The UN forces in East Timor at first are likely to be involved more in fighting terrorism than keeping the peace, argues Hugh Smith.

Peacekeeping is a continuation of politics by other means. And in East Timor the politics do not look good. Indonesian agreement to a peacekeeping force is no guarantee that the situation on the ground will be peaceful. Militia elements are liable to continue their violence, perhaps helped directly or indirectly by the Indonesian armed forces.

Not only the peacekeeping force will be under threat, but UN staff, many East Timorese and foreign citizens, especially those belonging to countries taking part in the mission. Some in East Timor will obviously find the peacekeeping operation highly provocative.

The first challenge has been to persuade governments to contribute to a force of sufficient size. The target is about 8,000, of which Australia is likely to contribute 2,000, rising to 4,500.

Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand, Canada and the UK also appear convinced that the operation is worth the costs and the risks. Approval by the UN Security Council and the logistical backing of the US will have influenced their decision. In Australia planning has been under way for some months and the ADF is ready to go. The contingent will be predominantly infantry, with necessary support elements such as transport, communications, logistics, intelligence and medical units. Personnel have had injections, briefings and intensive training. Leave and courses have been cancelled and wills prepared. Equipment has been checked, supplies and munitions replenished, and detailed plans made. Not all countries will be as advanced.

Several tasks face the planners. Getting soldiers and their equipment to East Timor is not easy. Troops can be conveyed by RAAF Hercules and the Navy's catamaran, but transporting light armoured vehicles and armoured personnel carriers by sea will be much slower. Australia has minimal airlift capacity and planners probably wish they had twice as many Hercules or a few C-5 Galaxies. The Blackhawk helicopters can fly across without refuelling.

The first priority will be to secure the means of entry to maintain supplies and personnel. Planes landing at Dili or ships pulling in to the docks could be attacked, so a defensive perimeter has to be established. Then Dili and the larger population centres must be secured, including the UN mission, hospitals, and camps for displaced people. Communications within the force and back to Canberra will also be a priority.

If militia violence continues, infantry patrols – on foot and in vehicles – must seek out the sources and deal with them rapidly and ruthlessly. Armoured personnel carriers, light armoured vehicles and Blackhawk helicopters will be at a premium.

Peacekeepers will need rules of engagement covering when they can open fire with lethal force, how to deal with violent mobs and what riot-control agents can be used. The whole operation begins to look less like peacekeeping and more like the counter-insurgency the British Army has been doing in Northern Ireland for decades. ADF experience in Somalia will be an asset.

The great uncertainty is the level of violence. A force of 8,000 is too small to control a large number of widely separated townships if significant hostilities continue. Poor transport infrastructure and mountainous terrain compound the problems.

Initially, East Timor is likely to be divided between the peacekeeping force and the Indonesian Army, with the former controlling the key centres, leaving the hinterland to Indonesia. There are dangers in this, but there seems to be no alternative, politically or practically.

But what happens if, for example, militia elements base themselves in the Indonesian-controlled areas for attacks on peacekeepers? Do the peacekeepers have to stop at the boundary or will they be entitled to maintain pursuits that could bring them into conflict with Indonesian forces? Apart from the difficult question of where the boundaries are to be drawn, there is also the prospect of a de facto partition of East Timor.

The legal status of the operation also needs careful management. Will Indonesia agree to a status-of-forces agreement authorising peacekeepers to carry arms and use them against Indonesian citizens? And what is to be done with militia members detained by the peacekeepers? Can they be tried and punished? Do they have to be handed over to Indonesian authorities? Who will be responsible for peacekeepers captured by hostile forces?

Another delicate question is what the peacekeepers will do with evidence of war crimes which they will find hard to avoid. Will they record mass graves and photograph buildings where captives have been killed? The force is unlikely to have a mandate to arrest suspected war criminals, but if it does not act the UN will be called impotent.

Humanitarian problems must also be dealt with. Peacekeepers will be expected to bring in initial supplies of food, water, shelter and medical support until non-government international agencies can establish. Police will be needed to bring back law and order. Civil administration has to resume. The entire country will need to be rebuilt, almost from scratch. This cannot be done quickly or cheaply.

The peacekeeping operation will also have to be conducted in co-operation with the governments of the contributing countries, each of which will have its own concerns and a domestic constituency to keep happy. Australia may be the lead nation and provide the force commander, but it will not have total control over other national forces and their resources.

We can hope for a peaceful mission with minimum casualties. But military planners have to prepare for the worst because the lives of peacekeepers, Australians and others, will be at stake. Those in charge will also have to be flexible. No military plans, it is said, survive contact with the enemy. The same is true of peacekeeping.

[Hugh Smith is an associate professor in the school of politics at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra.]