Kirsten E Schulze – As Indonesia's military operation against the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakin Aceh Merdeka, or GAM) is entering its third month, it is becoming increasingly clear that an end to violence is not imminent. However, while casualties among soldiers, insurgents and above all civilians have steadily increased, there has been no significant shift in either Indonesian or international popular opinion. In fact, both have just become further entrenched – at opposite poles.
Indonesian popular opinion swung behind its government early on amid a resurgence of nationalism. If anything, it has become more rather than less nationalistic over the past two months. Meanwhile international popular sympathy has remained largely, although not surprisingly, with the underdog.
GAM's struggle for independence has been cast as a fight for the noble ideal of liberty while Indonesia's efforts to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity have been widely condemned. But does GAM really warrant such romanticization? A closer look at GAM's ideology, its attitude toward the peace process, and its activities during the recent cessation of hostilities may suggest otherwise.
GAM was established in 1976 and has since been struggling for the liberation of Aceh from what it sees as Indonesian neo-colonial occupation. Yet while GAM leaders in exile have attempted to rewrite Acehnese history in pursuit of independence, the driving force on the ground is somewhat different. GAM guerrillas are motivated by parochial ethnic hatred. For them the war is about killing Javanese. As a result GAM forces have not only attacked the Indonesian security forces but have also systemically targeted, killed or forced out Javanese transmigrants.
Ethnic chauvinism is also evident in GAM's construction of Acehnese nationalism. While Indonesian identity is a civic nationalism which is inclusive, multi-religious, multi-ethnic, and multi-tribal, Acehnese nationalism is ethnic and exclusive. It is based upon the imposition of the identity of the Aceh tribe upon the other eight tribes in the region in order to create the Acehnese nation. This nation is defined by blood ties, tribalism, and Islam.
GAM's ethnic parochialism has been underscored by a narrow, hardline ideology that has defined the movement's attitude toward the peace process. GAM has made it very clear that it is neither interested in negotiating with the Indonesian government nor in a compromise solution. It sees the peace process as a way of internationalizing the conflict with the aim of forcing Indonesia to relinquish sovereignty under outside pressure. Thus it is not surprising that it was not interested in Jakarta's concession of special autonomy for Aceh and even actively worked to undermine its implementation by paralyzing the local administration through threat and intimidation.
In line with this attempt to internationalize the conflict, GAM's focus has been on ensuring that the venue for all of its meetings with the Indonesian government has been outside of Indonesia. It hailed the introduction of a foreign facilitator – a Swiss-based non-governmental organization (NGO), the Henry Dunant Center. It embraced the subsequent inclusion of the foreign "wise men", including retired US Marine General Anthony Zinni and former Thai foreign minister Surin Pitsuan, as advisers to the dialogue. It welcomed the entry of foreign monitors – Thai and Filipino soldiers – last December to oversee the cessation of hostilities. It also regularly appealed to the United Nations for intervention East Timor-style.
GAM's strategy of internationalization is also key to understanding why during the peace process since 2000 the movement increased rather than decreased its military capacity. The threat or use of force served the same function as the dialogue, namely to attract international attention. Arguably, the higher the profile of the targets such as ExxonMobil and the higher the civilian death toll, the greater the prospect of foreign intervention. GAM guerrilla tactics of striking from and retreating to residential areas thus served two purposes: to provide the ultimate cover and to ensure that the casualties of Indonesian retaliation were civilian.
As compromise with Indonesia was not the goal, there was no need for a reduction in violence other than tactical ceasefires to recruit, regroup, train and arm. This also held true for the recent cessation of hostilities from December until May during which GAM increased its active membership from 3,000 to 5,517 and its arsenal from 1,600 to 2,134 small arms.
It also used the space created by the so-called peace zones to spread its ideology, including rather imaginative claims that UN intervention and independence were imminent. Above all, however, it used this ceasefire to step up its extortion activities under the guise of an "Aceh state tax". This "tax" was levied on all elements of society, particularly targeting contractors, foreign corporations, and Indonesia's regional and local budget allocations. GAM even attempted to "tax" international humanitarian assistance money.
So does GAM warrant romanticization? As with most other national liberation movements, it would be better to it see for what it really is. It is an organization that has fed off local grievances but has provided no real alternative. Its vision is backward-looking, parochial, and steeped in ethnic hatred. It has maintained control through intimidation and has funded itself through kidnapping, the drug trade and extorting from the very people it claims to represent. And finally, its involvement in the peace process has shown GAM as fundamentally unrealistic.
It has wasted the opportunity provided by the negotiations, the special autonomy and the cessation of hostilities to improve the lives of the Acehnese in hope of an imagined grand salvation at the hands of the UN. This has not only resulted in the squandering of diplomatic goodwill but also demonstrates the extent of GAM's misreading of the international mood since September 11, 2001, which has endorsed the territorial integrity and rights of sovereign states, particularly in the face of Muslim liberation struggles and especially in Southeast Asia.
[Dr Kirsten E Schulze is senior lecturer at the London School of Economics. She has traveled extensively in Aceh and is writing a book on democratization and conflict in Indonesia.]