Ellen Nakashima and Alan Sipress, Jakarta – Indonesia's decision to detain and interrogate Seyam Reda, a German citizen suspected of links to al Qaeda, marks a significant shift for Indonesian security forces, which earlier turned suspects over to the United States for questioning elsewhere, according to diplomatic and security sources.
Reda was arrested after his name was given to US officials by Omar al-Farouq, a suspected al Qaeda operative picked up in June in Indonesia. Reda, a burly man who speaks Arabic and German but little Indonesian, was seized in what police and diplomatic sources have described as a $4,000-a-month South Jakarta home, with a swimming pool and an internal camera system. German police arrived in Jakarta last week to aid in the probe.
Unlike in the cases of al-Farouq and another al Qaeda suspect, Muhammad Saad Iqbal Madni, both of whom were quietly handed over to US authorities and whisked out of Indonesia, police here are taking charge of the Reda matter themselves, including the interrogation. Also, in another indication of a different approach, the police have disclosed these steps as they take them. "It's a sign they're beginning to take ownership," said a Western diplomat based in Jakarta.
In the past week, several Indonesian military officials, including the armed forces chief, Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, have acknowledged that the al Qaeda network has been active in Indonesia. His comments were notable given the prevailing opinion that Indonesia is free of international terrorists.
Taken together, these developments could indicate that the Indonesian government is overcoming ambivalence about the US-led war on terrorism and Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network. At the same time, there continues to be widespread public support here for steering a course independent of the United States, reflecting Indonesian nationalism and the success of activist Islamic politicians in dominating much of the debate in this overwhelmingly Muslim country.
The most pressing issue now is whether Indonesia will move against radical cleric Abubakar Baasyir. US and Southeast Asian intelligence officials say he is the leader of a regional militant network, Jemaah Islamiah, with links to al Qaeda. The Bush administration intends, in a matter of weeks, to place Jemaah Islamiah on its list of foreign terrorist organizations, though the precise timing remains uncertain, diplomats said. Baasyir denies the allegations of links to terrorism.
President Megawati Sukarnoputri, a secular nationalist who will be up for reelection in 2004, is facing "two unpalatable choices," the Western diplomat said. One is "taking a position that will bring down some opposition in the streets and charges of being a flunky" of the United States. The other, the diplomat said, is doing nothing despite the "inexorable march" toward US designation of Jemaah Islamiah as a terrorist group, which will place even greater pressure on her government to arrest Baasyir.
The United States, aware of Megawati's dilemma, has been pursuing a strategy of quiet diplomacy, sharing intelligence with Indonesian officials and hoping to persuade them to act on their own. The Bush administration has refrained from applying open pressure while delaying the designation of Baasyir's group, despite what officials say is compelling evidence of its ties to terrorism.
The stakes got higher on September 9, the day al-Farouq gave interrogators details that led to Reda and pointed to plots to bomb US embassies in Jakarta and other Southeast Asian capitals. The United States quickly closed a dozen embassies and raised the nationwide terrorist threat index. According to a US government document, al-Farouq also told investigators that Baasyir was behind the embassy plot as well as a series of bombings at Indonesian churches and Jakarta's largest mosque in 1999 and 2000.
US officials decided to quietly share the information with Megawati so that she could move against Baasyir without appearing to yield to US pressure. According to officials, Karen B. Brooks, a member of the White House National Security Council staff who is close to Megawati and speaks Indonesian, flew to Jakarta for a two-day visit to speak privately with the Indonesian president.
On September 16, Brooks laid out the details provided by al-Farouq and made the case for action, the officials said. That night, President Bush called Megawati. He wanted to convey to her the seriousness with which the United States took the information. An embassy spokesman declined to discuss Brooks's visit.
But an official familiar with the briefing said Megawati appeared to be coming to "substantially the same conclusions" the United States had reached. "She was remarkably attentive to the details," the official said.
In the following days, Megawati summoned her top ministers at least twice to discuss terrorism. That week, Indonesian police arrested Reda, one of a half-dozen al Qaeda suspects whom officials said al-Farouq had identified. Indonesian authorities said Reda had violated immigration law by claiming to be a journalist while in the country on a tourist visa. Investigators said a search of his home found videos of al-Farouq giving weapons and military instruction to Islamic militants in eastern Indonesia.
The same day that Brooks briefed Megawati, however, the US strategy of approaching Megawati quietly was disrupted. Time magazine disclosed the details of documents from the CIA and Southeast Asian intelligence agencies similar to those that Brooks shared with Megawati. Bush administration officials were dismayed by the public disclosure, especially since many Indonesians assumed the US government had leaked the information to embarrass Indonesia.
In an effort to quiet the furor, US Ambassador Ralph L. "Skip" Boyce held a series of discussions last week with Muslim leaders, including a visit to the headquarters of the country's second-largest Muslim organization, Muhammadiyah.
"The idea that the United States would be trying to destroy the image of Islam in Indonesia, by providing information that comes to us about al Qaeda, sending agents to Indonesia with the express mission of creating problems in Indonesia, that somehow that should be a plot by Washington to destroy the image of Islam? No! Al Qaeda is trying to destroy the image of Islam in Indonesia," Boyce told about a dozen Muslim leaders seated around a conference table, as reporters listened. He added, "Do not condemn the messenger for the message. Just because you cannot see them, it does not mean that they are not there."
Moderate Islamic leaders, though respectful of Boyce's effort, remained skeptical that al Qaeda militants have a toehold in Indonesia. "Provide hard evidence," the deputy chairman of Muhammadiyah, Din Syamsuddin, said in an interview. Meanwhile, Indonesian security officials have been seeking to dispel the notion that they have been laggards in the US-led campaign against terrorism. "It's totally wrong to say that Indonesia is doing nothing against terrorism," said Brig. Gen. Dadang Garnida, who heads the national police unit dealing with transnational crime, in an interview last week.
In a document titled "Endeavors in Combating Terrorism," Indonesian police described their efforts to investigate a string of violent activities linked to Islamic militants. The booklet, written in English, was prepared for presentation to Secretary of State Colin L. Powell during his visit to Jakarta two months ago.
The document includes an organizational chart outlining the structure of Jemaah Islamiah and its purported ties to foreign militant groups. The chart, which Indonesian officials said originated with Singapore and Malaysia, shows Baasyir as the group's leader, although Indonesian authorities continue to insist they have no evidence to arrest him. The chart also links Jemaah Islamiah to members of al Qaeda, including bin Laden.