Trefor Moss – Southeast Asia's sleeping giant has begun to make some surprisingly wakeful noises. After decades of underinvestment and international isolation, the Indonesian Armed Forces, known as the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), are set for a capability overhaul that could reset the strategic balance of the Asia-Pacific region – at least if the ambitious pronouncements of Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro are anything to go by.
Having painstakingly assembled its first squadron of 10 modern Sukhoi fighter aircraft over the course of the last decade, the TNI's under-strength air force now aims to put together another nine Sukhoi squadrons in remarkably short order, Purnomo announced in late September – that's 180 planes in total by around 2024. This would be in addition to the 50 next-generation fighters which Jakarta agreed in July to develop jointly with South Korea, and which could also be in service by the early 2020s.
Plans to buy two new submarines, probably from Russia or South Korea, are more in keeping with Jakarta's traditionally modest levels of aspiration. More striking, however, was Purnomo's insistence that the procurement program would be used to secure an indigenous submarine-building capability, enabling Indonesian shipbuilder PT Pal to build additional boats domestically. A pledge from Purnomo to invest in a range of airborne and naval assets to improve maritime surveillance further promises to redress a long-standing imbalance in Indonesia's defense apparatus, and bring the neglected navy and air force into line with the army, whose political influence has always enabled it to monopolize scarce defense dollars.
The question is whether Purnomo's grand plans will founder on the same financial and political rocks that have sunk TNI modernization drives in the past. The minister himself remains under intense scrutiny; as government appointments go, Purnomo's was a strange one. His predecessor, Juwono Sudarsono, was widely regarded as a capable technocrat with solid defense credentials, while Purnomo, appointed in 2009, brought with him a blotted copybook from the energy ministry and nothing in the way of defense pedigree.
However, it would be a mistake to dismiss Purnomo's ideas as the overreaching of a novice. In late October, Indonesian lawmakers showed a desire to fund the minister's plans by agreeing to increase the country's 2011 defense budget to US$6.3 billion (over $1 billion more than previously contemplated), potentially taking spending beyond the 1% of gross domestic product (GDP) threshold for the first time in many years. Strong economic growth of around 7% annually could now enable President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to realize his stated aim of increasing the defense budget to 1.5% of GDP by 2014.
Nonetheless, these boosts in funding may still trail Purnomo's big-ticket procurement aims. "The ambition is there and the need is real," says Dewi Fortuna Anwar, a former assistant minister of foreign affairs and now with the Indonesian Institute of Sciences. "Defense has been neglected for so long and Indonesia needs to rebuild. But Purnomo is really talking about aspirations – there is a huge gap between desired needs and what Indonesia can realistically achieve. At the level of real procurement, the government will still be aiming only for the minimum."
Talk of acquiring 180 Sukhois might indeed be fanciful, yet Anwar defends the Sukhoi program from criticisms that the money spent on the one squadron assembled thus far could have been put to better use. "The Sukhois are more than just a prestige project," she insists. "Of course, one squadron is not enough – but there's been no money for any more than that. Right now it has an important training function." Anwar agrees that a sharper focus is needed on basic naval procurement: she applauds the defense ministry's ongoing attempts to procure new frigates for the navy, but reckons that 300 new ships are needed to give the island nation the navy it requires.
Even with rising budgets, Jakarta will almost certainly improve its defense capabilities more gradually than Purnomo's blue-sky thinking might suggest. For countries like Australia and Malaysia, which would be wary of a militarily more capable Indonesia, this is an important consideration. "There's a perception in Indonesia that the country's military weakness has been taken advantage of by neighboring countries," says Anwar, "but there's no clamor for us to have more planes than Malaysia, or anything like that. Indonesia is a developing country. We are not ambitious militarily, and will not sacrifice any development projects for defense."
Just as important as updating the TNI's aging inventory is the boost that an increased defense budget could give to Indonesia's military reform process. Off-budget funding has always been a serious barrier to TNI professionalization, and adequate central funding should finally enable the government to force the military to divest its business interests – if there is the political will to do so.
In this respect, the Yudhoyono presidency has a mixed record: while the TNI has been removed from front-line politics, it retains some important privileges, chiefly its territorial command structure, which enhances the army's ability to operate locally without too much oversight from Jakarta. However, new allegations of army abuses in Papua could force the government into a further wave of military reform, according to Anwar. "Papua certainly puts pressure on the government," she says. "There must be an end to the military's impunity."
To a change-averse military, the bitter pill of reform would certainly be sweetened by a clear government commitment to a properly funded modernization program. As such, Purnomo's ambitious plans – even if they are over-ambitious – should be welcomed. As Western militaries contend with sinking morale in the face of budget cuts and program cancellations, the Indonesian military finds itself in the happy position of dealing with a ministry of defense imbued with a new culture of aspiration backed up, for the first time, by budgetary resources.
If Purnomo now satisfies the TNI by delivering on at least half of his procurement promises, he could buy invaluable space for the government to pursue further military reforms - reforms which, as events in Papua suggest, need to be driven through.
[Trefor Moss is a freelance journalist who covers Asian politics, in particular defense, security and economic issues. He is a former Asia-Pacific Editor of Jane's Defense Weekly.]