Irman G. Lanti – The fourth round of peace talks between the separatist Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (also known as GAM or the Free Aceh Movement) and the Indonesian government ended last week in Helsinki. The talks, initiated and mediated by the Crisis Management Initiative led by former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, are set to resume on July 12.

The fact that there have been so many rounds of talks, with even more ahead, indicates that peace in Aceh is indeed a difficult goal. Nevertheless, a number of things have changed recently that allow us to be more optimistic about the Helsinki talks.

First is Dr Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's presidency. Even though Dr Yudhoyono is a former army general, his record shows he is no hawk. In fact, when he was the chief security minister in the Megawati administration, he worked with Mr Jusuf Kalla – now his vice-president – to initiate peace talks between factions in the sectarian conflicts in Ambon and Poso.

Second, the tsunami disaster that hit Aceh last December amplified the misery of the Acehnese. This has sensitised the parties, especially GAM, to the need to quickly find a permanent solution to the Aceh question.

The fact that the Helsinki talks were different from the previous rounds was evident almost from the outset. GAM was relatively quick to accept the condition set by Jakarta for the talks: Aceh independence is not an option and therefore would be excluded from negotiations.

In exchange for renouncing independence, GAM made several requests – for a general amnesty for all combatants, for the use of Acehnese symbols of identity (flag, anthem), for GAM to transform itself into a local political party and for its members to run in local elections. All these were in addition to the wide-ranging autonomy that the Indonesian government had already agreed to prior to the start of the Helsinki talks.

Indeed, both sides can claim victory. The Indonesian government has successfully fended off secessionist impulses from GAM. For its part, GAM gets an independent community in all but name. But these are early days yet, of course. Despite all the positive signs, things can still go wrong.

How? First, the fruit of the peace talks may not be easily accepted by Indonesia's political elite. Still reeling from the 'loss' of the former East Timor, resistance towards any form of international involvement in resolving Indonesia's internal conflict is great.

As news of the Helsinki meeting became public, opposition against it surfaced. Some Members of Parliament insisted that the peace talks be cancelled and demanded that the government make no more concessions to GAM.

The government has tried its best to explain to the public the merits of negotiations, but members of Dr Yudhoyono's Cabinet are not united here.

Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono, for instance, revealed recently that his ministry and that of foreign affairs were not involved in the negotiations, and that the Helsinki talks were mainly the initiative of Vice-President Kalla.

Mr Juwono also said the negotiations were informal. He pointed out that even though the Helsinki team included Justice and Human Rights Minister Hamid Awaluddin and Coordinating Minister for Defence, Law and Security Widodo Adisutjipto, they were picked by Mr Kalla and not by the Cabinet.

Next, parliament may not be easily convinced to approve final results from the negotiations. Certainly, the government can claim that the matter falls under executive discretion. But this will raise trouble in executive-parliamentary relations.

Hardliners in the military form another opposition bloc. The Indonesian military sees itself as the vanguard of the unitary state. Hence, it is opposed to any compromise with separatist groups.

For hardliners, even the idea of talking to separatists on an equal footing is heresy. Many in the rank-and-file still view the 'loss' of former East Timor as an act of betrayal by politicians. It is not difficult to imagine they will vigorously oppose any settlement that gives GAM much leverage.

To be sure, the potential road block does not only come from the Indonesian side. It is unclear how much control the GAM leadership, based in Sweden, has over its commanders in Aceh. In times of conflict, this division may not matter much; it is the judgment of local commanders that counts the most.

But if and when the conflict does end, an unambiguous line of communication between combatants and the political leadership is imperative. It is uncertain, however, whether a clear line of communication from the leadership to its men on the ground can be established to explain what is at stake in ending hostilities.

So while progress in the Helsinki talks is heartening, we need to leaven this with a dose of realism. Hope for peace; just do not think it will come easily.

[The writer is programme director at The Indonesian Institute in Jakarta.]