Beni Sukadis – More than 10 years have passed since Indonesia first sought to restructure the relationship among the Indonesian Armed Forces, or TNI, the Ministry of Defense and the central government. Systemic change, however, has been slow to take root. Instead, the transition period has been highlighted by an ongoing tug-of-war between newly empowered democratic forces and entrenched military mind-sets bent on maintaining the status quo.
The root of the problem is the military's continued autonomy and ability to stay outside the ministry's jurisdiction; this has occurred despite new legislation aimed at bringing the TNI under ministerial command. While the defense minister has the authority and influence to shape policy, design budgets and procure goods and services, the minister exerts no authority over the military. The TNI commander still reports directly to the president, and that has created the perception of a dual leadership within the defense establishment. A 2004 law was supposed to give a clear division of labor between the defense institutions but until today implementation and further clarification of some ambiguous articles has not been forthcoming.
One clear constraint in bringing the military under the ministry's authority – something that would reshape perceptions about the military's role in society – is a 2002 law stipulating that both positions will answer directly to the president and assist with defense matters. That has caused the military to be viewed publicly as a policy maker instead of a policy implementer. Adding to the perception is the inclusion of the TNI commander at all cabinet meetings regardless of the subject matter. Also, nominees for TNI commander must come before the House commission on defense for a "fit-and-proper" test, implying the position is a political post.
The competing roles between the TNI commander and the defense minister negatively impact the management of the defense establishment. However, while the ministry would like to see the TNI's powers curbed, it at times contradicts itself, sending a mixed message to the public over whether its reform efforts are genuine. For example, it almost always defends former military officers accused of past human rights violations.
To the specific functions of each post, both Law No. 2/2002 and Law No. 34/2004 confirm that the roles of the Ministry of Defense and the TNI are in fact different. The ministry is the said policy maker and the TNI the implementer of that policy at the operational level, although in practice the TNI regularly usurps the ministry's authority.
A glaring example of this was the procurement of Sukhoi jet fighters from Russia in 2003. The TNI spearheaded the effort, and it is well known that the ministry was sidelined during the process. Moreover, its team of representatives was not even included on then-President Megawati's delegation to Russia. A memorandum of understanding with Russia was actually signed by the TNI commander at the time, Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, and his chief logistics officer, Widjanarko Puspoyo.
That is a clear violation of the article on the procurement of defense equipment in the 2004 law, which states that it is the responsibility of the ministry to procure such items. Other examples of the TNI bypassing authority were the establishment of "raiders battalions" in Regional Military Command Posts, known as Kodam, and the re-establishment of a new Kodam in Aceh Province. Both occurred without consulting the ministry or receiving its consent.
Those three issues also can be viewed in relation to Article 4 from the 2004 law, which states that "in regard to defense policy, defense strategy and administration support, the TNI will be under the coordination of the Ministry of Defense." Nevertheless, the article does not clarify what it means by "under the coordination." Without adequate explanation and a detailed legal framework to make the TNI accountable at an administrative and operational level, it is almost certain the TNI will remain beyond the ministry's control.
A 2002 UNDP report clearly delineates international norms on both civilian authority and military authority, explaining that the ultimate authority on key security matters must rest with elected representatives. For real change to occur within the defense establishment, a well-articulated hierarchy of authority between the two camps and the obligations of each must be spelled out with total transparency and respect for human rights.
Internationally accepted standards for how this relationship should be tailored must serve as the backbone of Indonesia's own restructuring to ensure the TNI becomes subordinate to the country's political authority. In the past, particularly when Gen. Endriartono was TNI commander, the military resisted such overtures. But now the time is right to push ahead with a systematic and thorough restructuring under the leadership of the current TNI commander, Gen. Djoko Santoso.
Reform should be viewed as a balancing of the two institutions aimed at fostering a sound military-civilian relationship in Indonesia. By placing the TNI under the ministry, this could become a reality. Given the fact that President Yudhoyono will be in office for at least another eight months, the plan could still go ahead this year with the House of Representatives overseeing restructuring at the TNI headquarters. Additionally, the House and other third parties could ensure a transparent implementation of the policy. Finally, the coordination and cooperation among the ministry, the House and civil society in general is imperative in order to uphold the democratic control of the military.
[Beni Sukadis is a program coordinator at the Indonesian Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, or Lesperssi, in Jakarta.]