Increasing pressure from military hardliners to push President Megawati Sukarnoputri to give extra power to the military-backed intelligence service following the J.W. Marriott Hotel bombing has prompted former President Abdurrahman Wahid to come out against the return of military power.
Most analysts believe that Wahid was deposed in 2001 not because of Megawati or parliament, but because of opposition from the military top brass.
His rejection of revisions of the antiterrorism law has benefited Megawati and pro-democracy supporters within the ruling circle against the push by the hardliners.
On 16 August, Wahid, also known as the former chairman of the largest Muslim organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), expressed his opposition to the government's plans to revise the anti-terrorism law.
Following the cabinet meeting on 14 August, Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono told reporters that the antiterrorism law needed revision because it hampered security agencies from anticipating terrorist attacks.
There was growing suspicion that the revision of the antiterrorism law would pave the way for giving greater power to the military on the pretext of curbing terrorism. The move to adopt a National Security Law modelled on the Internal Security Acts (ISA) of Malaysia and Singapore was first launched by Defense Minister Matori Abdul Djalil.
When Matori suggested the adoption of an ISA-type National Security Law for the first time just days after the Marriott bombing, the ruling circle was divided into two camps. Vice President Hamzah Haz and Justice Minister Yusril Ihza Mahendra rejected the move. Yudhoyono and Armed Forces Commander Endriartono Sutarto fully supported such a law.
Separately, chief of National Intelligence Agency (BIN) Hendropriyono said BIN had known that the terrorist attacks were planned but the agency was powerless to act as existing laws did not allow it to take preventive measures.
As a player skilled in dealing with the schemes of generals ever since the Suharto era, Wahid is sensitive enough to realise the danger of imposing an ISA-type National Security Law.
And the successful capture of Asia's most wanted terrorist suspect, Hambali, in Thailand and the US's spiriting him out of sight, rang alarm bells warning that US activities can extend to bullying and the use of arbitrary and extralegal means.
Despite the denial of Indonesia's Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda that the capture of Hambali bore no similarities to the capture of Kuwaiti Omar al Faruk in June 2002, Hambali's removal from Thailand without due process showed the use to which the ISA-type executive decrees issued on 5 August by Thai authorities could be put.
Through these decrees, the Thai government has been given sweeping new powers to bypass parliament and the courts in the name of fighting terrorism.
In Indonesia, splits have emerged within the parliament as well. Retired Maj. Gen. R.K. Sembiring of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) said on Tuesday (19/8/03) that giving extra power to intelligence officers would greatly benefit the anti-terrorism drive. Nadhier Muhammad from the United Development Party (PPP) warned that the law should not give more power to the security authorities, in order to prevent the revival of authoritarian government.
Poor coordination between the Police and BIN dates back to the Bali Bombing last year. Even worse, they were caught in unhealthy covert competition.
Government sources told Laksamana.Net that after the Bali bombing, Police Commander Gen. Dai Bachtiar and Hendropriyono blamed each other for the debacle.
As events developed, Megawati gave full support and authority to the police as the leading actor in discovering and uprooting the mastermind and the field operatives of the terrorist attack in Bali.
BIN, still largely under the influence of high-ranking military officers from the days of Suharto and B.J. Habibie, is still seen as as the only possible vehicle for the military to regain greater power in handling internal security.
If coordination between the police and BIN was running well, BIN, with its sources and networks, could have played a significant role in helping the police.
But in reality, the covert competition between the two services reflects the military's dissatisfaction over the bitter reality that they are by and large marginalized and excluded from control over the government agencies outside the formal military institutions.
The military see that the imposition of a National Security Law in the name of fighting terrorism would provide the momentum for a greater role for the military.
Its supporters point to the political reality in which the US will fight terrorism anywhere in the world, a policy which demands greater emphasis on military power and strategic partnerships from its allies rather than democratic credentials.
This situation after 9/11 terrorist attacks on Washington and New York was used not only by relatively democratic Indonesia but also by authoritarian regimes in Asia such as Malaysia and Singapore to justify their repressive measures.
In both Singapore and Malaysia, anyone who opposes the regime can be conveniently labelled as a terrorist and imprisoned without trial.
A wide range of Asian states have introduced anti-terrorism laws in the wake of 9/11. Nepal adopted the Nepal Terrorist and Destructive Crime Control and Punishment Act. Thailand imposed the People's Protection and Internal Security Act.
India has adopted the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance since 2001. Hong Kong introduced the Anti-Subversion Law. Japan adopted the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Bill. Malaysia continued to use the Internal Security Act, enacted in 1960, while Singapore relies on its 1963 ISA.
Pakistan, a bastion for hardline Muslim groups, imposed the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, Antiterrorist Act and Security Act of Pakistan.
In the People Republic of China, 9/11 saw a dilution of US criticism of the draconian Law on the Preservation of State Secrets of 1988 and the State Security Law of 1993.
Indonesia, somewhat ironically, in declining to rush into an ISA-style law, is increasingly looking the odd man out.