President Megawati Sukarnoputri and her Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) have finally recognized the importance of gaining support from the Islamic parties in the 2004 direct presidential election.

In an official statement presented by PDI-P deputy secretary general Pramono Anung to reporters on Friday (18/7/03), he signaled that the party intends to approach the Islamic parties. The statement also made it clear that PDI-P will also strive to accommodate the aspirations of eastern Indonesia.

Megawati and PDI-P have apparently realized that in the 1999 general election eastern Indonesia, and especially South Sulawesi, became the main power base of Islamic forces linked to Suharto's successor as president, B.J. Habibie.

It was through eastern Indonesia that the old ruling party, Golkar, was able to gain 22.46% of votes, making it the second largest party in the election.

Analysts say that PDI-P's recognition of the need to work with the Islamic parties represents an improvement in the party's strategy.

The PDI-P offer for a coalition with the Islamic parties may cause a splintering in their unity as they jostle for a share in power, the analysts believe.

The strategy recognizes that the Muslim parties are characterized more by a desire for a share in power than by any conception of a shared vision.

In the 1999 poll, rivalry among powerful individuals was a more important factor than the parties those individuals represented. Hence, powerful individuals rather than political parties are the key to winning support.

Prominent figures such as Abdurrahman Wahid of traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Amien Rais of the modernist Muhammaidyah, and leaders of the Crescent Star Party (PBB), appeared on the political scene more as power seekers rather than Islamic ideologues.

It was therefore little surprise that the 1999 election results made it clear that most Indonesian Muslims did not support Islamic parties, even though 85% of the 210 million Indonesians profess adherence to Islam.

In the 1999 election, 20 Islamic parties out of the total of 48 parties that took part in the election managed to secure only 37.1% of the vote. PDI-P and the old ruling party Golkar, both seen as secular nationalist parties, took 33.76% and 22.46% respectively. Of the Islamic parties, only four met the required minimum of votes to take parliamentary seats: the United Development Party (PPP), National Awakening Party (PKB), National Mandate Party (PAN) and the Crescent Star Party (PBB).

The analysts doubt whether the Islamic parties will perform any better in the coming poll.

So why does the majority of Muslims support nationalist and secular parties? Was the 1999 general election a clear signal that the Muslim majority is not attracted by Islamic symbolism, and is more concerned with substance?

Over the past 15 years, "cultural" Islam rather than political Islam has demonstrated more impressive development in Indonesia. Thus the lack of interest in political Islam was not because Muslims regarded politics as unimportant but, on the contrary, represented increasing religious awareness that transcended the appeal of mere symbols.

Muslims increasingly believe that Muslim interests are being championed more by politicians from outside of the Islamic political environment than by Muslim politicians from the Islamic parties.

Worse still, the Islamic forces themselves made a political blunder in 1999. Fearing that Megawati and PDI-P would emerge as the winner in the 1999 poll, the Indonesian Ulemas' Council (MUI) hurriedly reminded its followers that many PDI-P candidates were non-Muslims.

This warning signal was widely publicized, but the election results showed that this was mostly ignored as irrelevant.

Judging by the present state of affairs, all is not well with the Islamic parties and many are embroiled in conflict.

PKB has split into two groups: one under Matori Abdul Djalil and the other under Alwi Shihab. PPP has also split into the Hamzah Haz faction and the Zaennudedin MZ faction, who leads a new splinter group, the Reform United Development Party (PPP Reformasi). PAN, led by Amien Rais, was abandoned by its secretary general, Faisal Basri and his allies, who rejected the overt Muslim direction that Rais wanted to take.

Internal conflicts, struggles for power for personal or group interests, weakness in organization and a lack of influential leadership continues to dog the Islamic parties.

Given the crisis of legitimacy in the Islamic parties, it was natural for reporters to ask Pramono Anung which Islamic parties PDI-P was considering as partners in a strategic alliance. He was reluctant give a specific answer.

Two Islamic organizations deserve special attention: Muhammadiyah and NU. As grass-roots social organizations, both remain strong institutions with real following.

Muhammadiyah and NU each claim tens of millions of members. Although their leaders deny the two organizations will themselves become parties, activists within them are acting like parties in the run up to the election.

In their respective national conferences, NU and Muhammadiyah came to the conclusion that figures such as Wahid and Rais are less important than the strategic role of the two social organizations.

Thus NU and Muhammadiyah did not explicitly nominate Wahid or Rais as presidential candidates.

Since well before the Suharto years, NU and Muhammadiyah have been trapped in rivalry. This rivalry has been partly responsible for the impotence of political Islam in Indonesia to date. In just one recent example, animosity between Wahid and Rais contributed to the downfall of Wahid's presidency in July 2001.

Muhammadiyah, which is closely connected with Amien Rais, is often called "modernist". Broadly, it is urban and middle class. Like suburban Christian fundamentalists, members take their religion straight from the holy book. Thus, the description of Muhammadiyah as modernist Muslim is less correct than to term it puritanical Muslim.

Given their characteristic as urban and middle class Muslims, Muhammadiyah members tend to fear the 'anarchy' of the poor and tend to be conservative in political outlook.

The more rural NU, closely associated with Abdurrahman Wahid, is called 'traditionalist' because it is closer to Javanese mysticism. Curiously, NU today has more progressives in its ranks than does Muhammadiyah.

Through a network of religious schools throughout the country, young NU radicals are encouraging a new theology that puts the poor first. Their role models are several liberal intellectuals from the Islamic Middle East and North Africa.

The differences between NU and Muhammadiyah are deep. They are social, and not merely doctrinal. They pit urban against rural, better-off against worse-off, and perhaps even the outer islands against Java.

The Islamic community has enough shared ground to press its demands vigorously. Among these demands are the following:

- Affirmative action in favor of indigenous Islamic entrepreneurs and against the ethnic Chinese who dominate the economy. Malaysia's New Economic Policy could be the model.

- Redress for human rights abuse against Muslims in the past, especially the Tanjung Priok massacre of 1984.

- More emphasis on Islamic symbols in public life, including disapproval of gambling, abortion, and western consumerism.

The nomination of a Muslim figure as Megawati's running mate who is acceptable to both Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, and support from eastern Indonesia are emerging as prerequisites for a second term in government.

A source from PDI-P circle told Laksamana.Net that the only candidate who meets the criteria is Coordinating Minister for Social Welfare Yusuf Kalla. "If there is no extraordinary situation, I am sure that Megawati will nominate Kalla as the most proper choice as her running mate."