his previously sky-high popularity is also starting to fray.
The announcement of former Golkar general chairman Airlangga Hartarto's resignation on 10 August was met with what could be described as "unsurprised surprise". Rumours had already been circulating for the past year about a potential takeover of this New Order-era party by President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo's allies. This is largely because Jokowi does not have his own political party, and any outgoing president needs a strong political base to support his post-presidential ambitions and relevance.
Throughout his political career, Jokowi had relied on support from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). However, relations between him and PDI-P soured in the final year of his administration. This tension stems from PDI-P's refusal to support earlier aspirations of Jokowi's allies for him to have a third term or to extend his term, and, perhaps the final straw, his turning to Prabowo Subianto after PDI-P's lack of support for his eldest son Gibran Rakabuming Raka, as a vice-presidential candidate.
Jokowi's decision to support his former arch-rival, Prabowo, in the February 2024 election came with a quid pro quo: Prabowo had to choose Gibran as his running mate. This ticket went on to win a landslide victory. However, this does not guarantee the longevity of Jokowi's influence after he steps down. He cannot rely solely on the mercy of Prabowo and the latter's Advanced Indonesia Coalition (Koalisi Indonesia Maju, KIM) without a firm base.
The takeover of Golkar by Jokowi loyalists is not unprecedented. In early 2021, Jokowi's ally, former general Moeldoko, who also served as his chief of staff, attempted to seize control of the Democrat Party, founded by former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. This attempt, however, ended in total failure. Despite Moeldoko's denial that he acted on Jokowi's orders, observers regarded this move as part of Jokowi's broader strategy to secure political dominance. That Moeldoko faced no repercussions and remained in his influential role as head of the presidential staff suggests at least tacit acceptance of such actions at the highest levels.
In contrast, this year's Golkar takeover unfolded rapidly. Just ten days after Airlangga resigned, Golkar convened a national conference, which was originally scheduled for December 2024. At this expedited conference, Bahlil Lahadalia, Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources and a close Jokowi ally, was unanimously elected as Golkar's general chairman for 2024-2029.
This episode with Golkar and Jokowi loyalists' other efforts to control political parties highlight the critical role these parties play in supporting a politician's power. It exposes the weak institutionalisation of political parties in Indonesia, which makes them vulnerable to manipulation by those in power and significantly undermines the quality of Indonesia's democracy.
The ease with which Bahlil took over Golkar raises questions: Why did the takeover occur without significant turmoil and why did Golkar so readily submit to the wishes of those in power?
What happened in the subsequent week was even more surprising. Even before Golkar had concluded its national conference, the Constitutional Court (MK) issued a controversial ruling in favour of the Gelora Party (a party without representation in the House of Representatives, DPR) regarding the parliamentary threshold for nominating candidates and the minimum age for candidacy in regional elections. Previously, the relevant law required that candidates be nominated by parties or coalitions with either 20 per cent of DPR seats or 25 per cent of the votes in the previous general election. The MK's decision allowed for parties or coalitions without parliamentary seats to nominate regional election candidates, provided that they secured sufficient votes corresponding with the number of registered voters in their constituency. For instance, in a gubernatorial election in a region with 2 million voters, a party or coalition must obtain 10 per cent of the vote to nominate a candidate.
Second, the Court overturned a ruling by the Supreme Court that set the minimum age of 30 years for gubernatorial or vice-gubernatorial candidates based on their age at the time of inauguration, not at the time of registration. Many believe this was intended to facilitate the candidacy of Jokowi's youngest son, Kaesang Pangarep, to be governor in either Jakarta or Central Java.
The next day, the DPR responded swiftly by drafting a new Regional Election Law bill aimed at overturning the Court's rulings. However, this move sparked massive protests from civil society and students. The mass mobilisation caught the Indonesian elite off guard, leading to the cancellation of the plenary meeting scheduled to ratify the Law.
Last week's protests have weakened Jokowi's political position. Just weeks ago, he seemed to be a dominant figure capable of compelling Golkar to submit, but now, his image as Indonesia's most popular president has taken a significant hit. The behaviour of his children has come under scrutiny and his loyalists' blatant attempts to change the law to advance his political dynasty face widespread opposition.
Parties that were once submissive and fearful of Jokowi are now distancing themselves from him. The president, whose support was once highly sought after, has now become a liability. Plans to amend the Regional Election Law have been abandoned and parties are quietly withdrawing their support for Jokowi-backed candidates for the November regional elections. In Jakarta, PDI-P candidates Pramono Anung and Rano Karno claimed support from figures outside their coalition, suggesting possible lukewarm backing from parties supporting Jokowi and Prabowo's chosen candidates. Moreover, the cancellation of the Regional Election Law revision prevents his son, Kaesang Pangarep, from running due to being underage.
Prabowo Subianto and his coalition are also walking a fine line. Although they have not openly abandoned Jokowi, they are acutely aware that his position has been damaged. Jokowi himself seems to recognise this shift. In his speech at the National Democrats' (Nasdem) Party congress, he alluded to being abandoned by the masses.
Jokowi's grip on Golkar is proving to be weaker than initially thought. The new chairman, Bahlil Lahadalia, appears to understand that he must choose between loyalty to Golkar or to Jokowi. Bahlil's statement during his inauguration – a warning against "messing with the king of Java" – could be interpreted as flattery directed at Jokowi, who was present. However, it could also serve as a warning to Golkar that Jokowi could potentially be a source of significant damage to the party.
Dissatisfaction with Bahlil emerged after Golkar's national conference: several members have filed a lawsuit claiming that the conference was procedurally invalid and demanding that Bahlil's position as general chairman be revoked.
In these rapidly unfolding developments, we are witnessing a significant decline in Jokowi's popularity and influence. The opposite is true for Prabowo. The recent demonstrations have provided him with a convenient opportunity to distance himself from Jokowi. Some reports already suggest that the two men's relationship is beginning to fracture, although both of them downplayed the suggestion. Consequently, the power and influence Jokowi anticipated wielding post-presidency now seem increasingly elusive, unless something shifts in his favour.
[Made Supriatma is a Visiting Fellow in the Indonesia Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Made's research focus is on Indonesian politics, civil-military relations, and ethnic/identity politics and he is also a freelance journalist.]
Source: https://fulcrum.sg/golkars-takeover-and-the-waning-of-joko-widodos-power